Most academics and people polled in recent surveys do not support the idea of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) doubling as Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) party chairman. Most academics, on the other hand, advocate reforms to Taiwan’s constitutional democratic system and the establishment of a system similar to those of Western countries.
Such ideas, however, ignore Ma’s real thoughts and his attitude toward democracy. So far, I have not heard any convincing arguments supporting Ma taking over as party chairman. All we have seen is infighting and power struggles within the KMT.
Ma’s low-key profile on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre and democracy and human rights in China, as well as his comments about how Demos Chiang (蔣友柏), the great-grandson of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), does not understand democracy despite having studied overseas, are good indicators of Ma’s ideas on democracy.
Nicholas Kristof, a columnist for the New York Times, had the following to say about Ma in a piece on the Tiananmen Square Massacre: “In Taiwan in 1986, an ambitious young official named Ma Ying-jeou used to tell me that robust Western-style democracy might not be fully suited for the people of Taiwan.”
Even as president, Ma has said to Taiwan’s Aborigines: “I regard you as humans.”
Ma has also shown a lack of respect for opposition parties by talking to the media rather than engaging in dialogue. For example, he has not adopted democratic procedures to inform the public on the signing of an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China. He has even said that people cannot say there is no consensus just because the opposition party disagrees. Such rhetoric is reminiscent of comments made by former Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀).
But Taiwan is not Singapore. These examples highlight the contradiction between Ma’s democratic understanding and his squeaky-clean image.
One of the reasons Ma wants to double as party chairman is the legislature’s “disobedience,” which on several occasions has sent him begging for support on legal bills and election promises as well as personnel appointments to the Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan.
In addition, the Cabinet, which enjoys Ma’s full support, has often been kept in check by the legislature because of its own vested interests. But we have yet to see Ma handle these matters using democratic means. Instead, he feels that from a government perspective, the party should cooperate and help him smoothly achieve his political goals, while forgetting that this could belittle the legislature and turn it into a rubber-stamp office.
Is it OK to bypass legally required procedures to make things easier for the Cabinet? Regardless of whether we look at this issue from a three-branch or a five-branch government, moves aimed at restoring the party-state are detrimental to the consolidation of democracy and riddled with problems.
Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) has also been a factor in the calls for Ma to take over the party chair from Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄).
In addition to clearly stating that the forum between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would continue, Hu has showed a willingness to negotiate important agreements, including a peace agreement.
While not discussing the appropriateness of party-to-party talks, the KMT-CCP platform still requires chairman status to facilitate meetings.
In particular, since Hu’s term ends in October 2012, he naturally hopes Ma will become party chairman sooner rather than later to allow the necessary time to go through the laborious process of setting up a meeting. Such a meeting would affect Hu’s place in history and that is also why American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt told reporters that cross-strait relations were at an all-time high after a meeting with Ma as he transited in the US.
During his year in office, Ma has been troubled by lack of government-party synchronization, with even the KMT-CCP forum coming up against resistance at times.
Ma learned from former president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) that authoritarianism is not necessary and that power and influence can be obtained by controlling the party-government and the legislative party caucus.
In addition, the party chairman holds the right to nominate candidates for elections at all levels, and he can even decide who becomes legislative speaker and legislator-at-large.
That means Ma begins with his hold on power and then continues with system reform. However, being both president and party chairman is a double-edged sword.
It will facilitate policy implementation, but also means there may not be room to maneuver, especially when it comes to handling elections, disagreements and political infighting between faction leaders.
Ma’s clean image is easy to talk about but difficult to use, and it actually interferes with the operation of the system of checks and balance between the Cabinet and legislature. Only time will tell if Ma can carry out constitutional reform.
The process to determine whether Ma will double as party chairman has been rather coarse and the issue of the “government leading the party” can potentially lead to conflict over government and party appointments.
Lu I-ming is the former publisher and president of the Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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