Taiwan is in a serious predicament. The most important issue facing President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration is how to maintain Taiwan’s political identity and sovereignty.
That is, of course, unless they have given up on them.
There is a lot of confusion on this issue even though, in the new scheme of things, both Beijing and Taipei now subscribe to the “one China” principle.
While Beijing has no doubt that Taiwan belongs to China, the Ma administration would prefer to take shelter behind the vague formulation known as the “1992 consensus,” which broadly means that each side interprets the “one China” principle to suit their political needs.
In other words, Taiwan will continue to behave as a distinct political entity.
And Beijing won’t make much of an issue of it because the Ma administration is formally committed to “one China.”
In the past Beijing wasn’t prepared to accept ambiguity on this issue, insisting that any talks with Taipei must be based on an explicit recognition that Taiwan is an integral part of China.
But with a sympathetic new political order in Taiwan, Beijing may become less rigid. And the new administration in Taiwan will be keen to underplay differences with China.
Beijing might therefore seek to accommodate the Ma administration by not gratuitously chanting the mantra that Taiwan is a part of China.
Ma will also be loath to provoke China by invoking referendums that assert Taiwan’s sovereignty.
At the same time, the US is relieved that Taiwan is becoming less of an issue for them, at least for the moment.
Considering that the Ma administration is going to open up Taiwan to more trade, investment, communications, tourism, property deals and other dealings with China, one has to ask the obvious question: How will Taipei keep a tab on Beijing’s efforts to undermine its political culture and institutions?
One doesn’t have to be a genius to conclude that, with such an extensive and growing presence from these multiple channels of exchange, Beijing will be able to exercise considerable influence over, if not determine, how Taiwan goes about its business in a very short period of time.
Any divisions in the KMT between those who want to ingratiate themselves with Beijing will give China considerable leeway in playing politics within the party’s ranks.
Unlike in the past, China will not feel terribly concerned over the ambiguity of the “1992 consensus,” even if they have a tendency to remind everyone that ambiguity doesn’t mean erasure.
In any event, Taipei will tend to look the other way, satisfied with the outward appearance of the “status quo” in cross-strait and domestic affairs.
What all this means in effect is that Taiwan will end up being a de facto part of China sooner rather than later.
Beijing has a strong political lobby in the KMT and in the business community. And with new economic access points and expanding contacts, it might be able to subvert Taiwan’s painstakingly built political culture.
It is a scary scenario.
But it doesn’t have to go this far if the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and other groups, which favor a sovereign identity, get their act together.
The DPP polled more than 40 percent of the vote in the last presidential election, and just over 50 percent in the poll before that. These are not small proportions of a polity.
Besides, many of those who voted for the KMT would be horrified at the prospect of Taiwan’s subjugation and absorption if the Ma administration looks like becoming a part of this process.
If the opposition can reinvent itself — a difficult, but not impossible task — it will give itself the space to mobilize large numbers of people against China’s incremental takeover, regardless of the degree of complicity of the new administration.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
On Sept. 3 in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rolled out a parade of new weapons in PLA service that threaten Taiwan — some of that Taiwan is addressing with added and new military investments and some of which it cannot, having to rely on the initiative of allies like the United States. The CCP’s goal of replacing US leadership on the global stage was advanced by the military parade, but also by China hosting in Tianjin an August 31-Sept. 1 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which since 2001 has specialized
In an article published by the Harvard Kennedy School, renowned historian of modern China Rana Mitter used a structured question-and-answer format to deepen the understanding of the relationship between Taiwan and China. Mitter highlights the differences between the repressive and authoritarian People’s Republic of China and the vibrant democracy that exists in Taiwan, saying that Taiwan and China “have had an interconnected relationship that has been both close and contentious at times.” However, his description of the history — before and after 1945 — contains significant flaws. First, he writes that “Taiwan was always broadly regarded by the imperial dynasties of
A large part of the discourse about Taiwan as a sovereign, independent nation has centered on conventions of international law and international agreements between outside powers — such as between the US, UK, Russia, the Republic of China (ROC) and Japan at the end of World War II, and between the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since recognition of the PRC as the sole representative of China at the UN. Internationally, the narrative on the PRC and Taiwan has changed considerably since the days of the first term of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic
A report by the US-based Jamestown Foundation on Tuesday last week warned that China is operating illegal oil drilling inside Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Island (Dongsha, 東沙群島), marking a sharp escalation in Beijing’s “gray zone” tactics. The report said that, starting in July, state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp installed 12 permanent or semi-permanent oil rig structures and dozens of associated ships deep inside Taiwan’s EEZ about 48km from the restricted waters of Pratas Island in the northeast of the South China Sea, islands that are home to a Taiwanese garrison. The rigs not only typify
RSS