North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are proving a major headache for China. Pyongyang recently tested a second atomic device with a much higher yield than the one in 2006.
To make matters worse, Pyongyang is perfecting its missile technology with a series of tests.
Although Pyongyang has gone its own way previously in pursuing its nuclear ambitions, at least it has not been dismissive of China’s concerns.
Indeed, by participating in the Six-Nation Talks in Beijing, it showed some consideration toward China. By the same token, it expected Beijing to play a sympathetic role.
But just when it seemed North Korea might scale back its nuclear ambitions, shutting down its Yongbyon reactor in 2007, things started to go wrong.
North Korea has restarted its nuclear program with greater vigor. And it has abandoned the Six-Nation Talks in Beijing.
It has walked away from the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War. And it has threatened to hit back at those contemplating any hostile action, especially South Korea.
North Korea’s brinkmanship is all the more dangerous now that China seems to be losing control over its communist neighbor.
If anything, North Korea is beginning to distrust China.
Why is this the case? Because, in Pyongyang’s eyes, China has failed to deliver.
North Korea wanted a sequential deal from the talks and believed that the 2007 agreement was a step in that direction.
What this meant was that Pyongyang’s nuclear disarmament would be a step-by-step process, punctuated by rewards from the US and other countries in terms of energy supplies, diplomatic normalization, aid, trade concessions and so forth. And China was supposed to ensure that implementation of any agreement met Pyongyang’s expectations.
In Pyongyang’s view, however, things did not move in that direction. It felt that the US simply wanted North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Only then, and after full verification, Pyongyang might be entitled to the benefits of the nuclear deal.
Pyongyang came to lean on China for a favorable resolution of negotiations. Instead, it now watches Beijing joining the US and other states in castigating it for its nuclear and missile testing.
Pyongyang thus had no option but to ratchet up tensions by restarting its nuclear program to gain the attention of the world, especially the US government.
The US’ response has been pointed. Washington is not only worried about Pyongyang’s emerging nuclear capability, but also that it remains a conduit for nuclear materials and technology to other hostile states.
In this nuclear roulette, Pyongyang is playing the highest stakes. But there is method in the madness.
Considering North Korea’s overwhelming dependence on China for energy supplies, food and trade, Beijing shouldn’t have much difficulty in reading the riot act to ensure compliance. But it is wary of taking this option as it has little leverage in North Korea’s internal politics.
Short of bringing down the Kim dynasty — and probably the entire country with it — by tightening the economic and political screws, China’s options may well be limited to just this: reading the riot act.
But it is also unlikely to be party to any cataclysmic change that it cannot channel or control. And even without a military conflagration, abrupt destabilization would likely trigger a flood of refugees across the border into China.
Beijing is therefore unlikely to bring down the regime or support international action — through the UN Security Council or otherwise — that might push North Korea into a final mode of desperation.
Even though South Korea is a US ally, its domestic politics frequently carry anti-American overtones that revolve around the politics of unification. Internal divisions and China’s economic weight make China an equally important factor in South Korean strategy.
But North Korea’s reckless and dangerous nuclear politics is making China look increasingly impotent, with the added effect of pushing South Korea further into the US’ fold.
No wonder China is hopping mad over Pyongyang’s nuclear tantrums: It is finding itself increasingly unable to lobby North Korea for fear of creating an even bigger disaster.
Gone are the days when a nuclear neighbor with a highly volatile government might offer diplomatic opportunities. China now fears that Pyongyang’s headlong embrace of nuclear weapons is going to push Japan into acquiring nuclear weapons to balance the threat, potentially disrupting China’s political and strategic architecture for the region.
There is method in North Korea’s madness, but it is dangerous method, indeed: Knowing that Beijing might huff and puff but won’t blow North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s house in.
Therefore, if the US is looking to China for an effective resolution to North Korea’s provocations, it will be disappointed. The most China can do is reconvene another session of the Six-Nation Talks.
But in the present mode of North Korean belligerence, even that seems improbable.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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