The democratic backlash
It is becoming abundantly clear that Taiwan’s best — and perhaps only effective — defense against aggression by China is a strong democracy.
It will serve as the ultimate poison pill that would in the long run curb Beijing’s hunger in occupying Taiwan.
That’s why Washington’s attempt to put a ceiling on Taiwan’s democracy runs counter to the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which was created precisely to promote the security of Taiwan and the welfare of its people.
When the TRA was enacted 30 years ago, neither side of the Taiwan Strait had any substantive experience of democracy. Washington saw a military invasion or blockade by China against Taiwan as the only threats. Washington therefore sought to maintain a military balance in the Taiwan Strait as a means to defend Taiwan.
With China’s military growing at an alarming rate, that parity is now lost at a time when Washington remains stuck in an outdated interpretation of Taiwanese independence as an offensive weapon.
Such an interpretation, combined with its “one China” policy, has turned into folly as Washington praises President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) unabashed subjugation of Taiwan to China while half-heartedly lamenting its inability to join the Taipei-Beijing tango.
This was manifested by Washington’s reluctance to protest against Ma’s ostensible backsliding on democracy.
Significantly, Ma’s 12-month shenanigan might inadvertently have convinced an increasing number of Taiwanese that independence is a dream that Taiwanese have no choice but to pursue.
Whether or when that quest will come to fruition might not matter, because without that dream, Taiwan’s chance of survival is inexistent.
A few years ago, Taiwan’s democracy was paralyzed by Washington’s straitjacket.
Specifically, there was no hope of a constitution that would define Taiwan’s democracy and lay down a blueprint through which Taiwanese can create a new country of their own.
That made Taiwan a fertile ground for Ma and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), the quintessential antithesis of democracy, to preach their gospel of “dollar dearer than freedom” and seize near-absolute power.
Ma and company lost no time in laying the groundwork to undermine the pillars of Taiwanese democracy — outwardly its sovereignty and inwardly the judiciary.
Ma’s anniversary report card then counts among his biggest “achievements” the latest World Health Assembly fiasco and the continuing “preventive incarceration” of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
Despite the incessant attacks by Ma and the KMT (or perhaps as their result), Taiwanese thirst for democracy appears to have grown.
The opposition’s political rallies are increasingly taking on an air of urgency.
As Ma’s penchant for using bald-faced lies in various tongues to provide a cover for the subversion of Taiwan’s democracy shows no sign of abating, there is the possibility that Taiwanese could become angry enough to bounce back with such ferocity as to shatter the glass ceiling that Washington has erected above Taiwan.
At the minimum, prospects of a Taiwanese rebound could serve to deter Ma from going too far. To be specific, Ma, drunk with power at the moment, could be reminded that in a democracy, he and his accomplices will eventually have to answer to the people.
HUANG JEI-HSUAN
Los Angeles, California
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