In an advanced democracy, leadership is more about the power to persuade and bargain than to dictate and manipulate.
Recent cases in East Asia have shown that popular leaders are enjoying shorter and shorter honeymoon periods after taking office. The decision by President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) to replace Premier Liu Chao-hsiuan (劉兆玄) with Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) secretary-general Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) over the government’s poor handling of Typhoon Morakot is a good example of this political cycle.
Ma is following in the footsteps of other Asian leaders by making mistakes such as failing to honor a promise to bring the economy back on track. If Ma had not raised voters’ expectations that he could achieve a growth rate of 6 percent, US$30,000 in per capita income and an unemployment rate of 3 percent, they would not feel so frustrated and regretful for voting him into office.
Furthermore, the Ma administration has been preoccupied with China-centric policies while overlooking government efficiency and discipline. The incompetent and inefficient response to the typhoon therefore cost Ma a premier and a Cabinet.
Will replacing the premier and most members of the Cabinet restore Ma’s declining domestic support? Can the new team of Premier Wu and Vice Premier Eric Chu (朱立倫) rebuild public confidence?
The Cabinet reshuffle was the only option for Ma if he wanted to survive the reminder of this term. But if the rationale was to pave the way for two sets of local elections, voters will punish the president for his political miscalculation.
What exactly went wrong with Ma’s leadership? In most cases, it is his attitude. Ma continues to highlight the 58 percent of the vote that he received at the last presidential election and has tried to use this to push through China-leaning policies without legislative oversight or considering criticism by the opposition. The Liu Cabinet’s slow and arrogant response to the typhoon also reflected a serious lack of connectedness with the needs of ordinary people.
Moreover, Ma and his Cabinet failed to use their authority to persuade the public on key issues and avoided consulting the opposition. Even with the KMT government controlling the executive and legislative branches, Ma needs to better utilize reconciliation to bridge social division and establish domestic consensus, particularly on cross-strait policy.
The efficacy of persuasion determines whether Ma should be aggressive or conciliatory in advancing major policies. Should he forge ahead boldly or focus instead on incremental change? Is it time to run up the flag and charge, or to mediate differences and attempt to move to a consensus step by step? Should he listen more to what voters are saying or concentrate exclusively on his agenda?
Ma should rely more on “issue” rather than “image” to build domestic support. Especially with bold initiatives, leaving voters behind is not an act of leadership but of self-indulgence and arrogance. Hence, the inability to strike a balance between foreign, cross-strait and domestic policies demonstrates weakness in the Ma administration.
In contrast to the Liu Cabinet’s academic background and bureaucratic thinking, the appointment of Wu and Chu reflects Ma’s desire to rely more on experienced, campaign-capable politicians. Wu and Chu developed their political skills in the rank and file, local government, the legislature and top posts in the KMT. Both are considered potential successors to Ma. Chu especially could be Ma’s running mate in 2012.
But if the new arrangement is solely aimed at strengthening Ma’s credentials through “pork barrel” politics and “black gold” political skullduggery to capture local elections to be held in a few months, Ma and the Wu Cabinet will be punished.
The public is more politically savvy and dispassionate over government performance and responsiveness than some might think. Ma and his new Cabinet must therefore bend their knees and lower their voices. A leader who indulges his personality, whether angry or conciliatory, at the expense of the public mood is guilty of hubris.
Liu Shih-chung is a visiting fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
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