In the upcoming presidential elections in Taiwan, voters will be faced with the question of how they identify their nation, as "Taiwan" or "Republic of China." This is not an issue of "mere labels" -- as some foreign observers have suggested -- but touches on fundamental questions of identity, nationality and fate. It is as fundamental as the difference between being "American" or "British" in the American colonies in the 18th century.
While this decision is up to Taiwanese themselves, from a foreign policy perspective, it is important to ask if the name will affect Taiwan's relations with other countries.
The key issue facing Taiwanese policymakers is how to remove the nation from its international isolation. How did it get there in the first place?
In 1945 Taiwan was occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, who themselves were kicked out of China in 1949 and transplanted themselves to the island, continuing their claim to sovereignty over China. This claim became untenable and in the 1970s, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime was de-recognized and expelled from the UN.
It is important to note that Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his representatives were not expelled from the UN in 1971 because they claimed to represent Taiwan. They were expelled because they claimed to represent China. This is an essential difference.
They did not represent the Taiwanese people in any fashion: from 1949 until 1987 the nation was under authoritarian martial law and ruled by what former president Lee Teng-hui (
Subsequently -- from 1986 through 1992 -- the Taiwanese pushed through their momentous democratic transition, and, since 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government has emphasized that Taiwan is now a free and democratic nation that deserves to be accepted by the international community as a full and equal member.
Initially, the government of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) followed a cautious approach. For example, it merely asked that the issue of representation of its 23 million people be put on the agenda of the UN and that Taiwan be granted "meaningful participation" in the WHO through observer status.
However, this soft approach didn't go anywhere and earlier this year, the DPP government rightly put the issue more clearly on the table, and asked for full membership in both the WHO and the UN under the name "Taiwan."
An election of the DPP's Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) as president would help continue Taiwan-centric policies. Hsieh may utilize different tactical approaches, but his long-term vision is very much the same as Chen's and is rooted in the new-found Taiwanese identity, which was suppressed during the four decades of KMT rule.
What will happen if the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou (
He portrays himself as "moderate" and "flexible," especially in cross-Strait relations, and castigates the DPP and its "scorched earth diplomacy" for leaving Taiwan "utterly isolated within the international community."
Ma's line sounds a bit like sour grapes in new bottles: his party is still smarting from the election losses in 2000 and 2004, and has not been able to make its imprint on foreign policy.
However, a closer look at the paper reveals that he would follow many of the same policies as the DPP: defending sovereignty, economic strength, expanding bilateral foreign relations, support the US-Japan Security Treaty, expand Asian-Pacific relations, joining international organizations. One could doubt that this policy line will enamor Ma to the leaders in Beijing.
There are fundamental differences going back to the issues of identity, nationality and fate: Ma wants to continue to represent "Republic of China," and he wants to "return" to the UN. This raises the question of what this ROC represents? In 1912 it was set up as the government of China when Taiwan wasn't even part of China. In 1971 the "representatives of Chiang Kai-shek" were expelled from the UN through UN Resolution 2758.
As indicated earlier, the title "Republic of China" -- and the associated claim to represent China -- were the basic reasons the international community un-recognized the KMT government in the 1970s in the first place. Confronted with a reincarnation of such a claim, the international community will very likely reiterate the old mantra that it has a "One China" policy. That approach is thus unlikely to succeed.
On the other hand, the DPP's approach -- emphasizing that Taiwan is a new, sovereign and democratic nation and pursuing international recognition as such -- may be held hostage by Beijing's high-handed obstruction tactics for some time to come, but it is clearly in line with the basic principles of human rights, democracy and self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter.
Over time, it will be increasingly difficult for the US and the European countries to continue to ignore this quest for recognition.
Letting Beijing get away with bullying Taiwan in the international arena will not bode well for democracy in the world. It will set a role-model of "capitalist authoritarianism" for many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Is this what the West wants?
The right policy would be for the US and Europe to stand up firmly for democracy and insist on Taiwan's participation in the international community as a full and equal member.
Gradually enhancing diplomatic ties with Taiwan and allowing democratically elected leaders of the Taiwan government to visit Washington and European capitals would be a good start.
Gerrit van der Wees is the editor of Taiwan Communique.
In their recent op-ed “Trump Should Rein In Taiwan” in Foreign Policy magazine, Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim argued that the US should pressure President William Lai (賴清德) to “tone it down” to de-escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait — as if Taiwan’s words are more of a threat to peace than Beijing’s actions. It is an old argument dressed up in new concern: that Washington must rein in Taipei to avoid war. However, this narrative gets it backward. Taiwan is not the problem; China is. Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions
The term “assassin’s mace” originates from Chinese folklore, describing a concealed weapon used by a weaker hero to defeat a stronger adversary with an unexpected strike. In more general military parlance, the concept refers to an asymmetric capability that targets a critical vulnerability of an adversary. China has found its modern equivalent of the assassin’s mace with its high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons, which are nuclear warheads detonated at a high altitude, emitting intense electromagnetic radiation capable of disabling and destroying electronics. An assassin’s mace weapon possesses two essential characteristics: strategic surprise and the ability to neutralize a core dependency.
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) were born under the sign of Gemini. Geminis are known for their intelligence, creativity, adaptability and flexibility. It is unlikely, then, that the trade conflict between the US and China would escalate into a catastrophic collision. It is more probable that both sides would seek a way to de-escalate, paving the way for a Trump-Xi summit that allows the global economy some breathing room. Practically speaking, China and the US have vulnerabilities, and a prolonged trade war would be damaging for both. In the US, the electoral system means that public opinion
Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) said in a politburo speech late last month that his party must protect the “bottom line” to prevent systemic threats. The tone of his address was grave, revealing deep anxieties about China’s current state of affairs. Essentially, what he worries most about is systemic threats to China’s normal development as a country. The US-China trade war has turned white hot: China’s export orders have plummeted, Chinese firms and enterprises are shutting up shop, and local debt risks are mounting daily, causing China’s economy to flag externally and hemorrhage internally. China’s
RSS