You have to worry about a country that condemns two of its elderly people, aged 77 and 79 (one of them virtually blind), to “re-education through labor” for one year. Their crime was to seek permission to protest (in officially demarcated protest sites) against their eviction from their homes at Qianqiao, near Tiananmen Square. These two frail women were seeking due compensation for their eviction. If this sort of thing can happen right under the glare of the Olympics in Beijing, one can only imagine the fate of the poor, the vulnerable and the marginalized when nobody is looking.
With such lack of compassion when dealing with its own people, China’s ruling oligarchy would be hard pressed to show much consideration in their dealings with the rest of the world. This is pertinent when examining China’s political and strategic goals in the Asia-Pacific region. It suggests a very ruthless political streak.
Beijing swears that its rise will be peaceful and mutually beneficial for all concerned. And that they are doing it in a benign environment. China is “benign” not because it is a peaceful power but because it is largely getting its way thanks to a juxtaposition of favorable factors.
First, its rapid economic growth has created an image among its Asian neighbors of a powerful country that means business politically, economically and strategically. They are, therefore, adjusting to the new perceived reality of Chinese power by coming to terms with it.
Second, the US over-stretch in Iraq and Afghanistan has created an impression that the former might be retreating from Asia. Hence, China’s neighbors increasingly believe that they have no choice but to heed and accommodate a rising China.
Third, China’s hesitance to use military power is also dictated by its limitations. Take Taiwan, for instance. Beijing has been preparing to take it by force for many years, but has repeatedly hesitated to go all the way. It is because, as Jonathan Pollack of the US Naval War College believes, their generals are probably a long way from feeling confident of a successful outcome.
Elaborating on this during a lecture at the University of Sydney, Pollack reportedly said: “China has not fought a war in 30 years [since the last one against Vietnam over Cambodia, with not very flattering results]. Not only that, any kind of use of force directed against Taiwan would be qualitatively different … The risks therefore are much higher: the risks of failure.”
In any case, with President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) regime sending accommodative signals, China might not need to test its resolve in this matter. In other words, Beijing seems to be pretty much getting what it wants without having to use force, though it did come quite close to using force against Taiwan in the mid-1990s, and with Japan in the East China Sea.
Because of its relative success in pushing its agenda of regional primacy, an impression is gaining currency that the present century belongs to China. In other words, Beijing will be able to operate at will in the Asia-Pacific region.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has sought to dispel this impression of China’s omnipotence. In a paper titled, “The new American realism,” in Foreign Affairs (July/August 2008), Rice wrote: “Indeed, although many assume that the rise of China will determine the future of Asia, so, too — and perhaps to an even greater degree — will the broader rise of an increasingly democratic community of Asian States.”
In her view, this is the “defining geopolitical event of the twenty-first century, and the United States is right in the middle of it.”
In other words, the US is going to remain fully involved in Asia and is not going anywhere.
To elaborate her point, she said: “We enjoy a strong, democratic alliance with Australia, with key states in Southeast Asia, and with Japan — an economic giant that is emerging as a ‘normal’ state [to exercise a commensurate political and strategic role], capable of working to secure and spread our values both in Asia and beyond.”
Rice has thus strongly endorsed the validity and vigor of the US alliance with Japan as a counterpoint to China. As well as Japan, Rice also made a point of declaring that “the United States has a vital stake in India’s rise to global power and prosperity, and [that] relations between the two countries have never been stronger and broader.”
The growing impression that China will be the determining power in Asia (to the exclusion of others) in the present century is unwarranted. In Southeast Asia, for instance, Indonesia is emerging as a stable democracy likely to impact on the contours of a new regional architecture. At the same time, as Rice has indicated, the US is starting to recognize the diffusion of power in the region.
This makes it “incumbent on the United States to find areas of cooperation and strategic agreement with Russia and China, even when there are significant differences,” as on Taiwan.
Pollack has also noted that the US is slowly recognizing the emergence of a new multipolar world order. In Asia, with Japan still in the US camp, Washington will need to deal with two “unequivocally autonomous powers” (China and India) to create some kind of trilateral understanding.
Pollack doesn’t believe that India will become a US ally. But China will continue to stake its claim for political primacy in Asia, which the US is unlikely to recognize. This would cause tensions between China and the US, independent of the Taiwan factor. China’s military build-up, with annual double-digit increases in its defense budget, is causing concern.
As Rice pointed out in her article: “The United States, along with many other countries, remains concerned about China’s rapid development of high-tech weapons systems … China’s lack of transparency about its military spending and doctrine and its strategic goals increases mistrust and suspicion.”
For instance, China’s new underground nuclear submarine base near Sanya, on Hainan island, is a serious development. As Jane’s Defence Weekly has commented, “This development, so close to the Southeast Asian sea lanes so vital to the economies of Asia, can only cause concern far beyond these straits.”
This development, combined with China’s steady overall military build-up, points to Beijing’s medium and long-term ambition to dominate the region. This ambition is likely to meet resistance, thus creating strategic uncertainty in the region.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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