Kosovo's declaration of independence has put stability in the Western Balkans back on Europe's agenda. Unless the EU acts quickly, the whole region could slide backwards, with dire social, economic and security consequences. The EU needs a comprehensive regional approach, focusing on the remaining steps that would lead each country toward membership.
The Western Balkans -- a term used only since 1999 -- comprises Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, with a combined population of roughly 22 million. Economic developments in the region are promising, with almost all its economies posting high growth, fueled by increasing industrial output and exports. Inward investment is steadily rising, as business seems to believe that the remaining political and security challenges -- the possible negative effects of post-independence Kosovo and Bosnia's malaise -- will be overcome sooner rather than later.
Much work has already been done to re-establish and improve regional relations. The EU-led Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has since 1999 successfully stimulated regional cross-border cooperation, for the first time since the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Energy, transport infrastructure -- roads, railways and waterways -- and crime prevention have all benefited. The pact has now been transferred to local control, re-emerging as the Sarajevo-based Regional Cooperation Council, ready to develop regional and multilateral standards for its members.
The recently revived Central European Free Trade Agreement is meant to be the main regional engine for trade and business generally and will adhere both to WTO rules and the parties' obligations toward the EU. Similarly, the South-East European Cooperation Process is one of the relatively new regional organizations that contribute to candidate and potential candidate countries' preparations for EU membership, providing the first genuine regionwide policy forum where both EU members and candidates participate.
But these bodies must not be seen as substitutes for the far more comprehensive accession process, which only the EU itself can initiate. And yet, despite the region's favorable prospects and relatively small size, the union has been slow in doing so.
Certainly, the pace of candidate countries' approach to the union depends on the speed of their reforms. And Europe, with the vital support of the US, worked hard to stop the carnage of the 1990s and subsequently to help rebuild the Balkan countries.
But the EU has so far failed to prepare the Western Balkans for accession, in line with its leaders' promise at their Thessaloniki summit in 2003 to admit the Western Balkan states when they meet the union's standards.
That promise was not a matter of charity; the Balkans would add value to the EU. To be sure, the EU's lengthy internal crisis over the proposed constitution was a major distraction and damaged the union's reputation in the Balkans. Let us hope that the new Reform Treaty will help to reassure the critics and pave the way for a new -- and more robust -- phase of integration.
If not, one would have to ask what had happened to the European spirit of the 1970s and 1980s, when countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, which had just emerged from dictatorship and civil unrest, were welcomed into the European community of democratic states. Political decisions taken then were far more risky than those at hand in the Balkans, and the Greek and Iberian success stories demonstrate the wisdom of the courageous decisions taken at that time.
What about today? The most recent EU members, Bulgaria and Romania, are both in the Balkans and both are examples of countries with special needs. While the union at first took their accession negotiations a bit too casually, it subsequently decided to continue monitoring the two countries even after accession to ensure that they develop the effective administrative and judicial systems that are an obligation of membership.
The EU must learn from this experience to develop an accession strategy for the Western Balkans, whose development has been delayed by a complex post-conflict transition process.
The special needs of this region should be taken into account in any new EU approach, giving them hope while mitigating the fallout from Kosovo.
It is in Europe's interest as much as it is in the interest of the region to accelerate the integration process. A reinvigorated accession process would contribute to the EU's consolidation, both territorially and politically, while strengthening its role in its wider neighborhood -- the Mediterranean, the Middle East and around the Black Sea.
Wolfgang Petritsch is Austria's UN ambassador in Geneva. He was previously the EU's special envoy for Kosovo, its chief negotiator at the Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris and the international high representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
US president-elect Donald Trump continues to make nominations for his Cabinet and US agencies, with most of his picks being staunchly against Beijing. For US ambassador to China, Trump has tapped former US senator David Perdue. This appointment makes it crystal clear that Trump has no intention of letting China continue to steal from the US while infiltrating it in a surreptitious quasi-war, harming world peace and stability. Originally earning a name for himself in the business world, Perdue made his start with Chinese supply chains as a manager for several US firms. He later served as the CEO of Reebok and
Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesman Wu Qian (吳謙) announced at a news conference that General Miao Hua (苗華) — director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission — has been suspended from his duties pending an investigation of serious disciplinary breaches. Miao’s role within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) affects not only its loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but also ideological control. This reflects the PLA’s complex internal power struggles, as well as its long-existing structural problems. Since its establishment, the PLA has emphasized that “the party commands the gun,” and that the military is
US president-elect Donald Trump in an interview with NBC News on Monday said he would “never say” if the US is committed to defending Taiwan against China. Trump said he would “prefer” that China does not attempt to invade Taiwan, and that he has a “very good relationship” with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Before committing US troops to defending Taiwan he would “have to negotiate things,” he said. This is a departure from the stance of incumbent US President Joe Biden, who on several occasions expressed resolutely that he would commit US troops in the event of a conflict in
US$18.278 billion is a simple dollar figure; one that’s illustrative of the first Trump administration’s defense commitment to Taiwan. But what does Donald Trump care for money? During President Trump’s first term, the US defense department approved gross sales of “defense articles and services” to Taiwan of over US$18 billion. In September, the US-Taiwan Business Council compared Trump’s figure to the other four presidential administrations since 1993: President Clinton approved a total of US$8.702 billion from 1993 through 2000. President George W. Bush approved US$15.614 billion in eight years. This total would have been significantly greater had Taiwan’s Kuomintang-controlled Legislative Yuan been cooperative. During
RSS