The reopening of talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), together with partial agreements on charter flights and increased Chinese tourism to Taiwan, has generated considerable interest in Taiwan to take the next step. More people, including many government personnel, will be able to visit China; civic groups are seeking to do the same. And at the top, the president is now seeking a “comprehensive economic cooperation pact” with China.
The first two agreements have been discussed for some time, but only now have they been accepted by both sides. Other agreements, such as allowing cargo flights, may eventually see the light of day. But continuing discussions with China on almost any subject will require expert advisers who understand the issues.
Reaching agreement on any subject will take much time, while the content of closed-door discussions — at least in democratic Taiwan — will inevitably become public, if not always in its entirety.
In seeking an economic cooperation pact, for example, the issues involved should be discussed in public. If not, any agreements made could lead to problems that will be difficult to resolve. As an example, there is the so-called “1992 consensus”: In invoking this slogan, China does not broach all that the term means to it, while Taiwan backs away from defending its sovereignty. Using past ambiguities to deal with today’s issues may not be wise.
Neither side wants to raise sensitive issues in discussions, and ambiguity will continue to prevail. So how will the people of Taiwan — a full democracy whose people have the right to know what its government is doing — be assured that their fundamental rights are being protected? This is a delicate and difficult task, and it falls to the president and his administration to meet both sides’ expectations.
The president’s first step was the SEF-ARATS meeting in Beijing. This was more important than the two agreements on flights and tourism. At the next meeting, it will harder to reach further agreement. And even if the meeting only covers economic matters, issues such as Taiwan’s need for international space will become increasingly difficult to ignore.
The problem is that signing a “comprehensive economic cooperation pact” with China without agreeing on fundamental issues such as political matters could be dangerous. The Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration has yet to state clearly what it wants for Taiwan. This is becoming clearer to China and the US, as it is to the Taiwanese public.
Few Taiwanese media outlets seem to focus on substantial domestic issues; instead, stories on cross-strait and Chinese affairs proliferate, while recently the sinking of a Taiwanese boat off the Diaoyutai (釣魚台) islets by the Japanese coast guard has taken up most of the coverage.
A recent opinion poll by the TVBS cable news channel showed that government approval ratings have dropped to 41 percent; that 60 percent are dissatisfied with increasing inflation and that 45 percent disapprove of the handling of the Diaoyutais incident. Only the handling of ties with China gained higher approval at 60 percent.
This highlights the importance of the domestic issues that the public considers to be the most pressing. Higher prices, especially the rising cost of oil and food, are a priority.
There is an interest in maintaining the status quo — protecting the country’s democracy is part of this — and in bolstering economic growth. Yet the names “Taiwan” and “Taiwanese,” the issue of sovereignty, and for many eventual de jure independence, remain in the wings.
Establishing a broad pact with China on a number of issues could easily generate problems with many smaller issues in which meaning is clouded by ambiguity.
Taiwan should continue pursuing a constructive relationship with China, of course, but the results should be acceptable to Taiwanese.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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