The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and Taiwan's international status have recently been topics for lively debate. I think the crux of the controversy is the question of how we should understand the strategic implications of the TRA in the international political environment of the 21st century.
The TRA pragmatically states that Taiwan does not fall under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, but faced with a democratic Taiwan, mapping out a reasonable way of approving Taiwan's status as a sovereign nation has become urgent.
When the TRA was enacted in 1979, Taiwan was not a democratic nation and China had not yet begun its economic rise. In order to establish diplomatic relations with China while at the same time maintaining substantive relations with Taiwan, the US formulated the TRA, a piece of domestic legislation with the same legal binding force as the three joint Sino-US communiques.
The TRA tells us that the US gives de facto recognition to Taiwan; that it aims at protecting and guaranteeing the interests of Taiwan and the Taiwanese people; and that the US' definition of "one China" is not the same as Beijing's definition of "one China."
This is also one reason why the US keeps repeating that the TRA deals with the framework of relations between the US, China and Taiwan.
Taiwan has transformed itself from an authoritarian regime promoting unification with China to a democracy demanding independence. Democratic self-determination is built on a broad consensus, and the public have many times expressed the wish that Taiwan's future be determined by its 23 million people. This is consistent with the TRA perspective that Taiwan is not under the jurisdiction of China.
In his status as a popularly elected leader, President Chen Shui-bian (
This is tantamount to declaring that Taiwan is a sovereign nation not under the jurisdiction of China.
Faced with the rise of the Chinese hegemony, its ambitions to invade Taiwan are fast becoming clear.
Its attacks on the Taiwanese government through the "Anti-Secession" Law, which legalizes the use of non-peaceful means and assists the military threat against Taiwan, its hollowing out of the Taiwanese economy and its suppression of Taiwan's diplomatic space all violate the TRA, which stipulates that "the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means."
The TRA opposes the use of non-peaceful means to threaten Taiwan's economic and social systems.
If the US continues to hide behind its policy of "strategic ambiguity," or to tolerate Taiwan's pan-blue politicians' actions, which are based on a wish to join up with China and distance themselves from the US, then it will be trapped in domestic controversy over the intent behind the TRA.
Not only that, but with the disappearing trust that Taiwanese people have in the US, the TRA's definition of the cross-strait "status quo" will lose its significance.
All in all, the pragmatic perspective of Taiwan's sovereignty in the 1979 TRA goes beyond the "one China" framework of the KMT and Chinese Communist Party governments at that time. Section 4(b)(1) of the TRA declares the relationship between the status of Taiwan and other diplomatic allies of the US, while section 2(c) makes the promotion of human rights in Taiwan a US goal.
As China's military threat and suppression of Taiwan's international space continue to destroy the international participation of Taiwanese and threatens their basic rights and their ability to determine their own future, the people and governments of the US and Taiwan should return to the TRA's pragmatic perspective in order to guarantee Taiwan's democratic government.
They need to help redress the growing imbalances in the tripartite relationship between the US, China and Taiwan.
It is therefore my hope that Taiwanese voice their support for the president's effort to take Taiwan along the path toward normal statehood and that they will call on the US government to return to the basic pragmatic spirit of the TRA.
Lin Chia-lung is the Democratic Progressive Party secretary-general.
Translated by Lin Ya-ti
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