The climate conference in Copenhagen has become a battlefield for the old controversy between Taiwan and China. Almost like a ritual, Taiwan is not invited to the climate conference despite the fact that its economy, technology and political will are fully capable of contributing to the resolution on climate change, and far better equipped than most of the participating countries.
Quite surprisingly however, Taiwan is not eager to participate despite announcements from the government that “meaningful participation in the UNFCCC is a priority for President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration.”
Taiwan has not applied for observer status at the conference, “missing” the deadline on Aug. 7. In addition, the government supported Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was listed under China after a symbolic protest from Taiwan.
The climate conference in Copenhagen is therefore a victory for the “one China” policy. The “one China” policy of Denmark and Europe has put longstanding and massive pressure on Taiwan to make it understand that it is a part of China. Therefore, Taiwan did not receive an invitation to the climate conference. This should come as no surprise because the “one China” policy is supported by the Taiwanese government.
No one has asked Taiwanese people whether they accept the “one China” policy despite the fact that several indicators reveal that the UN climate conference and Taiwan’s government are failing to live up to the expectations of Taiwanese. Last Saturday’s local elections and several polls have revealed a loss of support for Ma and the current government’s China policy. In addition, more than 80 percent of Taiwanese refuse to be a part of China, regardless of the model offered. This should arouse thoughts among policy makers in Europe and in Taiwan.
The Taiwanese have good reason to complain about their exclusion from the climate conference, but the Taiwanese government’s complaint is hollow in light of the missing application for observer status and in light of its own moves toward closer political links with China. The government is clearly moving away from self-determination for Taiwan. Surprisingly to many Europeans, Taiwan’s government supports the “one China” policy just as Denmark and Europe does. Therefore, Taiwan’s government just got what it asked for. This is satisfactory to all parties — except the Taiwanese who want to determine their own future.
Michael Danielsen is the chairman of Taiwan Corner.
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