A US State Department spokesperson at a routine press conference on June 19 expressed the US' opposition to Taiwan's plan to hold a referendum to determine whether the country should apply for UN membership under the name "Taiwan."
Several reasons were given for the opposition, including that the referendum appears designed to unilaterally change Taiwan's status, based on the US' "one China" policy. Also, the US does not support Taiwan's joining international organizations requiring statehood, so the referendum will not do anything to help Taiwan's UN bid while having an impact on peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
First, does joining the UN under the name "Taiwan" constitute a unilateral change to Taiwan's legal status? Such a question involves the interpretation of Taiwan's legal status. Applying for UN membership under the name of "Taiwan" is only a way to highlight that most Taiwanese feel that Taiwan is a sovereign state.
What is merely the Taiwanese people's interpretation of the nation's legal status will not necessarily amount to a binding and unilateral change to Taiwan's status. China will not recognize Taiwan as independent because of such a referendum. In the same way, the US will maintain its interpretation of Taiwan's status.
Second, I want to ask whether the referendum will be of any substantive help to Taiwan's UN bid. That should be decided by the Taiwanese themselves. I agree that it is delusional to think that the referendum in itself will suffice to grant Taiwan UN membership. If, however, the referendum is held, it will at the very least serve to determine Taiwan's future direction.
Third, cross-strait tensions are beyond the control of Taiwan itself. Whenever Taiwan takes democratic measures to show that it has sovereignty and thus is democratically legitimate in the eyes of the international community, China expresses its opposition. For example, in the run-up to Taiwan's first direct presidential election in 1996, China not only expresses opposition, but even threatened Taiwan.
If the US opposes Taiwan's actions simply because Chinese opposition leads to cross-strait tension, then the US is placing restrictions on good actions while promoting malicious behavior.
Finally, because the US is concerned with safeguarding its own interests, it is unwilling to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that require statehood, which leaves other nations without ways to help.
Deeper reflection shows that holding a referendum will help the US control the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. If a majority of Taiwan's voters say that Taiwan should join the UN under the name of "Taiwan," they are saying that they do not think Taiwan is a part of China. This would give more international legitimacy to US arms sales to Taiwan and intervention in the cross-strait situation to maintain peace and security in the Taiwan Strait.
Without US support, it is very unlikely that Taiwan will be able to participate in any international organizations, particularly the UN. But if most Taiwanese freely and democratically express their wish for UN membership, there is no need for the US to manifest its opposition in terms that more or less amount to intervention in Taiwan's domestic affairs.
Regardless of what the US' stance may be, it could at least remain silent. That would give it more flexibility in negotiating with China and more options when dealing with other countries. On the name issue of Taiwan's UN bid, the US has plenty of room to maneuver and there is no need to overreact and even less need to be in such a hurry to show its stance.
Chiang Huang-chih is an associate professor at National Taiwan University's College of Law.
Translated by Lin Ya-ti
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