Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) is scheduled to arrive in Taipei today for talks. President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) says that the four agreements due to be signed at Chen’s meeting with Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) are necessary for Taiwan, and he has sought to dispel fears of a sellout. He says the agreements will be enormously beneficial to Taiwan’s development.
Many people, however, do not believe Ma. Several groups plan to protest during Chen’s visit, and the list of activities includes egg throwing, sit-ins, rallies and sieges. Seven thousand police officers will be mobilized and razor-wire barriers laid down to contain the protesters. Taipei City will not be a peaceful place for the next few days.
Although the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are now reconciled and ready to sign agreements, the KMT has not achieved a consensus on cross-strait policy with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
During the 1993 SEF-ARATS meeting in Singapore, then-DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh (施明德) staged a protest outside the talks venue. Now, as then, the major political conflict affecting cross-strait relations is not between the KMT and the CCP, but between the KMT and the DPP. Eight years of DPP government did not change this fundamental dichotomy.
Where do the KMT and DPP differ? Actually, the agreements to be signed at this SEF-ARATS meeting hardly differ from proposals mooted under the DPP administration. The real difference will be in the atmosphere of the talks and the symbols related to national sovereignty. The real point of sensitivity lies in whether Taiwan’s welcome for Chen and his attitude to the government and people of Taiwan are in the spirit of mutual equality and dignity.
Pressed by reporters, Ma recently asked: “Can you give me one example of anything I have done to sell out Taiwan?”
It is true that Ma has done nothing specific to sell out the country. He has, however, referred to Taiwan as an “area” and said that Chen can call him “Mr Ma” rather than “president.” Ma defended himself by saying that the terms “Taiwan area” and “mainland area” were written into the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China in 1992. But Ma’s remark constitutes a retreat for Taiwan’s desire for sovereignty back to the situation 16 years ago, and is out of line with public opinion today. For a president to back down from recognizing his own status in his own country for fear of offending China is a worrying show of weakness.
Neither Ma nor China really understand Taiwanese public opinion or the concerns of Taiwan’s opposition parties. What Chen needs to do to make a good impression on Taiwanese does not hinge on the content of agreements. It cannot be achieved by giving Taiwan pandas, nor by shedding crocodile tears as ARATS Vice Chairman Zhang Mingqing (張銘清) did during his recent visit. The key question is whether Chen respects the feelings of Taiwanese and whether he will address Ma as “president.”
Public support for Ma and his government has fallen to less than 30 percent. Ma sees this week’s talks as a golden opportunity to regain popularity with a breakthrough in cross-strait relations. Of course the agreements themselves will bring some benefits, but China’s real attitude to Taiwan will be revealed by exactly what Chen says when he meets Ma. This will be the real test of Chen’s visit, cross-strait relations and Ma’s popularity.
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