President-elect Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) convincing victory and the simultaneous defeat of the UN referendums on March 22 clearly was the outcome a majority of Taiwanese voters sought, but also the result preferred by Beijing and Washington.
A giant sigh of relief came quickly from Washington in the form of a congratulatory message enthusiastically welcoming the opportunity for a fresh start in US-Taiwan relations. However Washington’s enthusiasm did not extend to prompt welcoming of the president-elect’s proposed visit prior to inauguration day — after which Washington’s symbolic restrictions will prohibit a “visit” to the US.
Beijing’s reaction came across more as satisfaction than exuberance, gloating over the perceived disapproval of President Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) agenda but simultaneously warning the world to watch out for tricks yet to be played before he leaves office.
Following the election, expectations in Taiwan and the US have been quite high that improvements in cross-strait relations are imminent and that an ease in tensions should translate into economic and security benefits for Taiwan. Beijing has conspicuously talked down expectations for the pace and scope of the upcoming agenda. Symbolic meetings and progress in functional areas may be the extent of Beijing’s interest for some time.
Some of what Ma proposed seemed reasonable and pragmatic. His cross-strait strategy, described as “small steps at a quick pace,” placed priority on strength at home and in relations with the US as a precondition for engaging Beijing, and declared discussion of Taiwan’s future status to be off the agenda during his time in office.
But some of what he proposed was quite bold, perhaps more than Beijing cares to entertain for the time being. The idea of a peace agreement and moving toward a common market has been met with rhetorical welcome but operational caution in Beijing. A sampling of this caution was shared by a Chinese academic who opined: “How can the military sustain its budget if a peace agreement is reached, and yet Taiwan could return to its previous ways in four or eight years?”
There is also the challenge of envisioning how a common market approach can be negotiated and implemented via any channel other than government-to-government, something Beijing has opposed.
What then is reasonable for the people of Taiwan to expect from the US and China as the Ma administration begins? Mostly small gestures that welcome the change in tone from Taipei, but do little to change the status quo in terms of interaction with Taiwan.
A new Straits Exchange Foundation chairman will be appointed as the Ma administration takes office. The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits also needs a new chairman, to fill the vacancy left with the passing of Wang Daohan (汪道涵). With those formalities in place, a symbolic meeting of the two chairman should be scheduled perhaps before the Beijing Olympics, but the agenda likely would be limited to perceived “low hanging fruit” at best — direct flights, pandas, etc. Gradually the functional agenda could expand, even allowing visits of Cabinet-level officials representing portfolios unrelated to sovereignty, such as transportation.
So far there is no evidence that officials in Beijing or Washington are entertaining meaningful changes to treatment of Taiwan in international settings. Beijing has not agreed to a “ceasefire” in efforts to take Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies and has not defined what international space (if any) it will support for Taiwanese representatives. And Washington has not linked its relief with Ma’s victory to forthcoming relaxation of symbolic restrictions placed on interaction with Taiwanese officials (in the US and internationally).
For example, where is the international space that the US will now pro-actively advocate for Taiwan even if Beijing continues to object? Hard to imagine anything in the near-term, with so many other equities at stake with Beijing that the US is likely to see as more important.
Economic relations with China and the US are the area of greatest promise in terms of expanded interaction, although it is unclear what if any improvement it will lead to in Taiwan’s economic performance. Loosening restrictions on cross-strait investment, trade, transportation and tourism will clearly increase activity. Actual progress towards establishing a common market would do even more.
Similarly economic interaction with the US could expand if the US agrees to simultaneously open negotiations for a bilateral free-trade agreement. But would deeper economic integration with either China or the US necessarily lead to more rapid GDP growth, lower unemployment, greater international competitiveness or higher consumer confidence?
For outside observers it is hard to assess how important near-term progress is to the fate of the Ma administration.
Some suggest that a moment of strategic opportunity may be lost if Beijing and Taipei fail to get off to a quick and productive start. Others say that all Ma needs to accomplish is effectively hitting the cross-strait ball back into Beijing’s court, with Taipei no longer seen as creating tension or unreasonably standing in the way of progress.
Whether the bold or more limited vision is correct, voters in Taiwan have four years to assess the value of the president-elect’s new agenda. All who share a stake in Taiwan’s continued success should wish him well.
Stephen Yates is president of DC Asia Advisory, a consultancy in Washington, and former deputy assistant to Vice President Dick Cheney for national security affairs.
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