Three agreements and a joint statement were signed at the third round of talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) in Nanjing, China, on April 26. But the government expressed disappointment over discrepancies between its expectations and the results of the talks. This raises the question of why Taiwan is always at a disadvantage and forced to make concessions at cross-strait talks. To protect Taiwan’s interests, the government’s most urgent task is to review its China policies, not to continue deceiving the public by saying that compromises are necessary.
More importantly, until it has righted the many mistakes it has made, the government is not qualified to convene a fourth round of SEF-ARATS talks.
A quick look at the negotiations and the agreements signed last week and at the previous two rounds of talks easily turns up reasons for the government’s constant setbacks. The fact is that it has failed miserably in everything from setting negotiation goals and its behavior at the negotiation table to managing ethical risks and securing bargaining chips.
Negotiation is a means to achieve a goal, not a goal in itself. Since taking office, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has not disclosed the government’s goals for cross-strait talks and has tried to avoid legislative and public oversight of cross-strait agreements in every way.
Because the government’s goals for the talks are unclear and because the government lacks back-up plans, the public is left with the impression that the government negotiates for the sake of negotiating, allowing the enemy to dominate the talks.
If the goals of the talks are, as the government claims, improving cross-strait relations and connecting with the world, then China has clearly rejected these goals by reiterating its “economics before politics” position. Beijing has never put the “one China” principle or the “1992 consensus” on the agenda, but views them as a precondition for talks. The government wants, but doesn’t know how, to address this problem.
At the negotiation table, the focus should be to place issues that concern us on the agenda. The more successful we are, the more likely that a consensus will be reached. If our points for negotiation are not included or if more of China’s points are placed on the agenda, the game is lost before talks even begin.
The “fifth freedom of the air,” which allows domestic airlines to carry passengers from China to a third country, has not been put on the agenda for talks on cross-strait transportation. If this issue — a core interest for Taiwan — is not even discussed, how can the government expect anything but failure?
A key to determining the success of talks with China is whether the agreements are in Taiwan’s best interests. Although the two sides agreed to increase the number of cross-strait passenger flights to 270 a week, the Mainland Affairs Council estimated that at least 500 flights per week are needed to meet demand. China has furthermore capped the number of Taiwanese flights to popular Chinese destinations including Shanghai and six airports added in the latest round of talks. Only four Taiwanese airlines can fly to Shanghai. Strict limitations on the business opportunities that these golden routes represent goes against the interests of Taiwanese airlines, but the government is at a loss for what to do.
The financial cooperation agreement allows Chinese and Taiwanese financial institutions to establish offices on each side of the Taiwan Strait. In doing so, Taiwanese banks will be able to upgrade their representative offices in China to branches where China-based Taiwanese businesspeople can take out loans. But if larger Chinese banks are allowed to come to Taiwan and access credit information on Taiwanese businesspeople, they will become more competitive than Taiwanese banks and could take them over. Given the gap between Taiwan and China in terms of supervision, transparency and management of financial institutions, how would the government prevent a crisis? The government signed the agreement without thinking this through.
The question of whether Taiwan has enough bargaining leverage to reach deals on an equal footing involves a key concept of negotiation — does the government have alternative options? A professional negotiator always has two plans to weaken the other party’s negotiating power and strengthen his own bargaining position.
To this end, Taiwan should strengthen its national defense and reduce economic reliance on China, yet the government is moving in the opposite direction. It sees China as the only solution to the economic downturn. What bargaining chips does the government have? Taiwanese sovereignty was compromised when ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) encouraged Chinese to visit Taiwan to buy Taiwanese products.
One crucial question is whether the nation’s negotiators and those deciding its China policies have any conflicts of interests that could lead them to sacrifice national interests in favor of pursuing their own. This would have a bearing on Taiwan’s bargaining power, yet we have seen that the government is not against working with individuals who have no qualms about conflicting interests nor has the government investigated the background of its delegation members. This is highly irresponsible.
This delegation does not consist of expert negotiators. The government has repeatedly said that these agreements are beneficial to Taiwanese, yet it has not prioritized the nation’s future and the public interest in negotiations.
On top of this, Taiwanese industries are being undermined. In such a weak position, the government should not schedule another round of talks as it is fighting a losing battle. The public must call on the government to scrap plans for further cross-strait talks.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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