Last Monday, Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) met President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) at the president’s office and tendered his resignation. Ma rejected it, urging Chiang to continue in his position.
Chiang is to be admired for his conscientious work. After 40 years in public service, he is still not resting on his laurels. Over the past year as SEF secretary-general, he has achieved an impressive nine accords and one declaration of common understanding with his Chinese counterpart, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林).
The SEF’s role has, however, been partly undermined, as the framework for developing cross-strait relations has been laid out in talks between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Much of the wording of cross-strait agreements is agreed upon at preparatory consultations between representatives of the two parties, reducing the SEF’s role to something of a rubber stamp.
Chiang is well versed in economic and trade affairs, but have his views on such issues been taken up? It is unclear whether Chiang has an opportunity to offer his opinions at all.
The SEF was established as a private legal entity in 1991 against a certain historical backdrop. It was mandated by the Mainland Affairs Council to handle matters related to cross-strait negotiations and dialogue, verification of documents, visits to relatives by the public, business trips and tourism; to arbitrate in disputes arising from such activities; and to handle other affairs that would otherwise call for official intervention.
The SEF is what interpretation No. 269 of the Council of Grand Justices calls “a legally established legal person delegated by a government agency to exercise government power with respect to certain specifically designated matters.”
Within Taiwan, the SEF is expected to seek public consensus on cross-strait policies. Taiwan is a democracy with provision for oversight of government policy by elected bodies and for checks and balances between governing and opposition parties. In the course of cross-strait talks, the government should seek public consensus on its direction. Unlike China, Taiwan is not a one-party state.
Cross-strait affairs cover a myriad issues, including global and regional politics, economics, trade, defense, and cultural and civil exchanges.
Over the past year, the two sides have made at least temporary progress in normalizing cross-strait relations. They have set aside political differences and taken a more pragmatic approach. The speed with which the two sides have moved in a cordial atmosphere toward agreement on practical matters is worth celebrating.
Non-political issues such as transport links, investment, financial cooperation and so on have been resolved gradually at three rounds of talks led by Chiang and Chen over the past year.
But as time goes by, thorny and sensitive issues concerning the status of Taiwan and China and participation in international organizations and activities are likely to come to the fore.
It is therefore important that the government and the public work together with regard to cross-strait talks. The government needs to work with all parties, be they pan-blue or pan-green, and prioritize national security. More resources and personnel will need to be mobilized to deal with the more sensitive and important issues that will crop up at future talks.
It is worth asking, therefore, whether the SEF and ARATS can continue to handle cross-strait negotiations on their own.
During its eight years in power, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government drew useful ideas from both ruling and opposition parties, establishing a “Macau model” for cross-strait negotiations.
Chang Wu-ueh (張五岳), director of Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of China Studies, described the SEF as having a political mandate but the status of a civic group. Its officials are in charge of negotiations but the agreements are put into effect by government bodies, Chang said. In this way, talks are carried out by high-ranking civilian officials from both sides.
In WHO Secretary-General Margaret Chan’s (陳馮富珍) recent invitation to Department of Health Minister Yeh Ching-chuan (葉金川) to attend the World Health Assembly as an observer, Chan addressed Yeh as “Minister, Department of Health.”
Will it eventually be possible to progress beyond using civic groups to conduct cross-strait talks in favor of a more official negotiating structure? Has the SEF fulfilled its transitional role and should it bow out? This is something for all political parties to consider.
The Statute Governing the Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例) invests executive departments with considerable powers. Fifty-six subsidiary laws are categorized under “law, politics and society,” “finance, economics, science and technology” and “education and culture,” such as the Regulations Governing Approval for People from the Mainland Area to Engage in Commercial Activities in Taiwan (大陸地區人民來臺從事商務活動�?鴘k) and the Regulations Governing Approval for Mainland Area Professionals to Engage in Professional Activities in Taiwan (大陸地區專業人士來臺從事專業活動�?鴘k).
Although these laws may have inadequate provision for legislative supervision, they are at least sufficient to address non-political issues. While gradually setting up a more official structure for cross-strait talks, the government should enact and amend laws to allow for greater legislative scrutiny. By engaging in sincere dialogue with the opposition, the government can build a consensus on cross-strait policy.
Hong Chi-chang was chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation from 2007 to last year.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
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