In 2003, while still serving as deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, I was asked by Taiwanese reporters what the US view would be on the proposal for Taiwan to hold a national referendum in conjunction with the 2004 election.
I gave a rather lengthy, rambling and convoluted answer that could have been summarized in a more concise form by saying, "it depends." The same remains true today.
Why does a referendum pose difficult questions for the US government? Why are US government officials unwilling to simply endorse any referendum on any subject of Taiwan's choosing?
The core challenge faced by US government officials when such matters are considered comes from the tension that emanates from asking two questions: How can the US be pro-Taiwan, but not anti-China? And how can the US be pro-democracy, but not pro-independence?
Clearly the US is a long-time supporter of Taiwan, sustains a great affinity for its people and stands to benefit from investing further in the bilateral relationship. But the US also needs good relations with China.
The US has a strong interest in seeing Taiwan's democracy succeed and strengthen. Such an outcome not only supports a regional and global strategy to broaden the international community of democracies, it also best positions Taiwan to be a like-minded partner to the US on a range of important issues such as counter-terrorism, trade liberalization and maritime security. But the Bush administration, like the six preceding administrations, will not support Taiwanese independence.
It is important for government leaders in Taipei and people in Taiwan to understand that these are the questions that will inform policy discussions in Washington.
It is the dynamic analysis surrounding these questions that leads Washington to conclude that the subject matter of a referendum in Taiwan is consequential, and the timing of public announcements related to a referendum matter as well.
Too often, frustrated people in Taiwan will interpret a US policy statement as being animated by a desire to curry favor with Beijing.
The truth of the matter is that US policy decisions are often more complex than would be the case if the sole objective was to please China.
It is more accurate to acknowledge the balancing act -- how to be pro-Taiwan, but not anti-China.
Returning to the question of a national referendum in Taiwan in this context, let's consider what US policy officials are likely discussing as Taiwan conducts its own debate regarding the wisdom of holding a referendum next year.
As I stated in a variety of public forums in 2003, one can imagine categorizing referendums in Taiwan in three ways from the US perspective.
Category one is a referendum on a topic that relates to good governance, increasing efficiency and resolving a contentious public debate that the legislature is unable to resolve (e.g. whether or not Taiwan should build a fourth nuclear power plant).
A second-order benefit of a referendum in category one is that the collective experience resulting from conducting the referendum in and of itself would help further strengthen Taiwan's democracy.
Category two is a referendum that most clearly addresses the question of independence and/or sovereignty (e.g. an actual referendum on whether or not Taiwan should declare its independence).
And finally, category three would be a referendum that is highly symbolic in nature (has no consequential impact on governance and policy), and touches obliquely on questions of Taiwan's status or sovereignty.
From the US perspective, a referendum in Category one is quite easy to support despite pressure that might come from Beijing.
In such a case, the US could comfortably support a referendum in the spirit of being pro-Taiwan (but not anti-China), and being pro-democracy (without being pro-independence).
A referendum in category two is quite easy to oppose despite the deep desire among many in Taiwan to see such questions addressed in a direct fashion.
The US would oppose a referendum in category two on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with our non-support for independence.
It is category three that will spark the most internal debate in Washington and whose wording will become the Rorschach test for Asia policy experts in the US trying to manage a set of competing interests.
But ultimately, Washington would likely discourage this type of referendum as well because the cost-benefit analysis for the US tilts in the negative direction.
Thus far, the proposal on the table in Taiwan rests firmly in category three. Holding a referendum on whether or not to seek membership in the UN under the name "Taiwan" will be problematic for Washington. It is a topic that seems highly symbolic (no matter the results of the vote, there is no chance Taiwan will be admitted to the UN under any name as long as China holds a veto) and certainly touches on Taiwan's status (by virtue of specifying the application should be made under the name "Taiwan").
There is also a chance that an attempt to hold a referendum on this topic could be a set-back for Taiwan's democracy rather than a step in the direction of strengthening democracy (there is a very real possibility that a referendum on such a topic could draw another boycott from the pan-blue camp).
Two referendums in a row that draw under 50 percent participation would constitute a blow to efforts to deepen democratic culture.
So what should the US do in response to the desire of many in Taiwan to hold a referendum next year?
Rather than oppose Taiwan's efforts outright, officials in Washington should encourage Taiwan to take steps that will truly strengthen its democracy and improve the quality of governance.
More specifically, the US can actively encourage Taiwan to employ the tool of a national referendum to address issues that will be consequential in improving the lives of the people in Taiwan, rather than a more symbolic issue such as UN membership.
The US should also remind Beijing that Washington supports democracy in Taiwan, including support for democratic methods such as conducting referendums.
Even if Taiwan ultimately does pursue a referendum on seeking UN membership under the name "Taiwan," Washington should urge Beijing to show restraint (an expression of public sentiment is hardly casus belli), and remind China that its overall posture toward Taiwan, which is characterized by missile deployments and pressure on Taipei's government, is doing more to drive Taiwanese away rather than attract them to better relations with China.
Finally, Washington should encourage leaders in Taiwan to consider its broader interests in bettering relations with the US versus whatever short term gain might come from holding a symbolic referendum.
We can position ourselves for much more robust bilateral ties across the full spectrum of activities including trade, security, regional democracy promotion, global issues and the like -- but not if we are consumed with squabbling over the true intent behind a particular referendum.
Randall Schriver is a founding partner of Armitage International LC.
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS