The day after Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) won the presidential election, he announced he would accept the “one China with each side having its own interpretation” framework. Three days later, the Xinhua news agency reported on the discussion between Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and US President George W. Bush on the so-called “1992 consensus.”
The English version of the report contained the phrase “one China, different interpretations,” while the Chinese version only mentioned the “one China” principle. This sequence of events must have been carefully orchestrated and planned beforehand. Because of differences between the Chinese and English versions of the story, much room was left for interpretation.
Whether Chinese leaders verbally agree with “one China with each side having its own interpretation” is not important. What matters is whether Beijing is sincere in putting it into practice. This is something that can be verified as soon as Ma takes office.
Let’s take currency exchange between the New Taiwan dollar and the Chinese yuan as an example. Because of Beijing’s opposition, Taiwan is not a member of the IMF, so it cannot demand that China follow through on currency-clearing obligations, as IMF rules state. Therefore, before allowing the exchange of the yuan, it is only economically sound and reasonable for Taiwan to demand that China enter into a bilateral currency-clearing pact. This requirement has already been stipulated in the Statute Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (兩岸人民關係條例).
China has refused to sign such a pact. Taiwan’s government, however, has been under pressure from businesspeople and the banking and tourism industries to unilaterally legalize the large-scale exchange of yuan for NT dollars. Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers have been to trying to amend Article 38 of the statute to remove the “currency clearing agreement” clause.
Without such a deal, legalizing the large-scale exchange of yuan would be recognizing the yuan as a legal foreign currency, while the NT dollar would not be viewed the same way in China. Chinese would be able to exchange yuan for NT dollars on a large-scale basis, but Taiwanese would not enjoy the same privilege, except at a limited number of locations.
Without a bilateral agreement, any problems involving the yuan in the future would be the Taiwanese government’s problem. China would be under no obligation to provide any assistance or cooperation.
Solving problems with the international currency mechanism requires a bilateral or multilateral effort. A unilateral approach will only create more problems.
Signing a bilateral currency-clearing agreement is a simple economic task. It does not involve any of the complications of signing a so-called peace agreement. Therefore, come Ma’s inauguration on May 20, we can immediately put him to the test.
KMT legislators appear very eager to change Taiwan’s laws to cave in to China’s position. They seem to have little, if any, faith that Ma’s “one China with each side having its own interpretation” policy will work. They also do not seem to believe that China would sign a currency-clearing agreement with Taiwan under this framework.
KMT legislators should give Ma and the Chinese government a chance to put the “one China, different interpretations” framework into practice. If Beijing is willing to sign a mutual and equal currency-clearing agreement that does not limit Taiwan’s rights or marginalize Taiwan or its currency, then it would truly be a master stroke and a blow against the Taiwanese independence movement. The Taiwanese independence discourse would need to be adjusted.
But if Beijing only makes exploitative demands about an agreement’s preconditions, structure and content, then the Ma government, pan-blue legislators, and voters will not need to entertain any illusions about its idea of “one China with each side having its own interpretation.”
Lin Chia is an independent commentator.
Translated by James Chen
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