The referendums on applying for UN membership face a difficult fate. If neither referendum passes, they will naturally become a tool for Beijing in its mission to undermine Taiwan's independence. Knowing this, it's not surprising that the fate of these two referendums are on the minds of many people.
There are several courses of action that should be considered.
First, the referendums could be moved from the election date and the voter threshold for valid results lowered. Separating the plebiscites from the election would only be significant if the threshold were simultaneously changed. Otherwise the referendums would still fail to pass, rendering the effort to move them from March 22 pointless.
If the referendums were to be moved and the threshold lowered, what would be an appropriate date for them? The Referendum Act (公民投票法) stipulates that the Central Election Commission should hold referendums within one to six months after a referendum proposal has passed the application procedure.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) referendums on applying for UN membership were both formally announced on Feb. 1, which means the referendums must be held before the end of July at the latest. Since the Beijing Olympics are in August, holding the polls sooner rather than later might help avoid fueling tension with China.
Another scenario would be for the referendums and the election to be held in tandem, but with a lower voter threshold. That would increase the chances of the plebiscites passing.
However, the pan-blue camp would oppose such an idea, since it proposed its mirror referendum with the goal of preventing the DPP poll from passing. The KMT rationale was essentially that the pan-green camp would use its referendum to garner votes in the presidential election. To combat this, it proposed its own version.
But now it seems clear that the DPP has not made any electoral strides by touting its plebiscite. Nevertheless, the pan-blue camp will still do what it can to stop the DPP poll from passing to ensure that a poll using the name "Taiwan" doesn't succeed.
The two plebiscites are not just about representation at the UN. The choice of the word "joining" in the DPP version and "rejoining" in the KMT version represents different positions on the core issue of national identity and radically different political ideologies.
As a final scenario, the nation could consider going through with the referendums as planned. No date changes and no changes to the voter threshold. Instead, the legislature could pass a resolution as a sort of "airbag" to minimize the damage caused by the failure of the two referendums.
If the referendums take place on March 22 and the threshold has not been lowered, it seems both will fail, much to the delight of Beijing and to the relief of Washington and Tokyo, as it would rid them of concern over one source of tension between China and Taiwan.
If this happens, a legislative solution could at least offer a patch-up, but the content of the resolution would be extremely important.
Unfortunately, the KMT has no sincere desire to negotiate with the DPP. Once again their behavior is indicative of their approach to politics: pursue party interests over national interests.
The drama surrounding the referendums and election has turned into a tragedy in which a matter of utmost importance has become nothing more than a political tool. That reality is a far cry from the point of the referendum mechanism, which is to give the public a voice.
Margot Chen is a research fellow at Taiwan Advocates, a think tank initiated by former president Lee Teng-hui.
Translated by Angela Hong
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