Since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office last year, 17 members of the US House of Representatives and two governors — but no senators — have visited Taiwan. Yet senators are leading political figures, and considering that several presidents were at one time senators, inviting them to visit and learn about Taiwan has always been a focus of diplomatic efforts.
Ma’s government has done poorly in this regard. One possibility is that the US is suspicious of the government’s pro-China stance, making senators hesitant to visit. Another possibility is that the government is not interested in bolstering ties with the US and has therefore not invited senators to come.
Ma has proposed a “diplomatic truce” to promote cross-strait peace talks and end the diplomatic competition between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s sovereignty is now in a “diplomatic coma.”
For more than a year, the government has distanced itself from friends and treated a China that wants to annex it as a good friend. Its policies can be summed up with the slogan: “Cross-strait relations transcend all else.” Thus the government fails to distinguish between friend and foe. This is key to the nation’s sovereignty crisis.
In addition to the US, the government has distanced itself from Japan despite Tokyo’s friendly policies toward Taiwan and concern for Taiwan’s security.
The government has echoed Beijing by insisting on sovereignty over the Diaoyutai islands. When Japanese Representative to Taiwan Masaki Saito said in May that Taiwan’s status was undetermined, he meant to make clear that Taiwanese sovereignty is not in China’s hands. Yet Ma and Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou (歐鴻鍊) have punished Saito by refusing to meet him since then, thus damaging Taiwan’s traditional friendship with Tokyo.
The government seems to harbor a historical hatred of Japan, but its negative attitude is very different from the public’s.
Ma is nevertheless not afraid of offending Japan or disregarding public opinion because Beijing is behind him.
Ma reserves his warmth for China. When Chinese envoy Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) visited in November, his administration oppressed protesters and banned them from displaying the national flag and playing Taiwanese songs. This, to curry favor with his Chinese guest.
Taiwan also obtained Chinese approval through murky channels to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer under the name “Chinese Taipei.” The arrangement implies Taiwan is subject to China’s control and requires Beijing’s approval for participation in international organizations and activities.
Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu (陳菊) says Beijing was opposed to Ma attending the World Games, yet Ma praised Beijing’s “goodwill” in connection with the event.
Ma does not value Taiwan’s allies. He claims he has put an end to “cash diplomacy,” yet China is continuing the practice.
The Presidential Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have said they do not mind if Taiwan’s allies pursue interaction with China, but that dual recognition would be unacceptable.
The government seems not to mind if its diplomatic allies switch recognition to China and is uninterested in seeking dual recognition.
Ma’s “diplomatic truce” is likely to drive away all of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. As China’s international blockade tightens, Taiwan will eventually become a special administrative region of China.
Ma’s “diplomatic truce” is harmful to Taiwan and its people, yet Ma favors it, because by belittling Taiwanese sovereignty in the international community and catering to the “one China” principle, Ma hopes China will offer rewards as he opens up cross-strait economic links. That would help Ma improve his poor performance.
Ma knows that China’s “united front” strategy includes economic links that are sugarcoated poison. He knows that Taiwan’s fate after taking this medicine will be gradual economic and political paralysis leading to annexation by China without resistance.
The “diplomatic truce” and “eventual unification” are two sides of the same coin. The benefits of cross-strait detente cannot be measured without weighing the risk of ultimate unification.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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