President Ma Ying Jeou’s (馬英九) first state visit to diplomatic allies is under way. In the past, these small states in Central and South America learned to profit from the cross-strait diplomatic competition by approaching Taipei and Beijing with their hands out. Now, however, Ma’s stress on his cross-strait “diplomatic truce” means that they are weighing their options. Ma should be given credit for his new approach in so far as it means that our allies will not get everything they ask for, but the “diplomatic truce” must not mean giving up allies without a fight.
In a true diplomatic truce, both sides would have to lay down their arms. Now, Taiwan is at an extreme disadvantage in its diplomatic tug-of-war with China. The capital and energy invested in the past was intended to avert the crisis over Taiwan’s sovereignty and international space. In such life-and-death battles, there is no room for mistakes.
Diplomacy is a game of deceit, and the members of the international community look for substantial benefits. Ma’s new diplomatic strategy is ultimately dependent on China’s goodwill, and the fact that he is already leaning toward China leaves him no space for negotiation and compromise. If our allies turn to Beijing, one might say that such allies are not worth having, but we must remember that without those allies, Taiwan will become even more isolated and helpless internationally. Ma and his government will be the first to suffer if that happens.
Considering that China has always done all it can to suppress Taiwan internationally, it is absurd to pin our hopes on Beijing not trying to entice our allies simple because of the so-called “diplomatic truce.” Predicating the “truce” on China’s goodwill begs the question of how much trust there is between the two sides, and how long that trust, if it indeed exists, will persist. These are all unknowable variables
Before implementing the “diplomatic truce,” the focus must be on communicating our ideals and persuading China, and not on unilateral compromise. Since this is a new approach to maintaining national sovereignty, there can be no confusion between means and goals.
The Ma administration wants to abandon the money diplomacy but maintain our allies. What is the overall diplomatic strategy that will achieve this goal? As president, it is Ma’s duty to clearly explain this to the Taiwanese. While it is true that his administration has reduced cross-strait tension — at least for now — the closer relationship is a problem for the US because it is no longer clear where Taiwan belongs. Despite this, Ma has not offered an unambiguous explanation, and his government policy continues to lean heavily toward China without any signs that the government sees cause for alarm or a need to correct the situation.
Still, militarily, economically and internationally, the US remains Taiwan’s most important supporter. The US government is still waiting for Ma to react to the rumored freeze on US arms sales to Taiwan. A president is supposed to set a nation’s primary goals and deal with the big issues.
Rather than micro-managing and fiddling with trivialities such as saving a few dollars on chartering regular aircraft for overseas state visits, Ma should expend his efforts on designing the main direction of the nation’s future development.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
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