Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) promised during his presidential campaign that he would liberalize existing regulations on “economic” links between Taiwan and China, starting with direct charter flights, allowing more tourists from China, welcoming Chinese capital to be invested in Taiwan’s real estate market and lifting the existing cap on Taiwan’s firms that prevents them from investing more than 40 percent of their assets in China.
The cap was placed under President Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) administration in an effort to stem the exodus of capital going to China and in an attempt to diversify Taiwan’s economic outflow to the local market and other less politically risky countries.
Despite the recent public display of affection, observers should not expect a substantial thawing of cross-strait relations in the near future. As president, Ma will also have to consider the 42 percent of Taiwan’s 13.1 million voters that cast their ballots for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷).
There is still a significant portion of Taiwanese who are concerned that a deepening engagement with China could have a corrosive effect on Taiwan’s nation-building process. During his presidential campaign, Ma also pledged that he would not enter into direct talks with China unless it removes the 1,400 missiles that it has deployed along the southern provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang, an increase from 350 missiles in 2002.
The Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) proposition essentially amounts to an armistice, which Chinese government academics have flatly dismissed. Ma and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), however, have carefully avoided this delicate fault line, and instead have focused much of their rhetoric on the opportunities for closer cross-strait economic ties by using the so-called “1992 consensus,” an agreement the DPP administration has said is fictional.
Ma believes “one China, and each side has its own interpretation of ‘one China’” to be the foundation of cross-strait relations.
Ma’s “mutual non-denial” as the parameter for dialogue avoids definitions of what each side’s interpretations are and avoids politically sensitive issues such as independence or unification.
Again, the day after his election victory, Ma openly stated that he has no problem with the “one China” principle at an international press conference. He later qualified his statement by pointing out that “one China” is the Republic of China, not the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Ma also emphasized that without room for different interpretations of “one China,” he would not negotiate with the PRC. However, Ma was immediately criticized by a wide range in the political spectrum for showing his cards too soon, and thereby compromising Taiwan’s security.
The rule Ma follows is no different from what former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and Hu agreed to on in 2005 — the so-called “five-point consensus.”
As president of the 23 million citizens of Taiwan, how will Ma detach himself from the KMT old guards such as Lien without putting himself in a puppet position? How successful will he be at fulfilling Lien’s promise to Hu without compromising Taiwan’s national security and interests?
The extent to which Beijing will genuinely pursue cross-strait rapprochement with the KMT will be gauged in Taiwan by its response to Taiwan’s long-standing campaign to gain observer status in the WHO and related bodies — organizations in which statehood is not prerequisite for entry.
Beijing’s consistent blocking of Taiwan’s entry into international organizations has had an adverse effect on the domestic polity in Taiwan, and its isolation as a result has given the DPP support for its more Taiwan-centric policies.
Ma recently said that unlike the Chen administration, which applied for WHO observer status under the name of “Taiwan,” he believed that there was no better name than “Chinese Taipei” for the application.
His statement stirred suspicion among the public. If Beijing continues to restrict Taiwan’s participation in these international organizations, then it will be a slap in the face for Ma and the KMT and consequently there may be more questions than answers concerning the feasibility of Ma’s approach.
Without the possibility of genuine overtures from Beijing, Ma will find it difficult to overcome domestic pressure from the DPP and pursue closer engagement with Beijing without being seen as kneeling to Hu’s crown.
The US welcomed Ma’s victory, praising the peaceful transition of power and consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy, seeing the ascendancy of the KMT as a positive sign toward thawing cross-strait relations.
Leaders in Washington see Ma’s conciliatory position towards Beijing as offering a window of opportunity for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, a relief from the often tense atmosphere that has characterized cross-strait relations during Chen’s administration, and contributed to a deterioration of mutual trust between US President George W. Bush and Chen.
At the same time, the KMT’s victory moved the ball into China’s court to deal with how it should engage cross-strait relations with the KMT in power.
The US continues to spend political and economic capital on the “war on terrorism,” particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. As it also faces a stalemate on the six-party talks, Washington will take any breathing room it can get from a Taiwan less confrontational toward China.
In its view, unnecessary provocation “pushes the envelope” and raises the stake in cross-Strait relations.
This attitude, however, is not without risks and concerns. If Taiwan, already the most economically integrated country in Asia, is too close to Beijing, it could make the US more dependent on China for support of its foreign policy interests in Asia.
This poses a significant challenge to the US’ traditional security paradigm and its more value-oriented foreign policy that was initially adopted in Bush’s first administration but was then completely integrated into the global war on terrorism.
Ma’s attitude toward Japan, from his college years as a Diaoyutai activist throughout his political career leading up to his election as president, have shifted over time.
During the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in 2005, Ma, while serving as mayor of Taipei, declared that Japan was “stealing” the disputed Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands. Ma’s statements on the disputed islands and Japan’s history of colonization are significant because they risk confusing Taiwanese, who had under the previous two Taiwan administrations had a far more intimate relationship with Japan.
Later as chairman of the KMT, Ma even called on Chen to “use a battle to force a peace” in a fisheries dispute involving Diaoyutai.
Under former president Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) administration, the KMT’s historically anti-Japanese stance was largely changed to project a new, pro-Japanese attitude.
In Japan, there was a prevailing fondness toward and admiration for Lee, especially after he was the first elected Taiwanese president in 1996.
Obviously, Ma’s past record in his relations with Japan can not be compared to Lee’s, nor to Chen’s. The Japanese impression of Ma’s unfriendly position will definitely be the biggest challenge in dealing with Japan during his presidency.
A critical issue that has perhaps deliberately been given less discussion by the KMT is the significance of the US-Japan security alliance and its importance for Taiwan’s security during Ma’s administration.
As Ma pursues opening economic links with Beijing while shelving discussion of sensitive political issues, the question remains as to how Ma will justify Taiwan’s need for a robust security relationship with the US and Japan if it chooses to ignore China’s military threat to Taiwan?
Where will Taiwan then pivot in the strategic landscape for the US and Japan? It appears that what Ma is offering is stasis in the Taiwan Strait, detaching cross-strait political conflict from international security, an initiative undertaken by the DPP administration in an effort to internationalize the issue of the Strait.
And if Ma was to strengthen the security relationship, how would Beijing react?
How Ma plans to maintain the US-Japan security alliance remains a mine field for his administration to navigate without jeopardizing the long-term security of Taiwan.
As the KMT prepares to take executive leadership of Taiwan’s future for the next four years, we can expect it to take extra caution in not irritating the PRC in order to avoid military confrontation across the Strait, but the KMT government should be wary of falling into the trap of forfeiting Taiwan’s dignity and its long-standing public ethos to pursue its national identity.
The emphasis on regional peace and stability in Ma’s national security formula should be welcomed by regional states, but the KMT government cannot be too compromising to the PRC at the expense of developing trustful relations with other important allies such as the US and Japan.
Taiwan under Ma must not get too much involved in the disputes between the PRC and Japan on matters such as the use of history textbooks, the Nanking massacre and the Yasukuni shrine, to name a few. Taiwan also needs to be especially careful in dealing with the unsolvable Diaoyutai issue between China, Taiwan and Japan.
It is, therefore, advised that the new foundation for the future of Taiwan-Japan-US security relations be implemented at the outset of the incoming Ma administration, which is based on the common interests of protecting and preserving Taiwan’s dignity, democracy and human rights as the only and strongest guarantee for enduring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
Michael Hsiao is executive director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies at Academia Sinica. Russell Hsiao is the editor of China Brief at the Jamestown Foundation in Virginia.
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