Looking at his record sheds some light on US president-elect Barack Obama’s thoughts on China’s rise and his interest in both cooperation and competition with China.
In response to a question on the campaign trail, Obama said: “Increasingly, the center of gravity in this world is shifting to Asia ... Obviously China is rising and it’s not going away. They’re neither our enemy nor our friend. They’re competitors.”
He also said that “although the US should maintain a cooperative relationship with China, it should never hesitate to be clear and consistent with China where we disagree.”
Unlike his predecessors, Obama did not demonize China as “evil” and communist as a tool to feed xenophobia, boost protectionist sentiment or attack China’s trade surplus to pander to voters.
However, Obama vowed to push China harder to loosen the reins on its currency, improve its human rights record and end its support for repressive regimes in Iran, Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
This reflects his increasing maturity on US-China relations and shows that he sees China as a complex issue that involves trade, security, the environment, energy objectives, democracy, human rights, Tibet and military build up.
But with the US mired in both diplomatic and economic troubles and China’s growing clout in international affairs, Beijing’s value to Washington will likely outweigh issues such as democracy, human rights, Tibet and China’s defense buildup.
What is less predictable is whether, at a time of domestic crisis or international troubles, an Obama administration would be likely to accommodate China’s demands.
Former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) once said: “Don’t pay attention to unfriendly remarks [that a US presidential] candidate might make about China during the campaign, because once elected, [he or she] will be friendly.”
Some specialists have identified a pattern among presidential candidates, who are wont to take a hard stance on China during the campaign and threaten to change their country’s policies toward Beijing, only to find after being elected that there is little they can change before being compelled to cooperate with the Chinese government on common interests.
As a presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan once criticized Jimmy Carter for normalizing relations with China and forsaking Taiwan; Bill Clinton accused then-president George Bush of cuddling with the butchers in Beijing after the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. George W. Bush later criticized Clinton’s policies, arguing that China was not a strategic partner but a strategic competitor.
However, it did not take long for China to become the US’ “partner” and a “responsible stakeholder” in international politics and economics.
Although it is hard to pin down a candidate’s opinions during a campaign, it will be interesting to see how Obama handles relations with China, since he is resolute in his belief that China’s rise is inevitable and relations between the two countries have nowhere to go but forward.
Obama is a pragmatist at heart — he sees China not only as an opportunity but also as a challenge. The nomination of his national security team — with Senator Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, retired Marine General James Jones as national security adviser and Robert Gates staying on as secretary of defense — signaled that his China policy would be pragmatic rather than idealistic.
All three of Obama’s picks indicate a sweeping shift of priorities and resources in the areas of national security and foreign policy. They all know very well that China’s cooperation is very important to the US’ domestic and international interests.
If one focuses on Asia, China is definitely the most crucial player the US must deal with. The US has a good position in Asia, for example in the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program and on Myanmar’s human rights abuses. If Washington hopes to see results on these issues, it must work with China.
To bend China toward US interests, the US must, in Obama’s words, “pursue a new strategy that skillfully uses, balances and integrates all elements of American power: our military and diplomacy ... economy and the power of our moral example.”
In other words: “Strength and wisdom must go hand in hand.” Soft power and hard power must both be part of the strategy, although there should be more carrots than sticks.
But for its China policy to succeed, the US must take several factors into account.
First and foremost, the US must tend to its economic crisis and keep its economy competitive and vibrant.
As Obama said: “The national security challenges we face are just as grave and just as urgent as our economic crisis.”
The next US administration will need economic power to bolster the country’s military strength, diplomatic leverage and role as a global leader.
If the US wasn’t weighed down by an economic crisis as well as two wars, Washington would definitely hold more sway over Beijing on promoting a cooperative and constructive bilateral relationship.
In addition, Washington must remind Beijing that the US wants a cooperative relationship and is optimistic about a durable mutual relationship. But the dialogue on democracy, human rights, Tibet and military build up must be particularly careful.
For example, if Washington stays silent about Beijing’s recent pressure on French President Nicolas Sarkozy not to meet the Dalai Lama or on its recent execution of medical researcher Wo Weihan (伍維漢), it could send the signal that democratic values can be overshadowed by economic concerns and that Washington could eventually be turned against its own policies.
Moreover, Obama has said the US must strengthen its capacity to defeat enemies and support friends, and that Washington should renew old alliances and forge new, enduring partnerships.
The coming administration should therefore avoid giving China the impression that Washington is only interested in its relations with China — even at the expense of making other Asian allies irrelevant.
On the contrary, the new administration should indicate to its allies that they should expect more, not less, from US engagement with China.
The fact is that most of Asia consists of democracies such as Australia, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
Washington should indicate to China that reinforcing the multilateral relationships of its allies is not intended to contain China but to teach it the rules in Asia: freedom, democracy and respect for human rights.
China is welcome to join the democratic community, but it is not welcome to take charge of it.
Yu Tsung-chi is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.
It is almost three years since Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a friendship with “no limits” — weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, they have retreated from such rhetorical enthusiasm. The “no limits” language was quickly dumped, probably at Beijing’s behest. When Putin visited China in May last year, he said that he and his counterpart were “as close as brothers.” Xi more coolly called the Russian president “a good friend and a good neighbor.” China has conspicuously not reciprocated Putin’s description of it as an ally. Yet the partnership
The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu (孫子) said “know yourself and know your enemy and you will win a hundred battles.” Applied in our times, Taiwanese should know themselves and know the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) so that Taiwan will win a hundred battles and hopefully, deter the CCP. Taiwanese receive information daily about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) threat from the Ministry of National Defense and news sources. One area that needs better understanding is which forces would the People’s Republic of China (PRC) use to impose martial law and what would be the consequences for living under PRC
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) said that he expects this year to be a year of “peace.” However, this is ironic given the actions of some KMT legislators and politicians. To push forward several amendments, they went against the principles of legislation such as substantive deliberation, and even tried to remove obstacles with violence during the third readings of the bills. Chu says that the KMT represents the public interest, accusing President William Lai (賴清德) and the Democratic Progressive Party of fighting against the opposition. After pushing through the amendments, the KMT caucus demanded that Legislative Speaker
Beijing’s approval of a controversial mega-dam in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River — which flows from Tibet — has ignited widespread debate over its strategic and environmental implications. The project exacerbates the complexities of India-China relations, and underscores Beijing’s push for hydropower dominance and potential weaponization of water against India. India and China are caught in a protracted territorial dispute along the Line of Actual Control. The approval of a dam on a transboundary river adds another layer to an already strained bilateral relationship, making dialogue and trust-building even more challenging, especially given that the two Asian