The past few months have seen the best of times and the worst of times for the Indian Navy. Events have focused the attention of India’s famously landward-facing inhabitants on surrounding waters. But uneven responses to seaborne threats have shown that the sea services have some way to go — both in material and human terms — to become an effective arm of Indian foreign policy.
This opens up opportunities for China to position itself as a custodian of maritime security in South Asia — to the consternation of Indian commentators who fear that Beijing’s aspirations on the “day after Taiwan” would involve a naval buildup in India’s backyard, where shipments of oil, gas and raw materials bound for East Asia must pass. For the first time, Chinese warships are patrolling international waters off Somalia as part of multinational efforts to combat piracy.
New Delhi frets that this may be Beijing’s way of laying the diplomatic groundwork for a permanent naval presence. By combating piracy, the Chinese navy can serve the interests of all countries that depend on African energy supplies. At modest cost, then, China can portray itself as a responsible stakeholder in the regional order, in keeping with its much-trumpeted “peaceful rise.”
India sees itself as the foremost power in the Indian Ocean and has no intention of yielding its position to outsiders. So New Delhi’s effort to build capable maritime forces has larger geopolitical import.
Sea-service leaders need to upgrade hardware while building a service culture that makes Indian mariners proficient users of high-tech ships, submarines and aircraft. Alas, it often takes a calamity to discredit old ways of doing business, compelling change in big organizations. This is not a criticism of India. Indeed, Pearl Harbor is probably the best historical precedent for a navy remaking itself under the press of circumstances.
It took the destruction of US Pacific Fleet battleships in 1941 to force the US Navy to reorient its strategy toward submarines and aircraft carriers. That was all the Pacific Fleet had left after the Japanese attack, so the navy made do. Fleet submarines raided Japanese merchant shipping, choking off much-needed imports like oil and rubber. Carriers surged across the central Pacific toward the Japanese home islands, demolishing the Imperial Japanese Navy along the way.
The US Navy found virtue in necessity, discarding old methods for new, devastatingly effective ones. It’s possible that the recent spate of piracy incidents off Somalia represents the Indian Navy’s Pearl Harbor — a trauma that forces the service to reinvent itself for new realities. If so, these events will have a salutary effect on Indian foreign policy.
What challenges confront the Indian Navy? Consider the material dimension. The Indian defense industry remains underdeveloped, leaving New Delhi dependent on naval arms purchases from abroad, primarily from Russia. Dependency on foreign suppliers has yielded mixed results at best. For example, negotiations between New Delhi and Moscow over the sale of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov and its air wing have degenerated into a bad joke.
The two governments inked a US$1.5 billion contract for the Gorshkov back in 2004. Moscow balked last year after Russian engineers opened it up and — surprise! — discovered that the 1980s-era warship was in deplorable shape. Russia demanded an extra US$2 billion for the refit. The Gorshkov debacle is only one symptom of the growing pains besetting Indian sea power.
Next, lackluster performance in counterpiracy efforts has exposed frailties in the human dimension, the most critical element of naval affairs. Corsairs perpetrated some 100 raids on commercial shipping off the Horn of Africa last year, touching off a public furor in India. The government of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh deployed men-of-war to the Gulf of Aden as a countermeasure.
Indians cheered last November when an Indian warship sent a pirate “mother ship” — a large ship able to resupply short-range boats used by pirates — to the bottom. The celebration quieted abruptly when a Thai fishing company complained that the “mother ship” was in fact the Thai trawler Ekawat Nava 5. International Maritime Bureau spokesmen chided New Delhi for acting on scanty information.
Do these embarrassments add up to a Pearl Harbor for the Indian maritime services? Probably not. But Indian mariners understand that their shortcomings allow Beijing to indulge in one-upsmanship at India’s expense. The prospect of a Chinese naval constable walking India’s beat in Indian Ocean waters should concentrate minds in New Delhi — prompting much-needed change along the waterfront.
James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College. The opinions expressed in this article are his alone.
The US election result will significantly impact its foreign policy with global implications. As tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait and conflicts elsewhere draw attention away from the western Pacific, Taiwan was closely monitoring the election, as many believe that whoever won would confront an increasingly assertive China, especially with speculation over a potential escalation in or around 2027. A second Donald Trump presidency naturally raises questions concerning the future of US policy toward China and Taiwan, with Trump displaying mixed signals as to his position on the cross-strait conflict. US foreign policy would also depend on Trump’s Cabinet and
The return of US president-elect Donald Trump to the White House has injected a new wave of anxiety across the Taiwan Strait. For Taiwan, an island whose very survival depends on the delicate and strategic support from the US, Trump’s election victory raises a cascade of questions and fears about what lies ahead. His approach to international relations — grounded in transactional and unpredictable policies — poses unique risks to Taiwan’s stability, economic prosperity and geopolitical standing. Trump’s first term left a complicated legacy in the region. On the one hand, his administration ramped up arms sales to Taiwan and sanctioned
The Taiwanese have proven to be resilient in the face of disasters and they have resisted continuing attempts to subordinate Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Nonetheless, the Taiwanese can and should do more to become even more resilient and to be better prepared for resistance should the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) try to annex Taiwan. President William Lai (賴清德) argues that the Taiwanese should determine their own fate. This position continues the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) tradition of opposing the CCP’s annexation of Taiwan. Lai challenges the CCP’s narrative by stating that Taiwan is not subordinate to the
Republican candidate and former US president Donald Trump is to be the 47th president of the US after beating his Democratic rival, US Vice President Kamala Harris, in the election on Tuesday. Trump’s thumping victory — winning 295 Electoral College votes against Harris’ 226 as of press time last night, along with the Republicans winning control of the US Senate and possibly the House of Representatives — is a remarkable political comeback from his 2020 defeat to US President Joe Biden, and means Trump has a strong political mandate to implement his agenda. What does Trump’s victory mean for Taiwan, Asia, deterrence