The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is an old party, and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his government should have pushed to reform it during their first 100 days in office. But there has been little in the way of reform so far. Instead, Ma has created two political miracles.
First, Ma’s approval ratings have dropped by almost half as public discontent soars. Second, despite all the awkwardness resulting from the scandal surrounding the former first family, the pan-green camp still managed to organize a successful demonstration against Ma. Public discontent has stemmed mainly from economic factors, while the green camp’s anger comes from the government’s overt tilt toward China. But is such anger reasonable?
During the presidential campaign and in his inauguration speech, Ma’s message was that Taiwan is the “Republic of China [ROC] on Taiwan” and “the Republic of China is Taiwan.” Based on this foundation, his key values are seen as democracy and peace and stressing that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are involved in a battle of government systems.
His strategic goals were “no unification, no independence, no war,” while his strategic direction is to put aside the sovereignty dispute for the sake of the economy. His strategic choice was to prioritize “opening up” over sovereignty, and placing cross-strait relations above diplomatic affairs, while the basis for cross-strait exchanges is the so-called “1992 consensus.”
These claims were one reason for Ma’s landslide victory, influencing some swing voters and moderate pan-green voters. But the Ma administration and the KMT have continued to use the same slogans since May 20, although they haven’t dared insist on the existence of the ROC, while occasionally oppressing Taiwan and never mentioning democracy. This has disappointed moderate green supporters and swing voters and angered staunch green supporters.
Take the so-called “1992 consensus” for example. On first appearance, this is a consensus expressed in the “one China, different interpretations” formula, but in practice, some countries have already began using “Chinese Taipei” rather than the “Republic of China” or “Taiwan” because of Beijing’s dominance in the international community and Taiwan’s weakness and concessions.
Ma has willingly downgraded himself to “Mr Ma” for cross-strait exchanges and he was afraid to fight for the right of Taiwanese to carry the national flag at the Olympics. The national flag will not appear at cross-strait exchange meetings or even sports events in Taiwan. In what way is this version of “one China” open to “different interpretations?”
This is nothing but “one China, their interpretation” internationally, while the “Republic of China” is halfheartedly backed domestically — as long as China is not present, of course. The purpose of setting aside the sovereignty dispute is to avoid getting trapped by a dispute that cannot be resolved in the short term, and instead push for pragmatic exchanges.
But the Ma administration’s approach is put aside Taiwan’s sovereignty completely. Is this really what most Taiwanese want?
Would presidents Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) agree with this approach? Do former foreign ministers Fredrick Chien (錢復) and now Taichung Mayor Jason Hu (胡志強), who have worked so hard for the ROC, agree?
Let’s go on to the “diplomatic truce.” Given the international reality, this strategy could be discussed if there were mutual cross-strait guarantees allowing Taiwan reasonable international space.
Over the past 60 years, however, Taiwan and China have fought each other for every centimeter of international space, and Beijing has never relaxed its pressure. No Chinese official at any level has responded in any way to Taiwan’s “diplomatic truce.” Although Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) expressed some measure of goodwill by saying that Taiwan’s entry to the WHA and other international organizations could be discussed, this statement was rejected in substantive exchanges with Taipei by China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Chairman Wang Yi (王毅) and Chinese Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya (王光亞).
Experience has shown that Taiwan should not pin all its hopes on someone else, yet the Ma administration is placing all its hopes and some more on China. Is this feasible? What guarantees are there? What price will Taiwan have to pay? These are questions that Taiwanese must ask.
The unification-independence debate has always been Taiwan’s most sensitive issue and it has hampered the nation’s development. It is Ma’s responsibility to lead Taiwan out of this predicament or at least limit the dispute. Actually, he has pretty good conditions for doing this.
First, the former Democratic Progressive Party government created more strategic space during its rule. The party remains a useful bargaining chip for Ma even in the opposition.
Second, he is trusted at home and abroad because of his low-key personality. Third, the government’s voter base and legislative majority are stable.
So if Ma can keep his promise to “put Taiwan first for the benefit of the public” and manage to safeguard the ROC’s sovereignty and dignity and deepen the meaning of the ROC on Taiwan while stressing the value of democracy, he should be able to build a wider domestic consensus. This would give him the capability to lead Taiwan in dealing with economic challenges, the cross-strait issue and diplomatic affairs.
What he has done so far, however, is quite disappointing. Has Ma heard the cries of public discontent and the anger of the pan-green camp? Is he ready to make adjustments?
Lee Wen-chung is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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