President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) finally explained the government’s stance a week before Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) was scheduled to visit Taiwan. While a late explanation is better than none at all, these TV interviews actually exposed more problems.
Responding to public doubts about his leaning toward China, especially his description of Taiwan and China as “two areas,” Ma gave a straight answer, saying that the areas of Taiwan and China coexist under the Republic of China (ROC) in accordance with the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the ROC and the Statute Governing Relations Between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (兩岸人民關係條例).
If Ma were just a law professor, his explanation of the legal source of his two-area stance would be clear and definite, because it is valid, according to the law.
However, such a formulaic, law school professor-type answer clearly shows the lack of insight Ma has into our society’s doubts. The doubts and reservations the public has about his government are political in nature, not legal. He is either naive or irresponsible if he believes that complex political issues can be resolved by simple legal regulations.
Indeed, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have resolved a number of problems through their party-to-party platform and Ma’s government is very proud of that. However, this platform is not accountable to the Legislative Yuan, nor is it monitored by society in any way, creating suspicions. We have to ask the Ma administration to address these widespread suspicions in a more comprehensive manner.
If our government were able to quickly build mutual trust with the Chinese government after being in power for just a few months, why can’t the KMT and its government that enjoys an absolute legislative majority build mutual trust with the opposition camp? Is a consensus within Taiwan less important than a consensus between the KMT and the CCP?
Taiwanese society does not oppose cross-strait communication and negotiation. Nor does it seek to belittle the Ma government’s efforts. The concern is that Ma and his government have overlooked the need for internal consensus before contacting China.
To be frank, I am not sure whether the Ma administration and the KMT are truly aware of the fact that, because of their position in Taiwan’s political landscape, they have a responsibility to work harder to win the trust of the whole of society before conducting dialogue with Beijing.
Ma’s remark, “The pan-green camp proposed a cross-strait peace agreement during their time in office, so why can’t I?” is not only naive but also politically irresponsible.
He appears to be unaware of the fact that, as a pan-blue leader and given Taiwan’s political situation, he has the responsibility to strive for greater trust before contacting Beijing. This need can hardly be satisfied by merely nit-picking on legal matters.
Given Taiwan’s political reality, the fact that the Ma government has taken cross-strait talks for granted and did not bother to explain them to the public, while also making reckless comments about Taiwan and China being two “areas,” is just as irresponsible as the pro-independence camp when it provoked China and disregarded the concerns of the US.
Members of the pan-blue camp talk a lot about how the pro-independence camp’s provocation of China and its disregard for the US and its concerns caused long-term damage to Taiwan’s place in the international community. However, the pan-blue camp hopes it can relieve the administrative pressure it is facing by using the cross-strait talks without first gaining a domestic consensus or even communicating with the people of Taiwan.
These moves will cause distrust and dissatisfaction in the hearts of independence advocates and those with more neutral political views. This can only lead to erosion of the quality of democracy in Taiwan. The moves will also cause long-term damage to Taiwan’s overall interests.
The anti-independence groups hoped the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) would not impose pro-independence policies on the entire nation while it was in power. Likewise, the pan-blue government needs to give clearer explanations when pro-independence citizens describe pan-blue policies as “tilted toward China.”
Only when the government holds a non-chauvinistic attitude can it create a real and solid foundation for Taiwan’s democracy, and only based on such a strong foundation can the government’s policies ensure genuine cross-strait stability and peace.
On the other hand, on the eve of Chen’s visit, the pan-green camp recovered enough morale to take to the streets in protest. But apart from provocation on such symbolic issues as whether our national flag should be displayed during Chen’s visit, the opposition parties should have conscientiously and systematically sorted out the propositions and important issues that are likely to be ignored during Chen’s visit.
Beyond obtaining political capital on the streets, can the DPP truly supervise the content of the government’s policies and establish a channel to discuss policies with the ruling party?
Can the DPP clearly and methodically explain the differences between the framework for cross-strait peace and stability it proposed while it was in power and the accord being proposed by the KMT? Can it point out the substantial risks in the KMT’s cross-strait policies?
The pan-green camp should respond to Ma’s remarks that “the pan-green camp proposed a cross-strait peace agreement during their time in office, so why can’t I?” at the level of specific policies rather than just from the level of unification and independence ideology. If the DPP can achieve this, then the KMT would have to take more responsibility for failing to communicate with the pan-green camp.
Hsu Szu-chien is an assistant research fellow at the Preparatory Office of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG AND TED YANG
The US election result will significantly impact its foreign policy with global implications. As tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait and conflicts elsewhere draw attention away from the western Pacific, Taiwan was closely monitoring the election, as many believe that whoever won would confront an increasingly assertive China, especially with speculation over a potential escalation in or around 2027. A second Donald Trump presidency naturally raises questions concerning the future of US policy toward China and Taiwan, with Trump displaying mixed signals as to his position on the cross-strait conflict. US foreign policy would also depend on Trump’s Cabinet and
The Taiwanese have proven to be resilient in the face of disasters and they have resisted continuing attempts to subordinate Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Nonetheless, the Taiwanese can and should do more to become even more resilient and to be better prepared for resistance should the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) try to annex Taiwan. President William Lai (賴清德) argues that the Taiwanese should determine their own fate. This position continues the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) tradition of opposing the CCP’s annexation of Taiwan. Lai challenges the CCP’s narrative by stating that Taiwan is not subordinate to the
Republican candidate and former US president Donald Trump is to be the 47th president of the US after beating his Democratic rival, US Vice President Kamala Harris, in the election on Tuesday. Trump’s thumping victory — winning 295 Electoral College votes against Harris’ 226 as of press time last night, along with the Republicans winning control of the US Senate and possibly the House of Representatives — is a remarkable political comeback from his 2020 defeat to US President Joe Biden, and means Trump has a strong political mandate to implement his agenda. What does Trump’s victory mean for Taiwan, Asia, deterrence
The return of US president-elect Donald Trump to the White House has injected a new wave of anxiety across the Taiwan Strait. For Taiwan, an island whose very survival depends on the delicate and strategic support from the US, Trump’s election victory raises a cascade of questions and fears about what lies ahead. His approach to international relations — grounded in transactional and unpredictable policies — poses unique risks to Taiwan’s stability, economic prosperity and geopolitical standing. Trump’s first term left a complicated legacy in the region. On the one hand, his administration ramped up arms sales to Taiwan and sanctioned
RSS