Although the recent round of talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) focused on direct passenger charter flights and expanding Chinese tourism to Taiwan, the Taipei and Beijing governments are hoping that the resumption of dialogue could signal the start of regular cross-strait policy negotiations through these two agencies.
If that happens, the significance of the talks would not be limited to the real economic benefits of direct flights and increased tourism but would also have greater implications on the long-term development of cross-strait relations.
While the negotiators tout a brighter future arising from better cross-strait talks, there are economic, social and political concerns that Taiwan should address.
Politically, the resumption of dialogue is based on the precondition of acceptance — by both sides — of the so-called “1992 consensus.” While Beijing sees Taipei’s acceptance of the “1992 consensus” as Taiwan returning to the “one China” framework, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) stresses that the consensus meant “each side having its own interpretation” of the term one China.
The past decade lay witness to China’s political and economic rise and Taiwan’s comparative decline. As such, in the eyes of the international community, no matter how Taiwan interprets or explains what “one China” means or encompasses — “one China is the Republic of China [ROC],” “one China means one cultural China” or “one China is a future China” — these cannot rival Beijing’s claim that “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is part of China, and the People’s Republic of China is the only legal government of China.”
How the sovereignty of the Republic of China can be safeguarded against such a backdrop during political negotiations is an issue that Taiwanese and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) should continue to press upon the KMT.
President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) promise of “no unification, no independence, no violence” to maintain the “status quo” is actually a dynamic equilibrium. If it is in the interests of China, the US and Japan for Taiwan to maintain such a status quo, then they should more proactively assist Taiwan in doing so.
Once there is real advancement in Taiwan’s relationship with China through the resumption of cross-strait dialogue, Taiwan should have room to demand greater support from the US and Japan in terms of international participation, so as to not fall into an entirely passive position of relying entirely on the goodwill of Beijing.
Economically, aside from increased tourism and direct flights, the resumption of cross-strait dialogue means that there will be more economic exchanges and routine negotiations. Further integration of the cross-strait economies would be the inevitable outcome of such a development.
While the change in government has attracted more foreign investment in Taiwanese stocks, the US and European chambers of commerce have said that cross-strait economic integration is a precondition to raising Taiwan’s international competitiveness.
However, even if, as international investors predict, cross-strait economic integration is beneficial to Taiwan’s long-term economic development as a whole, this does not necessarily mean it would be beneficial to all Taiwanese. Just as globalization creates winners and losers in every country, so will further liberalization in cross-strait exchanges create beneficiaries and victims in Taiwan.
Taiwan has always used protectionist economic policies to safeguard the victims of cross-strait economic exchange. The result has been that the beneficiaries of these policies who desire liberalization left the country, while the perceived victims have failed to increase their global competitiveness and now face increasingly lower income standards compared with those in neighboring countries.
If the economy is to be liberalized, including gradually canceling regulations and barriers to the free flow of capital, goods and workers, to bolster economic growth, the government should promote more comprehensive social benefits, foster an active labor market and implement industrial policies that can help potential victims adjust or move into other industries to raise the economic competitiveness and income level of Taiwanese so that growth can be more evenly distributed across the board.
As the largest opposition party, the DPP should take up the cudgels in giving voice to these economic and political concerns stemming from the resumption of cross-strait dialogue. However, a look at the DPP’s recent criticisms shows a lack of scope, focusing mainly on the sincerity and negotiation skills of the Taiwanese representatives, as well as questioning Beijing’s goodwill.
If the DPP wished to question whether the so-called “1992 consensus” could protect Taiwanese sovereignty, it should have followed up on Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) statement during his meeting with KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) that Taiwan’s entry into the WHO can be a priority for discussion and demanded Ma recommend Taiwan’s entry into the World Bank, the IMF, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and ASEAN-Plus — all of which are worthy goals.
The DPP knew the importance of expanding direct links during its term in office. However, it was unable to overcome Beijing’s unwillingness to negotiate without the precondition of the so-called “1992 consensus.”
On the whole, the DPP has failed to criticize the process of economic liberalization that is about to be unleashed by the resumption of cross-strait negotiations. Instead, its criticism has focused on the exclusion of direct cargo charter flights, as though it was unhappy that economic liberalization was not happening fast enough. This is inconsistent with the center-left “Happiness Economy” policy that the DPP evinced during the presidential election, and the party has lost its chance to speak on behalf of the anxious underprivileged.
If the resumption of cross-strait dialogue is the beginning of a foundation of trust for cross-strait policy negotiations, then in terms of Taiwan’s long-term development, it is both a source of anxiety and of anticipation. Only through the complete expression and thorough discussion of variously oriented considerations can the benefits of the greater majority within Taiwanese society and the sovereignty of the nation be ensured.
In-depth deliberations and serious criticism of these problems have now become an unavoidable responsibility for the DPP.
Tao Yi-feng is an associate professor of political science at National Taiwan University.
TRANSLATED BY ANGELA HONG
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