While the administration of US President George W. Bush has officially objected to the administration of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) using the name "Taiwan" to apply for UN membership this year, calling it a move to unilaterally change the cross-strait "status quo," Washington seems to be overlooking measures by Beijing to wage diplomatic warfare against Taiwan's participation in the international arena.
Recently, China introduced a series of moves in some international organizations to identify Taiwan as part of its territory. For example, in the World Organization for Animal Health's latest resolution on affirming adherence to the so-called "one China policy," it "notes" China's view that "the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China, which includes Taiwan."
While some analysts from Washington see Chen's push toward explicit Taiwanese independence through implementing a referendum, introducing a new constitution and recently articulating the so-called "four imperatives and one non-issue," Beijing's diplomatic maneuverings to exclude Taiwan's participation and legal representation in international organizations deserves more attention.
The official US position toward Taiwan and China is to oppose unilateral change to the "status quo," although US officials ordinarily use the phrase only after the Taiwanese government has acted in a manner perceived to be aggravating China.
Only until recently, Richard Lawless, US deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia and the Pacific, publicly accused China of changing the "status quo" in the Taiwan Strait through its rapid buildup of a ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. In addition to his predecessor Peter Rodman's accusation that China violated the "status quo" last year, Lawless is the first US official to confirm Beijing's military expansion has "changed" the cross-strait "status quo."
Not only have those two statements illustrated the complicated nature of US-Taiwan relations, they have also demonstrated an essential need for leaders of both Washington and Taipei to engage in a more candid, cooperative and constructive dialogue in the next nine months prior to Taiwan's presidential election.
Some analysts have emphasized that since the Bush administration is preoccupied with North Korea and Iraq, Taiwan should remain quiet and refrain from giving Beijing reasons to pressure the US over Taiwan policy.
But even if Taiwan plays the good kid, to what extent has Washington successfully urged Beijing to give more space to Taipei on the playground?
Bush's recent speech in Prague earlier this month serves as an example for Taipei and Washington to rethink their bilateral relationship. Elaborating on his idea of expanding democracy and freedom to the world, Bush cited South Korea and Taiwan as examples that prove the US can maintain friendships while simultaneously pushing those nations toward democracy.
If Bush and his administration are serious about this, they should cherish Taiwan's democracy by showing more support for Taiwan in the international arena. The Taiwanese government's attempts to safeguard its sovereignty in the face of China's constant attempts at international isolation and military intimidation should be viewed as a model democracy counteracting authoritarian suppression. Who more than Taiwan deserves the promise behind Bush's strategy of "seeking and supporting the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation?"
The US-Taiwan relationship could benefit from following such a strategy.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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