Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s rise to power marks the beginning of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) era. How will this affect Taiwan-Japan relations?
After President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took power on May 20 last year, the relationship between Taiwan and Japan was soon on the verge of breakdown.
The problem began with concerns in the Japanese media over Ma’s anti-Japan and pro-China attitude, and continued with the sinking of a Taiwanese trawler off the Diaoyutai islets in June, which ignited strong public sentiment in Taiwan, bringing bilateral relations to their lowest point since Taiwan severed formal diplomatic ties with Japan in 1972.
Now, more than a year later, it is Japan’s turn to undergo a transfer of power, planting new variables in the evolving Taiwan-Japan relationship.
The DPJ is still building relations with Taiwan, but it lacks ruling experience. Even so, it is not difficult to identify three basic directions in the party’s Taiwan policy.
CENTER-LEFT
Following years of consolidation, the DPJ has drawn closer to center-left neoliberalism, both ideologically and from a policy perspective.
With the main direction of its foreign policy leaning toward Asia and distancing itself from the US, the party is stressing the deepening of relations with China.
It is to be expected, therefore, that the premise for the DPJ government’s relationship with Taiwan will be not harming relations with China.
On the other hand, experience suggests that the DPJ will not distance itself from Taiwan. The party’s platform specifically mentions the promotion of economic and cultural exchanges between Japan and Taiwan.
In addition, Hatoyama is well known for his pro-Taiwan stance. Both he and Minister of Finance Hirohisa Fujii are members of the Japan-Republic of China (ROC) Diet Members’ Consultative Council, or Nikkakon, and maintain a good relationship with Taiwan. The DPJ has also established the Japan-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Consultation Association Council.
Taiwan clearly enjoys much more exposure as an independent nation in the US — also not a diplomatic ally — than in Japan. The government of Boston, Massachusetts, for example, allows Republic of China flag-raising ceremonies in the city plaza.
PROMISE
This would be impossible in Japan. Since the Liberal Democratic Party era, Japan has sternly abided by its promise to China to act cautiously on Taiwan matters. This has to do with Japan’s history of conflict with China and the fact that Taiwan was administered as a Japanese colony before World War II.
However, because it lacks historical baggage, and because it stresses reform of decision-making organs, the DPJ is likely to develop a substantive practical relationship with Taipei.
Another major characteristic of the transforming Taiwan-Japan relationship lies in change in government personnel on both sides.
The second transfer of power in Taiwan and the DPJ’s rise to power could alter the nature of the two countries’ relationship, which used to be guided by Japan-based, pro-independence Taiwanese and anti-China, right-wing Japanese politicians.
It is worthwhile observing how this change will impact on bilateral relations.
John Lim is a Fulbright scholar at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies at Harvard University.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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