Many historians try to make much of the fact that Taiwanese did not have a clear idea of independence in 1895 or during any other era. They make the common mistake of supposing that it is possible for a nation to have a clear idea of its identity and goals with a singular vision and common identity shared by all levels of society. On the contrary, what motivates people throughout history is often mixed.
We learn by going where we have to go. Is any individual ever fully conscious of his or her complete identity and full motivation at any moment in time? Multiply this phenomenon by its number of people, and the motivation of a nation seems even more elusive.
In a nation, a full understanding of identity and motivation is always a work in progress. At any moment of a nation's history, the participants themselves cannot give all the answers. Taiwanese are learning by going where they have to go.
For example, take the analogy of a woman who lives in an abusive marriage or relationship. The woman knows she is not happy. She wants out. What she really wants is a divorce and to be her own boss. Yet her culture may not allow divorce or have a term for it.
Perhaps divorced women are chauvinistically discriminated against in her culture; perhaps that option has no precedent. Perhaps her relatives or others pressure her to stay.
The woman rebels against her marriage and eventually, after years of resistance, comes to the realization that what she had been seeking all along was to control her own destiny and be independent. Eventually she finds a way and the language to express it.
In a similar vein, if one were to examine the intentions of people in a revolution, it would soon become apparent that these people rarely have a clear vision of their goals.
They know what they want to escape from; they have a general idea of where they want to go, but they cannot predict or express it exactly.
Thus, for the many Taiwanese who resisted union with Japan in 1895, their motivations were as mixed and various as were their numbers.
Some were the Qing bureaucrats and their mercenaries, whose loyalty lay where their bread was buttered. They had loyalty to those who paid their salaries and gave them status and position.
Others were businessmen who watched to see which side would be most beneficial to their business. There were still other Taiwanese, however, who resisted union with Japan just as they had consistently resisted union with Qing China. They wanted out, both of their bad marriage to the Qing and of a coming bad marriage to Japan.
The latter may not have been able to spell out in full detail their vision of their hope for republic. They did know they did not want to return to China or be a vassal state to China.
During the American Revolution, the majority of Americans did not envisage the US as it is now. Many did not necessarily want to even break free of England; they had no clear concept of an independent identity. This had no precedent.
The people did know they were being taxed without representation. They did know they were abused and exploited. They did know that being on their own was as good as (if not better than) being under oppression.
Some did have a vision and a goal, but many others were reluctantly drawn into the revolution. As they fought, however, they began to discover a new identity; it was an identity that had been forming through years of oppression and resistance. They found that to control their own destiny was what they really wanted.
It was only after the Americans gained their independence that they began to settle down to hammer out how the 13 colonies could find a form of government under which they could all unite. This did not happen overnight; it was and continues to be an ongoing process.
That American identity was shaped as the country expanded across the continent; it was shaped as the country had to absorb continuous waves of immigration.
The country is still being shaped today as it continues to question and discover the true meaning of the words "all men are created equal" and realizes that these words apply not only to a landed gentry but also to former slaves, women, all races, all immigrants and on and on.
The US' identity is one that is still in evolving.
This is the common mistake of many historians when they talk about Taiwan. They fail to realize that Taiwan's identity is also a continuous process. It is similar to the mistake by historians who claim that simply because Taiwan did not have a clearly expressed and focused vision of a Constitutional Republic in 1895, it did not have an idea of wanting to be on its own, to be independent.
Identity is knowing one's past and present and having a vision of where one wants to go. Past, present and future must be continually integrated.
Taiwan's history is a catalogue of resistance to outside influences, dominance and exploitation.
Whether the outsiders were the Qing, the Japanese (the first ones to control the whole island), the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) or the next lascivious suitor in the wings, Taiwan's identity is separate from all of the above; it learns by going where it has to go.
After three forced and unhappy marriages, is there anyone naive or stupid enough to think that Taiwan, in establishing its identity, would desire to change its independent democracy for a forced marriage with the next ugliest and most oppressive of suitors, the People's Republic of China?
Whatever platitudes, fabricated historical claims of ownership and/or trumped up obligations to ancestors may be presented, the answer is "Been there, done that. Thanks, but no thanks."
Jerome Keating is a Taiwan-based writer.
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