President-elect Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) claimed that the so-called “1992 consensus” will serve as the basis of future negotiations between Taiwan and China. Subsequently, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), during a recent phone conversation with US President George W. Bush, indicated his willingness to reopen cross-strait talks on the basis of the “1992 consensus.”
During his meeting with Ma on April 1, however, President Chen Shiu-bian (陳水扁) again denied the existence of such a consensus. While the likelihood of future cross-strait negotiations greatly increases, the above-mentioned statements imply different perceptions regarding this arrangement. Discussion of future cross-strait relations, therefore, requires thorough understanding of the following issues: fundamentally, what is the “1992 Consensus?” Do the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have the same interpretations of this arrangement? Are the opposing positions of the KMT and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) regarding the so-called consensus a roadblock to future cross-strait dialogue?
During the October 1992 cross-strait talks, the thorny “one China” principle was brought to the attention of the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). The foundation suggested that both sides would adhere to the “one China” principle but reserved the rights to interpret the term “one China” differently.
This suggestion gave rise to the so-called “one China, different interpretations” concept, one that was later termed the “1992 Consensus” by former SEF official Su Chi (蘇起) — Taipei’s view of China as the “Republic of China,” while Beijing saw China as meaning the “People’s Republic of China” (PRC).
Since 1992, the concept constitutes the official KMT position regarding cross-strait relations. The KMT attitude is shown by key people such as Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤), who represented Taiwan at the 1993 APEC summit and stated that Taiwan would adhere to “one China” principle in the long-run, while also pursuing a “two Chinas” policy.
Former President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), the leader of KMT at the time, also seemed to uphold this concept when he voiced his “special state-to-state” model of cross-strait relations. Ma adheres to the alleged consensus, but he does state that Taiwan’s sovereignty issue and political status are matters to be decided by the Taiwanese people.
Beijing refused to sign on to the SEF’s proposal of “one China, different interpretations.” Beijing has always viewed the “one China” principle in its strictest terms. It refuses to acknowledge Taiwan’s independence or ambiguous arrangements such as “one China, one Taiwan” or “two Chinas.” In response to the SEF’s suggestion, ARATS “agreed to the foundation’s suggestion of stating the ‘one China’ principle, but both sides have to pursue reunification without talking about the political meaning of ‘one China’ when negotiating over policy affairs of mutual interest.”
Simply put, Beijing’s view of “one China” is: “There is only one China in this world, Taiwan is part of China and the PRC is the sole legitimate representative of China.” Its later modification of words into “there is only one China in this world, Taiwan and the mainland both belong to China and any attempts of sovereignty or territorial secession is prohibited” does not change the underlying premise: To Beijing, “one China” is literally one China. There is no room for any liberal interpretation.
The DPP government has denied the existence of the alleged consensus, arguing that there is no written agreement and common understanding of what constitutes the so-called consensus. It has advocated a “92 spirit,” one that shows DPP’s willingness to put disputes aside and solve policy issues of mutual concern through cross-strait talks. Chen proposed the resumption of cross-strait talks based on what was achieved during the 1992 Hong Kong meeting, but the DPP insists that the “one China” principle should not be seen as a conclusion.
The DPP has always advocated a “one China, one Taiwan” principle, so “one China” is seen by DPP as one of the several options for the Taiwanese. The so-called “1992 consensus” to the DPP is a trap set by Beijing. Accepting this arrangement would indicate Taiwan’s acceptance of the “one China” principle — agreement to become a part of the PRC.
The US has always maintained a “one China” position. It does not support Taiwan’s independence, “one China, one Taiwan” or “two Chinas.” However, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 stipulates the US’ commitment to peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences and sales of defensive military equipment to Taiwan. While the US will not serve as mediator, it encourages a resumption of dialogue and respects any forms of interaction agreed to by both sides. This implies that the US will not oppose the resumption of talks based on the principle of “one China.” The US is more interested in Taipei and Beijing’s commitment to talks than the legitimacy of the alleged consensus.
This analysis shows that three major players in cross-strait relations have drastically different positions regarding the alleged consensus.
While the KMT sees a cross-strait consensus on individual interpretations of the term “one China,” Beijing insists that the PRC is the only one that has legitimate claim to a “one China” title. The DPP questions the existence and thus the legitimacy of this arrangement.
Unless these players can find ways to get around this fundamental conflict, problems will arise and stall future dialogue. Thus, our new government faces a major challenge because it decided to base future cross-strait dialogue on the alleged consensus. It not only throws itself open to Beijing’s pressure (acceptance of the “one China” principle as a precondition to negotiations) but also to the oppositions’ criticism (that such acceptance would lead to a “sellout” of Taiwan’s sovereignty).
Lin Wen-cheng is a professor at the Institute of Mainland Studies at National Sun Yat-sen University.
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS