ON JUNE 18, President Chen Shui-bian (
This prompted a negative reaction from US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack the following day.
"We do not support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that require statehood. This would include a referendum on whether to apply to the United Nations under Taiwan," McCormack said.
The grounds for US objections were amplified by US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte in an Aug. 27 interview with Phoenix TV.
"We oppose ... that kind of a referendum because we see that as a step towards a declaration of independence of Taiwan, towards an alteration of the status quo," Negroponte said.
On Aug. 30, National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder said: "We are very supportive of Taiwan on many, many fronts ... However, membership in the United Nations requires statehood. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a state in the international community. The position of the United States government is that the ROC -- Republic of China -- is an issue undecided and it has been left undecided ... for many, many years. ... There has been a large scale ... Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan, and that is worrisome. And we certainly do not want to see any situation in which Beijing would consider the use of force or the threat of force against Taiwan."
The US position, however, is most clearly spelled out in a thoughtful speech delivered by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen on Sept. 11 at Annapolis. The speech, titled "A Strong and Moderate Taiwan," represents the agreed views of the US government.
A strong Taiwan is defined as "one that maintains the military capacity to withstand coercion for an extended period of time" until help can arrive. While Christensen is glad that Taiwan's military budget has at long last begun to increase as a percentage of GDP, he is concerned that the nation has yet to have a serious debate on overall defense strategy and on how to develop the capacity to sustain it.
He hopes, too, that Taiwan's political leaders will place national defense above partisan politics.
A moderate Taiwan is one which avoids unnecessary and unproductive provocations in cross-strait relations. Christensen believes that "as long as Taiwan maintains a credible defensive capability, the chief threats to its welfare are political actions by Taipei itself that could trigger Beijing's use of force."
This assertion is debatable. To Beijing the mere existence of a free Taiwan is a provocation, threatening China's autocratic government with the example of a thriving democracy. Beijing has also declared that it would resort to nonpeaceful means to annex Taiwan if the nation is too slow in surrendering its sovereignty. Obviously moderation will not necessarily ensure Taiwan's security.
Nevertheless, avoidance of provocative behavior makes sense, especially in view of the US preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan, the frayed state of US-Taiwan relations, and Taiwan's vulnerability to Chinese coercion. Christensen does not object to the referendum per se. What worries him is the name change, which he believes could trigger tension or even conflict.
His objection is blunt: "Supporters of the referendum ... do not take seriously Taiwan's commitments to the United States [and] are willing to ignore the security interests of Taiwan's most steadfast friend, and are ready to put at some risk the security interests of the Taiwan people for short-term political gain."
While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government may have failed to consult Washington in advance before it committed itself to the UN referendum, and thus deserves Washington's wrath, it would be rash to judge the referendum as merely an election ploy. The fact is the Taiwanese people are fed up with China's persistent efforts to isolate and denigrate Taiwan's status.
Opinion polls show that more than 75 percent of Taiwan's adult population support the government's effort to apply for membership in international organizations -- including the drive to join the UN under the name of "Taiwan." More than 60 percent believe Taiwan should try to increase its international presence -- even if it increases tension with China.
This pressure from below explains why even the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is proposing to conduct a referendum on whether to return to the UN under the name ROC or some other suitable name. It is interesting to note that a Zogby poll conducted in early September shows that 61 percent of American adults believe the US government should support Taiwan's petition to gain membership in the UN.
Meanwhile in Taiwan the number of signatures endorsing the UN referendum under the Taiwan name has now reached 2.7 million, way above the legal threshold. The two versions of the UN referendum will be held in conjunction with the presidential poll on March 22 next year. While the Central Election Commission is still working out the procedure for voting, the referendum will proceed. Neither the DPP nor the KMT can now abandon the UN referendum without committing political suicide.
So it is somewhat surprising that American Institute in Taiwan Director Stephen Young reiterated US objections to the referendum in a press conference on Nov. 9.
He complained that the referendum "poses a threat to cross-strait stability and appears inconsistent ... with the spirit of President Chen's public commitments." Washington and Taipei are now at an impasse. Neither side is willing nor able to change its position.
One or both of the referendums may well pass despite the high threshold (a majority of all eligible voters) if the turnout rate is high enough. The outcome is unpredictable because the KMT is playing a complex game of discouraging voting for both referendums while pretending to promote its own version. What is important, however, is not the outcome of the referendums but how to restore mutual trust between the US and Taiwan and how to prevent a similar quarrel from developing between the two long-standing democratic allies.
Christensen's prescription of a strong and moderate Taiwan is basically sound. In an increasingly precarious environment, Taiwan must build up its capacity to survive, and not be sidetracked by symbolic gestures or empty slogans. Taiwan must first take its national defense seriously. Beyond increasing the defense budget, Taiwan must find ways to lift morale and improve readiness, for example, by establishing a credible civil defense system and an effective system to mobilize reserve troops. The nation needs to be educated on the importance of national defense.
Second, economic development must stress self-reliance, away from excessive economic integration with China.
The major direction should be toward knowledge-based, high value added industries and away from short-sighted dependence on China's cheap labor or land.
Third, Taipei should pay greater attention to the interests of the US and how those interests affect those of Taiwan.
Taipei must learn to work closely with Washington, since both share the same democratic values and strategic interests in peace and stability of East Asia. No effort should be spared to restore mutual trust.
Finally, the Taiwanese government must, without fanfare, build up the national will to defend Taiwan's democracy and freedom. All its people share the same destiny. If Taiwan were to fall into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, all its citizens would lose the guarantee of life, liberty and property they now enjoy.
All Taiwanese, regardless of their ethnic origin or time of arrival in the country, should be proud of their contributions to the economic miracle and democratization of the nation.
It is in the interest of opposition parties to evolve into a loyal opposition, instead of trying to subvert Taiwan's democracy from within because of a misguided and illusory notion of Chinese nationalism.
In any event, the minority of die-hard Chinese nationalists has no right to impose its pro-Communist ideology on the majority of freedom-loving Taiwanese.
For Washington it is best to resist the temptation to penalize Taiwan for its errant behavior, for example, by withholding the sale of F-16 C/D fighter jets.
Weakening Taiwan's defense will simply add to the US' burden.
The status quo is changing every day as the People's Liberation Army develops ever greater capacity, not just to invade Taiwan, but eventually to challenge US dominance of Asia and beyond.
To deter a conflict, Washington must maintain a sufficient naval and air presence in the Western Pacific, as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act. In the long run, the US must endeavor to persuade China to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and to respect the right of the Taiwanese to determine their own future without outside pressure, because a more democratic and peace-loving China is in the common interest of the US and Taiwan.
Taiwan's security is ultimately the US' security as well.
Li Thian-hok is a commentator based in Pennsylvania.
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