The seventh legislative elections were of historical significance because of the halving of legislative seats to 113 and the adoption of a single-member district, two-vote system.
The election can be viewed from two angles: changes in vote distribution between the pan-blue and pan-green camps, and how this is reflected in the legislature under the new electoral system.
There have been two constants in Taiwanese elections: The pan-blue camp is slightly stronger than the pan-green camp, although the difference is small, and the country is divided along a geographical line, with the north leaning toward the pan-blue camp and the south toward the pan-green camp.
In the party proportional (or legislator-at-large) vote, the difference between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) increased to 16 percentage points, with the KMT winning 58 percent of legislator-at-large seats, against 42 percent for the DPP.
This is the same result as the 1998 elections, before the DPP gained power. But a warning sign for the DPP is that the party lost much support in its southern stronghold. Of the 22 voting districts south of Yunlin County, the KMT and the DPP won 11 each, breaking the DPP's hold there. The main reasons for this are probably the limited results after eight years of DPP rule and the party's attempt to rely on national identity to offset its performance.
In a more mature democratic system, the main concern is voter interests, with issues of identity having only temporary influence. In this situation, it is easier for voters to be critical of the government, thus laying the foundation for a change in government.
In Poland and Hungary, two newly democratic countries and recent EU member states, governments change regularly. Like Taiwan, these countries established a democratic system in the 1990s. They have held 12 legislative elections between them, and had 11 changes of government.
Because Taiwanese disagree on national identity, there is little flexibility in legislative and presidential election campaigns. Identity often becomes the focus of the campaigns, which means there is little change in the two camps' support base. This is a situation that cannot continue indefinitely.
Over eight years the DPP administration has not performed very well. Corruption became increasingly obvious, making it hard to maintain majority support simply by playing the identity card.
Yet this was still the focus of the election campaign, which benefited the KMT. Another reason the DPP suffered was that a perceived deterioration in the economic environment had a greater impact than issues of identity.
This was the first election to adopt single-member districts, and two-thirds of legislative seats were elected using this system. This reinforced the strength of the biggest party, dealing the DPP a second blow.
In the old system -- a single non-transferable vote -- the number of seats gained by a party corresponded more closely to the number of votes received. In the new system, losing by a single percentage point in any constituency means losing the constituency altogether, increasing the discrepancy between the percentage of votes received and seats obtained and increasing the chance of a dramatic victory for a party with a small advantage.
It was this reinforcement of small advantages that gave the KMT 81 seats -- three times the DPP's 27 seats -- a gap much larger than the difference in the vote. We have to go back to legislative by-elections in 1989 to find a similar difference. In other words, the KMT is now enjoying the same advantage that it had not long after the lifting of martial law.
One advantage of single member districts is the creation of a clear and stable legislative majority; a disadvantage is that voter support is not necessarily reflected in legislative representation. The KMT should be aware that if the DPP gets the upper hand in future, it could deal the KMT a similarly crushing defeat.
Because the presidential election in March involves a single nationwide constituency, the party proportional vote in a legislative poll is of major significance: It gives some indication of the nationwide support enjoyed by parties, not local candidates. Thus, adding the New Party vote to the KMT vote, we can get a measure of the support for KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (
This places Hsieh 16 percentage points behind Ma, and Hsieh has 70 days to bridge the gap.
The DPP's defeat was probably the result of poor government performance and excessive reliance on pro-localization and identity issues. Hsieh's challenge is to change this perception and compete with Ma on other issues of concern to the public.
In future, every presidential candidate from a party that loses legislative elections will face this conundrum: How does one turn around public opinion in the short time that separates the legislative and presidential polls?
The KMT will expect the support it received in the legislative elections will build momentum for Ma, while the DPP will hope for a "pendulum effect" to maintain its hold on the presidency. If Ma wins the presidency, the conflict between the government and the legislature will be greatly diminished. If Hsieh wins, however, he will have to deal with the massive KMT legislative majority through far-reaching compromises lest the legislature challenge his right to appoint the premier.
Regardless, Taiwan's semi-presidential system will no longer produce the kind of president-appointed minority government that we have lived with for the past eight years. From this perspective, Saturday's elections will have a historic impact on the constitutional framework and implementation of policy.
Wu Yu-shan is director of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Anna Stiggelbout and Perry Svensson
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