ON JAN. 20, China released its defense white paper for 2008, the sixth such policy report from the rising military power. Its previous five defense papers, released every even year since 1998, have given an overview of the country’s military buildup — ranging from its security situation and defense policy to the development of the People’s Liberation Army, military spending, international collaboration and arms control.
If one reads between the lines, last month’s 105-page white paper shed some light on subtle changes in the security function of interaction among the US, China and Taiwan, which deserves consideration by those who are concerned about Taiwan.
Beijing used to urge Washington to pressure Taipei and treat it as a troublemaker, but the defense paper shows that China seems to be shifting in a new direction, attempting to push out US influence to domesticate the Taiwan issue.
Beijing seems determined to win a tug-of-war between Sino-US and Taiwan-US relations. Although it may never openly admit it, one of Beijing’s ulterior motives is to gradually weaken US influence on the Taiwan issue through China’s rising economic, diplomatic and military clout.
On the one hand, China’s white paper denounced US arms sales to Taiwan, which it said had seriously hurt Sino-US relations and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
The paper also said: “Since 1996, a particular country [the US] has provided data on its arms sales to Taiwan to the [UN] Register [of Conventional Arms], which contradicts the spirit of the relevant Resolutions of the UN General Assembly as well as the objectives and principles of the Register. China was impelled to suspend its submission of data to the Register. Since the country concerned has stopped the above-mentioned act, China has resumed, since 2007, submitting data annually to the Register.”
On the other hand, referring to the cross-strait thaw, the paper said Taiwan’s attempts to seek “de jure independence” had been thwarted and the situation across the Taiwan Strait had taken a positive turn. The two sides have made progress in consultations on the common political basis of the “1992 consensus,” it said.
The paper not only played down China’s military buildup opposite Taiwan, but also declared “China will never engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it becomes,” although it still treated Taiwanese independence as a potential threat.
These messages aim to create the impression that China’s rise is peaceful, that the two sides of the Strait have resolved their sovereignty dispute and that US arms sales to Taiwan not only violate international law but also constitute interference in China’s domestic affairs and an attempt at sabotaging cross-strait peace.
The white paper also said “China wants to develop cooperative military relations with other countries in various forms of military exchanges and cooperation in an effort to create a military security environment and enhance mutual trust.”
Although it did not say it wanted to establish a confidence-building mechanism (CBM) with Taiwan, it did accentuate that such a move would enhance security and mutual trust. That is to say, Taiwan’s security can be guaranteed through a CBM with China rather than relying on US arms sales.
This seems to echo Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) six proposals for cross-strait relations made on Dec. 31, when he said: “China will pursue a policy of peaceful development and the two sides can pick the right time to engage in exchanges on military issues and explore setting up a military and security mechanism to build mutual trust, which would help improve the situation in the Taiwan Strait and lessen military and security concerns.”
On Feb. 3, Wang Weixing (王衛星), deputy director of China’s Military Science Academy, suggested that Taiwan and China draw up a CBM roadmap to set up military hotlines, notify each other of key military exercises and hold exchanges with retired generals to eventually end hostilities across the Strait.
Good reasons exist for analyzing China’s new strategy. Direct military coercion has been replaced by an indirect three-in-one approach that draws on psychology, the media and law.
The Pentagon’s report on China last year said that as far as China was concerned, “war is not only a military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy and law.”
In other words, China’s three-pronged strategy aims to weaken morale and obfuscate the designation of the “enemy” by influencing public opinion and seeking support from domestic and international audiences for its military actions.
Beijing’s gentle tone has largely moderated the bellicose attitude of Taiwanese toward China and fueled a rise in pacific sentiment in Taiwan.
This may be because Taiwanese see China’s seemingly good intentions through the “three-links,” the concept of a diplomatic truce, panda diplomacy and social and economic exchanges. But the motives behind China’s strategic thinking elude them.
China is furthermore reportedly mapping out a multi-pronged strategy to publicizing the “China model” abroad.
Beijing will spend around 45 billion yuan (US$6.58 billion) on boosting “overseas propaganda,” improving China’s international image and combating concern that China’s rise poses a threat.
This propaganda agenda could also be seen in the white paper. China set up a military spokesman last May to make key military information public.
China has also incorporated international humanitarian law into its military and sent its navy to the Gulf of Aden to protect its ships — and Taiwan’s — from pirates.
Taiwan as a democracy is poorly organized and unready for China’s three-pronged strategy, because no international organization or court of justice, nor the US, can protect Taiwan from a psychological campaign that is protean and cannot be legally adjudicated.
Taiwan cannot defend itself through hard power alone. Its soft power, such as its democracy and freedom, will be key.
Faced with China’s overwhelming military, economic and ideological threats, Taiwan can only survive if its democratic values are secure, its citizens loyal and its soft power effective enough to achieve objectives beyond its hard power.
The revolution in information technology has empowered a democratic Taiwan relative to an authoritarian China that successfully exploits modern technology to generate international and domestic support.
China’s state media, no matter how well-funded, could hardly win a global following, let alone help Beijing develop soft power commensurate to that of democratic Taiwan.
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is right to highlight freedom and democracy as the nation’s soft power.
As Ma said: “Politically we need to deepen Taiwan’s democracy and manifest Taiwan’s freedom — the two values vital to Taiwan’s existence and development.”
Yu Tsung-chi is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.
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