The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)-controlled legislature passed the budgets for the PAC-2 missile upgrades and the PAC-3 missile, and substantially increased the defense budget. After a meeting between KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), the KMT said China intends to redeploy the missiles currently aimed at Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), however, has neither publicly confirmed nor denied this information.<>
Even if Beijing decides to remove these missiles, we can be certain that it will demand corresponding adjustments from Taiwan and the US.
On Double Ten Day in 2002, then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) asked Chinese leaders to remove the 400 missiles Beijing was then deploying on the other side of the Taiwan Strait and to say that they would give up any military threats against Taiwan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also promoted the idea of removing the missiles and seeking peace.
On Oct. 25 that year, at a Texas summit with US President George W. Bush, then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) ignored Taiwan and told Bush that the missiles aimed at Taiwan could be linked to the US sale of arms to Taiwan.
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has said many times that the removal of missiles was a precondition for negotiations on a cross-strait peace agreement. Once weekend chartered flights begin crossing the Strait, it would seem contradictory, if not ironic, for China to increase its missile deployment against Taiwan in Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Anhui provinces.
Therefore, in addition to the KMT, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the US, Japan and the EU should demand the complete removal of missiles aimed at Taiwan, rather than just a freeze or reduction in their numbers.
If China removes these missiles, but does not destroy them or the missile heads, they could be redeployed if the DPP were to regain power or tensions return across the Strait.
Through its missile deployment, Beijing is trying to kill many birds with one stone. While a reduction of missiles would have a political and psychological impact on Taiwan, the US is still the main recipient of Beijing’s demands.
If Beijing demonstrates goodwill, the missiles could be removed either quietly or publicly. Insistence on negotiations with the US would indicate a hidden Chinese agenda.
There are already different voices within the US concerning whether Taiwan should be able to obtain additional F-16 fighter jets or submarines. If Beijing removes its missiles, this debate would be further complicated. Whether the EU weapons embargo on China should continue is still a major point of debate.
Taiwan will not always be ruled by Ma or the KMT. The CCP may withdraw its missiles and call a diplomatic truce with Taiwan while the KMT is in power. The same cannot be expected if the DPP returns to power.
Before the KMT took office, KMT leaders said they would allot US$10.5 billion per year, equivalent to 3 percent of GDP, to the defense budget. This shows us that the KMT also knows that solely relying on improving cross-strait relations is not enough and that a national defense plan is still necessary.
The increased business interaction and other exchanges between Taiwan and China as well as quicker cross-strait flights are promising developments. These same factors also make cross-strait relations more complex.
Taiwan may not have to worry about Chinese missile tests anymore, but Hu has still not said if he would relinquish the use of force against Taiwan. China’s “Anti-Secession” Law remains on the books and keeping Taiwan out of the UN and its agencies is still the main thrust of Beijing’s diplomatic actions.
The chartered flights and the increase in Chinese tourists proposed by the KMT government are about to become a reality. At this time, the real challenge for the KMT lies in how to get Beijing to remove its missiles and stop isolating Taiwan diplomatically.
It would be better for cross-strait relations if written agreements were reached between China and Taiwan instead of Beijing just saying it will remove the missiles. At talks held in Macau years ago, China and Taiwan declared they would do away with signing written agreements. This is inadequate for limiting Beijing’s actions and is also not enough to ensure Taiwan’s safety.
Taiwan has long had plans for Confidence-Building Measures for cross-strait relations, such as agreements on making military information more transparent, limiting military deployments, establishing communication channels and setting up inspection measures. It is now high time for Beijing to give some sort of response on such matters.
It is more important for China to actually remove the missiles, not just talk about it. It would be positive for Taiwan and cross-strait relations regardless of whether China reduces the number of missiles, removes all of them or destroys them.
What is crucial is that until Beijing renounces the use of force against Taiwan, Taiwan must be ready to defend itself. Washington also needs to continue to assist Taiwan in defending itself in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
We can welcome China’s removal of missiles, but we should not be overly optimistic and think that war will never happen in the Taiwan Strait. Nor should we naively believe that everything will be peaches when and if China removes its missiles.
Lin Cheng-yi is a researcher at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica.
TRANSLATED BY ANGELA HONG AND DREW CAMERON
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