President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was elected chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) yesterday. He actively campaigned for the position even though he was the only candidate. Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄), KMT chairman since 2007, has been abruptly and rudely pushed off the stage.
Reactions to Ma’s decision to double as KMT chairman have been negative. True, his predecessors in the party, presidents Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), also held the KMT chairmanship, but Taiwan is now a full-fledged democracy and for Ma to revert to the authoritarian practice of interlocking party-state leadership seems inappropriate.
Ma, whose list of about-faces and abandoned promises is long, pledged while running for president in 2007 not to serve as KMT chairman if elected.
As he said: “The president should be devoted full-time to government affairs.”
But now Ma says his decision to serve as KMT chairman was prompted by his “sense of responsibility for the nation’s competitiveness and government performance.”
Since taking office in May last year, the Ma administration has been troubled by the lack of party-government cooperation and the “disobedience” of the legislature, where the KMT has a nearly three-quarter majority.
To Ma’s chagrin, the legislature has on several occasions failed to confirm his appointees to two other branches of government, the Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan. Moreover, the legislature blocked half of the 50 bills on a priority list submitted by the Executive Yuan during the legislative session that ended on June 16.
One observer said the KMT caucus was not making a sufficient effort to support the president and the Cabinet and that Wu had failed in his responsibility as KMT chairman to push KMT lawmakers to follow party orders. This is why Ma wants the chairmanship.
Other commentators said the Presidential Office, the Cabinet, KMT headquarters and the KMT caucus were acting like four separate entities, failing to coordinate on legislation.
Many KMT lawmakers are veteran politicians and experts on various policy issues. They have their own concerns and preferences, which is another complication.
To gain full control, Ma intends to subdue or remove potential rivals inside the KMT. One such target is Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平), who ran against Ma for the KMT chairmanship in July 2005 and lost.
Wang continues to wield considerable power and influence as the legislative speaker and can hold Ma in check. Ma’s first goal is to erode Wang’s power base and lead his allies in the legislature to abandon him — dividing and conquering.
Ma has won over Deputy Speaker Tseng Yung-chuan (曾永權), Wang’s key partner, and some media speculate that Tseng will replace Wang as the next legislative speaker.
As party chairman, Ma will be able to nominate candidates for legislative elections and other posts and decide who the next legislative speaker and deputy speaker will be. He will also be able to appoint dozens of legislative members-at-large. In terms of policy-making, the KMT Central Standing Committee will set the legislative agenda. Thus, the room for independent political thinking and action by KMT lawmakers will likely be curtailed drastically.
In a meeting with Wu on May 24, Ma said the KMT-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) platform should not set the agenda for cross-strait relations.
“Today, political parties can no longer dictate government policies,” Ma said.
Ma made the remarks on the eve of Wu’s trip to China to attend a KMT-CCP forum and was reminding Wu who is in charge.
Ma is aware of Beijing’s united front strategy, which skillfully manipulates political forces inside the KMT and Taiwan.
In April 2005, Chinese President and CCP Secretary-General Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) invited Lien Chan (連戰), chairman of the KMT and its unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2000 and 2004, to visit China and establish a KMT-CCP forum to promote China’s policies toward Taiwan.
This platform has allowed Lien and Wu many opportunities to meet Hu to collaborate on cross-strait rapprochement.
Even since Ma took office as president, Beijing’s gambit of using Lien and Wu to advance its agenda has continued. Evidently Ma does not appreciate Beijing’s efforts to play Lien and Wu against him.
Although Ma seeks better relations with China, he wants personally to set the agenda and control the tempo of cross-strait development.
As KMT chairman, he will set the agenda and maneuver to meet Hu — his disclaimer notwithstanding.
One of his priorities is to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China by the end of this year.
Ma attaches utmost importance to the agreement, mistakenly believing that China can and will provide a badly needed boost to Taiwan’s struggling economy.
Inasmuch as Hu’s term as CCP secretary-general ends at the 18th Party Congress in October 2012, he will strive to promote cross-strait detente, reconciliation and a peace agreement with Taiwan on the basis of “one China,” paving the way for eventual unification, before he steps down.
If Hu were able to accomplish what is one of his government’s key national goals and which Chinese leaders Mao Zedong (毛澤東), Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) and Jiang Zemin (江澤民) were unable to accomplish, he would make his mark on history.
However, Hu will need Ma’s active and close cooperation. Ma’s doubling as KMT chairman will facilitate their collaboration through the KMT-CCP forum and other platforms.
Ma, too, has to run for re-election in March 2012 to keep control of the presidency. To be re-elected, China’s assistance through an ECFA and other measures to revive economic growth would be indispensable — or so Ma would think.
His design for re-election, however, is peace and detente with China — his pipe dream is to campaign and to win, together with Hu, the Nobel Peace Prize in November 2012.
Ma’s game plan is to work with Hu on concrete measures to strengthen peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, including an arms control and reduction agreement, removal of some of China’s missiles targeted at Taiwan, establishing a military confidence-building mechanism and signing a peace accord on the basis of “one China.”
There will be strong political opposition in Taiwan, including massive street protests and rallies, and calls for a referendum on the so-called “peace agreement,” because much of the public will see the plan as selling out to China.
On the other hand, Ma may believe that a Nobel Peace Prize would disarm and weaken the opposition, thus emboldening him to go all out for his quest.
But Taiwan’s democracy is dynamic and difficult to predict. No one can rule out the possibility that voters will come to see Ma as Taiwan’s Quisling and vote him out of office in the 2012 presidential election.
Parris Chang is professor emeritus of political science at Pennsylvania State University and former deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council. This is an abridged version of “KMT Change of Guard: Ma’s Power Play in Taiwanese Politics,” published by the Jamestown Foundation.
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