Mon, Oct 26, 2009 page8

• Don’t put US credibility to the test

  • By James Holmes
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  A Japanese reporter asks an intriguing question. China is fortifying its nuclear deterrent with road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the DF-31As showcased at the Oct. 1 military parade in Tiananmen Square, and with formidable Type 094 ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). This weaponry will guarantee Beijing’s capacity to strike US cities in wartime. In light of that, can Japan count on the US to retaliate against a Chinese nuclear attack on the Japanese archipelago?

  In theory, yes; in reality, it depends.

  Why the bleak prognosis? Because for “extended deterrence” to work, Washington must be ready — and be seen as ready — to defend allies over which it has cast its nuclear umbrella as though it were defending US soil. Those being deterred must be certain that striking a US ally would bring swift and sure nuclear retaliation, raising the costs of such an attack above any possible benefits. In short, strategic deterrence loses credibility if Washington is not prepared to trade Los Angeles for Tokyo.

  This is largely a question of psychology. The material component of US strategy — US nuclear forces — remains robust. But the resolve of statesmen can fluctuate with circumstances. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz helps explain this disquieting reality. Clausewitz sees strategy as a rational process dominated by policymakers.

  “Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object,” he writes, “the value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.”

  The corollary to this logic is that rational leaders start figuring out how to cut their losses and make the most favorable peace deal they can once the costs of an endeavor come to outstrip likely political gains. Survival is the most basic interest of any country. Defense of North America clearly holds the utmost value for any US administration, warranting maximum effort for as long as it takes. But when the homeland comes under threat for the sake of a geographically remote ally, US leaders may waver or hesitate.

  Clausewitz issues a sobering verdict for weaker powers that depend on stronger ones. Nations seldom attach the same value to defending allies that they do to defending themselves.

  The Prussian theorist declares laconically: “One country may support another’s cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own.” It may dispatch a “moderately sized force,” but “if things go wrong the operation is pretty well written off, and one tries to withdraw at the smallest cost.”

  Tallying up costs and benefits can take time. In turn, US hesitation grants an adversary time, and time translates into maneuvering room for a nation like China that boasts an increasingly effective nuclear deterrent.

  The US would almost certainly respond to an unprovoked Chinese strike on the Japanese home islands, but what about gray areas? Certain Chinese actions could remain under the threshold for US nuclear countermeasures. For instance, whether the US would risk devastating counterstrikes during a Sino-Japanese tussle over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai, 釣魚台) islands is an open question. It is also unclear how nuclear weapons would factor in during a war in the Taiwan Strait, assuming Tokyo got involved.

  Ambiguity, then, creates doubt. Nor are such quandaries confined to the US. All nuclear weapon states face them. Last month I took part in a seminar at the UK Defense College that explored how the British government might scale back its SSBN force while maintaining viable deterrence. One option bruited about was negotiating an arrangement by which the British and French navies shared the load. Between them, the two fleets would keep one boat on station at all times.

  This may seem sensible enough. France and Britain are fellow NATO and EU members, separated from each other by only a couple dozen kilometers of sea. Establishing rotating SSBN patrols should be a straightforward affair. But the British participants voiced qualms about trusting Paris to respond to a nuclear strike on London. Even the closest of NATO allies, it seems, harbor doubts about their partners’ reliability under extreme duress.

  Much as I would like to assure my Asian friends that the US will honor its commitments in Asia under all circumstances, such a promise would collide both with history and with strategic logic. US and Japanese leaders must manage their alliance relations wisely, so as to reduce the chances of a miscalculation that overstrains US extended deterrence. Let’s not put US credibility to the test.

  James Holmes is an associate professor at the US Naval War College. The views expressed here are his alone.
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