Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (
The trip had two main purposes.
One was to drum up support among the Taiwanese-American community across the US.
The other was to meet officials from the administration of US President George W. Bush and members of Congress to obtain a personal grasp of US concerns, and to explain Taiwanese aspirations, the complex and often divisive politics in Taiwan and his position on Taiwan's relations with the US and China.
In terms of the first objective, the trip was an unqualified success.
Taiwanese expatriates turned out in great numbers to welcome Hsieh. At the gala dinner in Washington on July 22, more than 1,000 attendees came from all over the US and a few from South America. In Los Angeles the rally attracted 3,000 participants.
Enthusiasm was high because Taiwanese-Americans realize that next year's presidential race will decide whether Taiwan is annexed by China should Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) win, or will remain a democratic state in which all citizens can continue to enjoy freedom and prosperity.
Hsieh had a busy schedule during his four days in Washington. During these sessions he expounded eloquently on his positions on many important issues. In his speech at the National Press Club, he stressed the importance of Taiwan's national security and the need to increase the defense budget.
He said that after years of obstruction by the pan-blue opposition, the legislature has finally approved a substantial portion of the arms package offered by the Bush administration in 2001, although that package is now stalled in the US State Department waiting for its approval.
Hsieh wisely linked the nation's security with a strong sense of Taiwanese identity that is based on a commitment to democracy. Such an identity, he said, "could come about only if the Taiwanese people are patriotic and believe they live in an independent country worth defending."
Hsieh pointed out the importance of solidarity at home to cope with China's divide-and-conquer strategy.
If elected president, he said he would invite members of other parties to form a majority coalition in the legislature.
Hsieh understands the critical importance of US friendship to Taiwan's survival. He is keenly aware of the US' overriding desire to avoid any confrontation with China in view of US entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Washington is very sensitive to any action by Taiwan which may irritate or anger Beijing. Thus Hsieh promised to consult Washington before any substantive action is taken and to keep his promises, as a way to increase mutual understanding and restore trust.
In regard to China, Hsieh promised to "make every effort to restore cross-strait dialogue ... and to ease the tension across the Taiwan Strait. But I will never accept any precondition to give up our sovereignty."
Hsieh's position is sharply different from Ma's peace accord proposal, which is predicated on Taiwan's acceptance of Beijing's claim that Taiwan is part of China.
In the face of considerable pressure from US officials, Hsieh defended President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) proposal to conduct a referendum to seek UN admission under the name "Taiwan."
"Taiwanese want more dignity, respect and international representation ... We feel that America needs to better understand Taiwanese sentiment on our wanting to join the UN," he said.
In response to a question about different opinions within the DPP regarding Taiwan's ultimate status, Hsieh's said "The DPP does have different factions, but we all agree on the final goal ... I believe that the DPP's 'Resolution on Taiwan's Future' sufficiently addresses the issue of the final goal for the time being. Other steps are redundant right now."
Some of Hsieh's statements are ambiguous, perhaps because he has not developed a firm position on the subject. When asked whether he was ready to affirm Chen's "four noes," or to make a new kind of promise, Hsieh deflected the question by answering: "The basic principle is that you should not promise what you cannot deliver. So you should not make commitments rashly. But what you have promised you need to stick to ... I don't think that America will pressure me into making any new promises."
In his National Press Club speech Hsieh said there was no need for Taiwan and China "to rush to the final decision" on Taiwan's future status.
"Both sides will ... have ample time to develop their economy, to reform their political systems, to deal with their social problems. Then peace and stability across the [Taiwan] Strait can be achieved."
Is Hsieh saying that once China becomes a democracy some sort of union between Taiwan and China can be achieved peacefully?
Will China, which rejects political reform, patiently wait for Taiwan's capitulation as its growing military, political and economic strengths threaten to overpower Taiwan's viability?
Hsieh's prognosis of Taiwan-China relations is unduly naive and complacent.
At the National Press Club Hsieh reportedly declared that if elected he would not hold a referendum on the issue of independence or unification with China, because Taiwan is already independent. For the same reason, "there is no need to promote Taiwan's independence as a movement."
During the debate among the four DPP contenders for the presidential nomination, all pledged to discard Chen's "four noes" if elected.
Hsieh's promise in Washington was inconsistent with that earlier pledge. It is also contrary to his own advice that promises should not be rashly made but once made must be kept. It also deprives Taiwan of its option to conduct a defensive referendum if China were to ask the UN to pass a resolution formally declaring that Taiwan is a part of China, or if China were to pressure the US to adopt a fourth communique acceding to Beijing's claim.
Despite the ambiguities and imperfections, Hsieh's Washington visit can be deemed a success. He certainly enhanced mutual understanding between Washington and Taipei. Overall, he gave the US policy elite a favorable impression as a pragmatic politician who may ease tensions with China and the US.
However, caution is in order.
The US policy establishment is split on the ultimate status of Taiwan.
Some want peaceful unification of Taiwan with China. Others want to preserve Taiwan's freedom until China's future direction becomes clearer, eg, until the US feels confident that the modernization of the People's Liberation Army is not designed to expel US military forces from East Asia.
Gaining applause from the pro-China wing as a moderate may only mean that the panda huggers perceive that Hsieh will cooperate with any joint US-China effort to bring about a peaceful annexation of Taiwan by China. Hsieh would be well-advised to renounce Chen's "four noes" pledge on the grounds that no one, not even the president of Taiwan, has the right to unilaterally abrogate the people's basic right to determine their own future.
A democratic Taiwan cannot long endure without evolving into a normal country by changing the national title and adopting a new constitution.
The "four noes" make it impossible for Taiwan to move towards the status of a normal nation without endangering US support for Taiwan's survival.
Once it is made clear that Taiwan will never compromise on its sovereignty and democracy, those US officials and academics who value democracy and who appreciate the strategic importance of Taiwan as an indispensable link in the security of Japan as well as the US will be encouraged to resist Beijing's pressure to undermine Taiwan's existence as a free and democratic state.
An unequivocal commitment to defend Taiwan's sovereignty and democracy is required if Hsieh wants thousands of Taiwanese-Americans to return home to vote for him next March.
Only such commitment will enable Hsieh to fire up his pan green base and persuade light blue voters that only a free and independent Taiwan can ensure their life, liberty and prosperity.
To secure his victory, to preserve Taiwan's freedom and stability in East Asia and ultimately to deter a conflict between the US and China, Hsieh has no choice but to stand firm on the right side of history.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
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