At a post-election international press conference, president-elect Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) expressed his intention to visit the US, Japan and Singapore before his inauguration on May 20. If Ma makes these trips without any political repercussions, it would definitely set a precedent for high-ranking officials, perhaps even the president, to visit major countries.
Nevertheless, as the administration of US President George W. Bush seems to be reluctant to approve a visit by Ma, his plans seem fated to fail for very obvious reasons.
Although he has not been sworn in yet, the fact that Ma received such a strong mandate from the public and that he has now become the symbol of a sovereign country that China will not accept means that he stands on the wrong side of Beijing’s “red line.”
Sovereignty is not an option for Taiwan, as far as Beijing is concerned.
Although Ma has yet to take office, his visits to those countries would attract wide media coverage and constitute a headache for Beijing.
Unless Ma’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has made an under-the-table deal with Chinese authorities concerning the proposed trips to ensure that sovereignty will not be discussed during the visits, Ma will be blocked by Beijing. Chinese interference at every stop would certainly make for a humiliating trip.
The fact that Ma expressed his desire to make the trip without first consulting Washington, Tokyo or Singapore has already caused controversy for the leaders of those countries.
The governments of the US, Japan and Singapore all sent congratulatory messages to the Ma camp immediately after he won the presidential election. They also indicated their hope that the cross-strait dialogue would soon resume and tension would ease.
In his telephone conversation with Bush, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) reportedly said Beijing could accept the so-called “1992 consensus,” under which each side of the Taiwan Strait should be allowed to have its own definition of “one China.”
But does Hu’s spurious gesture of “goodwill” translate into Chinese approval for Taiwan’s newly elected president to visit Washington at such a sensitive juncture?
Tokyo will also be caught in a dilemma if it allows Ma to visit before May 20.
Hu is scheduled to visit Japan later this month. Japan would hardly be willing to jeopardize Hu’s visit by allowing Ma to go to Tokyo.
In the case of Singapore, it is likely to follow in the footsteps of the US and Japan on this matter.
If the visits to these countries are basically impossible, why did Ma take the risk of seeking such visits?
Ma’s diplomatic maneuvring reflects his double standards concerning the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration’s foreign policy.
During his election campaign, Ma accused the DPP of being confrontational and a trouble-maker on the international front, and especially concerning relations with the US and China.
Ma’s party also called President Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) 14 state visits during his two terms “money diplomacy.”
The KMT said that the only result of Chen’s overseas trips was to provoke Beijing to buy out the nation’s allies.
If that is true, wouldn’t Ma’s attempt to visit Japan and the US risk raising Beijing’s hackles too? How does he intend to make peace with Beijing and win more international space for Taiwan if Chinese authorities find his actions as provoking as Chen’s?
Liu Shih-chung is vice chairman of the Research and Planning Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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