The economic crisis cast a pall over climate change talks held this month in Poland. While negotiators were hoping for concrete progress toward an international climate agreement, the world’s two largest polluters were distracted — the US with preventing a collapse of the financial system in the midst of a presidential transition and China with a slowdown in domestic investment and weakening foreign demand for its manufactured goods. With US home values and retirement savings falling and Chinese unemployment numbers rising, observers worry that neither the US nor China will have much appetite to cut emissions.
The paradox here is that the crisis presents a unique opportunity for the US and China to strike a deal that would lay the groundwork for a global climate agreement. Indeed, one of the main goals of the most recent biannual meeting of the US/China Strategic Economic Dialogue (held the week before the climate talks began) was to begin work under the “Ten Year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework” created earlier this year.
This initiative comes on the heels of a decade in which the US abstained from international efforts to address climate change.
Its rationale was that if it acts but China doesn’t, the world will fail to meet emission-reduction targets and US industry will suffer. China has countered that its historic and per capita emissions remain well below US levels and that to cap aggregate national emissions at the same level as the US would imply a personal carbon budget in San Francisco five times greater than in Shanghai.
The Strategic Economic Dialogue sidestepped this disagreement on burden sharing and focused instead on what the two countries have in common. Both depend on imported oil for transport and on domestic coal for power generation. Both have strong state-level governments and balkanized regulatory and energy supply systems. But the structure of the two countries’ economies and what drives their energy needs — and thus greenhouse gas emissions — are very different. It is this difference that offers the best chance for addressing climate change head-on.
Economically, the US and China are mirror images, opposite sides of a massive global imbalance. Americans spend too much and save too little, leaving a US$250 billion trade deficit financed by other countries. Much of this credit comes from China, where companies and individuals save too much and consume too little, leaving a surplus of both goods and capital that flows abroad.
This macroeconomic imbalance is reflected in the two countries’ carbon footprints. In the US, more than 70 percent of carbon dioxide emissions come from consumer-related activities, whether gas-guzzling sport utility vehicles or power-hungry McMansions.
In China, more than 70 percent of emissions come from industry. Steel production alone consumes 18 percent of the nation’s energy resources, nearly twice as much as all Chinese households. The chemical industry consumes more energy than all private transportation and aluminum production rivals the commercial sector in terms of electricity demand.
In terms of brokering a climate deal, this imbalance is good news. It suggests a framework for reducing emissions that respects the development needs of China’s households, addresses US firms’ competitiveness concerns and adheres to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” embedded in international negotiations.
In recognition of its outsized historic and per capita emissions, the US should agree to economy-wide emissions reductions in line with domestic climate legislation currently being considered. China should be excused from consumer-related obligations for the time being, but assume commitments on industrial production based on the recognition that effectively reducing emissions in these sectors requires coordinated international action.
China’s leaders are already eager to rein in energy and pollution-intensive industry for reasons of national security, air and water quality, and simple economic efficiency. The production of steel, cement, chemicals, paper, and aluminum alone account for nearly half of China’s energy needs and generate nearly half of the air pollution that claims more than 300,000 lives and costs the economy close to US$100 billion each year.
Yet these five industries combined employ only 14 million people out of a total labor force of 770 million and fewer people than they did a decade ago. For a country in an employment crisis, investing in energy-intensive industry is a losing strategy. Using climate policy to discipline these industries would help rebalance the economy while taking a bite out of China’s emissions. If China imposes a carbon price for its energy-intensive manufacturing industries, the US won’t need to do so at its border, lowering risks to the international trading system on which both countries rely.
The current crisis is already unwinding some of the imbalances that drive both countries’ energy and environment challenges. US oil demand has fallen 8 percent as consumers tighten their belts, and electricity demand in China is down by 10 percent as energy-intensive industries cut production. A smart response to the crisis can perpetuate these trends.
Future US consumption will be greener and the cost of climate policy reduced, if the US recovery package includes money to weatherize homes, upgrade the electricity grid and help the auto industry improve fuel efficiency.
If China consolidates its energy-intensive manufacturing, thereby freeing up investment capital for lighter manufacturing and services, then it will emerge from the crisis with a growth model that pollutes less and employs more. If the US and China can find agreement on these issues in the midst of crisis, they will pave the way for success when climate negotiators meet again next year in Copenhagen.
Trevor Houser is a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.
COPYRIGHT: PROJECT SYNDICATE
George Santayana wrote: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This article will help readers avoid repeating mistakes by examining four examples from the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces and the Republic of China (ROC) forces that involved two city sieges and two island invasions. The city sieges compared are Changchun (May to October 1948) and Beiping (November 1948 to January 1949, renamed Beijing after its capture), and attempts to invade Kinmen (October 1949) and Hainan (April 1950). Comparing and contrasting these examples, we can learn how Taiwan may prevent a war with
A recent trio of opinion articles in this newspaper reflects the growing anxiety surrounding Washington’s reported request for Taiwan to shift up to 50 percent of its semiconductor production abroad — a process likely to take 10 years, even under the most serious and coordinated effort. Simon H. Tang (湯先鈍) issued a sharp warning (“US trade threatens silicon shield,” Oct. 4, page 8), calling the move a threat to Taiwan’s “silicon shield,” which he argues deters aggression by making Taiwan indispensable. On the same day, Hsiao Hsi-huei (蕭錫惠) (“Responding to US semiconductor policy shift,” Oct. 4, page 8) focused on
Taiwan is rapidly accelerating toward becoming a “super-aged society” — moving at one of the fastest rates globally — with the proportion of elderly people in the population sharply rising. While the demographic shift of “fewer births than deaths” is no longer an anomaly, the nation’s legal framework and social customs appear stuck in the last century. Without adjustments, incidents like last month’s viral kicking incident on the Taipei MRT involving a 73-year-old woman would continue to proliferate, sowing seeds of generational distrust and conflict. The Senior Citizens Welfare Act (老人福利法), originally enacted in 1980 and revised multiple times, positions older
Nvidia Corp’s plan to build its new headquarters at the Beitou Shilin Science Park’s T17 and T18 plots has stalled over a land rights dispute, prompting the Taipei City Government to propose the T12 plot as an alternative. The city government has also increased pressure on Shin Kong Life Insurance Co, which holds the development rights for the T17 and T18 plots. The proposal is the latest by the city government over the past few months — and part of an ongoing negotiation strategy between the two sides. Whether Shin Kong Life Insurance backs down might be the key factor
RSS