During his historic trip to China, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) asked his Chinese Communist Party counterpart, Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), to respect Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Wu also emphasized that “Taiwanese identity” should not be treated as “Taiwanese independence.”
As the KMT pursues a quick resumption of cross-strait talks on direct links and allowing Chinese tourists into Taiwan, Wu and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) understand that the highly anticipated breakthrough in the cross-strait deadlock must be accompanied by Beijing giving Taiwan more international room.
Ma and the KMT leadership also realize that the key reason for Taiwan’s second transfer of power is the corruption that existed under the Democratic Progressive Party government, and not former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) push for Taiwanese consciousness.
Dislike of Chen and his government helped Ma to become president; his moderate image and a promise to rejuvenate the economy also played a role.
But governing a country requires more than a personal image. It takes full coordination and policy execution to live up to public expectations.
If Wu did not refer to Ma as president in front of Hu to avoid sovereign symbols, then to what extent can we trust the KMT to stand firm on Taiwan’s behalf — even if Beijing winds down its campaign of isolating Taipei?
As democratic concepts mature, the gap between the pan-green and pan-blue camps on the independence-unification dichotomy will become meaningless. The notion that Taiwan — or the Republic of China — is a sovereign and independent state will receive mainstream acceptance.
National identity is being played down as an issue even as it is being consolidated; it is in this context that Taiwan’s democracy will enter the next phase: judging a national leader by a higher standard.
If Chen was judged by most domestic and international observers as simply a politician pushing the envelope, then it is sad to see that Ma is slowly adopting the same model — running the country like an election campaign — and keeping political opportunism firmly in the grasp of the Presidential Office.
The publication of an advertisement pledging that “the future of Taiwan should be decided by the Taiwanese people” in pro-independence media outlets before the presidential election was a move by Ma’s camp to appeal to the DPP’s support base in southern Taiwan.
But in his inaugural speech, Ma did not refer to this issue other than by praising Hu’s recent statements on resuming cross-strait dialogue based on the so-called “1992 consensus.”
To avoid the perception that the KMT is tilting toward the Chinese Communist Party, Ma also labeled the party-to-party talks as “track two” in the facilitation of bilateral understanding. It is a strategy to downplay criticism that Ma and the KMT might sell out Taiwan.
But whether Beijing will relax its diplomatic stranglehold on Taiwan is uncertain. Getting results in this regard constitutes Ma’s greatest challenge.
Ma is using his mandate of 58 percent of the vote to assimilate the DPP legacy of building Taiwanese identity — but simply out of electoral concerns. Yet when the KMT contacts Beijing, Ma sets aside notions of a Taiwan-centered identity.
Is Ma doing this in the national interest? Is he a man of principle? Can he stand up to hardcore pro-unification forces, including the old guard led by former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰)? Or is he simply an opportunist?
These are questions that cannot be answered for now. But the public needs them soon.
Liu Shih-chung is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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