Taiwanese voters have overwhelmingly elected Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) with a 17 percent margin. The KMT now has control of the legislature, the presidency and most local governments. In short, the KMT now enjoys the strongest political position it has held since the beginning of open, democratic politics in Taiwan. But now the difficult task of governing starts, and no issue will be more difficult than to manage cross-strait relations. My advice to Ma in this endeavor is to follow the lead of Theodore Roosevelt, the US president from 1900 to 1909: "Speak softly and carry a big stick."
China greeted Ma's election with a mixture of "cautious optimism" and relief that they no longer have to deal with President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). For at least four years, Beijing will not be exasperated by a leadership in Taipei proposing de jure separation.
The fundamental problem with Chen's approach to cross-strait relations was that he insisted on poking his finger in China's eye without having the political capital necessary to strengthen Taiwan's defenses should Beijing lash out as a result. In February 2006 he closed the National Unification Council, further aggravating his already testy relations with Beijing.
Since his election in 2000, Chen's actions have only added fuel to China's military modernization, giving the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a ready rationale to demand more funding. It has also contributed to the deployment of more than 1,000 ballistic missiles in Fujian Province opposite Taiwan. In this way Chen's actions have only contributed to the deterioration of Taiwan's security situation, not to mention potentially dragging the US into a dangerous conflict.
However, the KMT is not entirely blameless, either. Each time Chen sought to purchase a package of defensive weapons from the US, the KMT and its allies in the legislature were able to defeat the measure -- more than 62 times. It is unclear if the KMT was merely trying to restrain Chen or if they actually did not want to make the purchase. Ma declined to reveal his position.
Here is where Roosevelt comes in. When Ma does come to power, he should take a page from Roosevelt's playbook. He does not advocate an independent Taiwan, so speaking softly should be fairly easy: Ma is unlikely to provoke China with statements or symbolic actions. He should revive the unification council, push the discussions for direct transportation links and reduce restrictions on Taiwanese investment in China. For Beijing, this will represent an immediate and tangible improvement over Chen.
But Ma must also not forget the second half of Roosevelt's dictum. He must continue to prepare Taiwan's military for potential conflict. This means that he should continue military exercises and computer simulations of a Chinese attack to maintain readiness, and that he should ensure the KMT legislators approve the purchase of weapons from the US. Beijing will undoubtedly raise a stink, but its Taiwan policy has become far more rational and measured than in the past.
If the purchase is timed to coincide with signals that Ma does not plan to move toward independence, it will go a long way toward conciliating China. Ma has the advantage that almost anything he does will look good compared to Chen.
In short, speaking softly and carrying a big stick will allow Ma to give China the "face" it needs for its own domestic purposes even as Taiwan maintains its ability to deter an attack. Taking common sense steps to improve its military capabilities while keeping quiet about independence is advantageous for the US, for China and for Taiwan itself. Hopefully, Ma's election will move us in that direction.
Alex Liebman is a doctoral candidate in Harvard University's government department.
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