Former French president Jacques Chirac left office on May 17. His successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, may be the most US-friendly French president since the creation of the Fifth Republic.
In his book Testimony, Sarkozy tells readers of his positive feelings for the US. During a visit to New York City in September to participate in a Sept. 11, 2001, memorial, when he was still interior minister, Sarkozy criticized Chirac's foreign policy, saying he believed France had made a big mistake by opposing the war in Iraq in 2003, promoting his political opponents to mockingly call him an American.
In his victory speech, Sarkozy said he would make an effort to improve France's relationship with the US and that the US could count on France's friendship.
Following changes in the political map of Europe in the past few years, Chirac had become the only European leader to insist on lifting the EU's arms embargo on China.
Although Sarkozy will introduce changes to France's traditionally Gaullist foreign policy, there may also be some changes to Chirac's policy of joining with China to counterbalance the US. This would make the EU's recent efforts to reach a compromise with the US over cross-strait policy clearer.
Thus, in the short term, the EU is unlikely to lift its arms embargo on China.
The controversy regarding the EU's potential lifting of its arms embargo on China originates from the Iraq War of 2003, a war that lead to a good deal of controversy between the US and the EU and during which the US seriously damaged the UN's authority.
It has also expressed a willingness to use its status as the only remaining superpower to pursue a unilateral foreign policy prioritizing US interests. This has generated a backlash among some European countries working toward a multipolar world. France worries that the world will become unipolar, which would damage its pursuit of a powerful and independent foreign policy.
In order to prevent a unipolar world dominated by the US, France has been actively engaging China. The two countries share policy goals such as the pursuit of a multipolar world and strengthening the UN's role. Under the direction of France, the EU also seeks to strengthen its relations with China and tries to improve their strategic relationship.
Both states try to co-opt and use the other to counterbalance the US.
Given these circumstances, France in 2004 pushed the EU to lift its arms embargo on China, which has always been seen as a major obstacle to the Sino-European relationship.
However, at a time when the EU was about to reach a unanimous agreement on lifting the embargo, the US strongly opposed the decision, which lead to a half year-long conflict between the US and the EU. During this process, many EU countries that value their relations with the US changed their past China policy mindset based on economic considerations to review the Sino-European relationship from a broader strategic view. It is clear that the the Atlanticist view weighed more heavily.
The embargo debate came to an end after Beijing officially passed the "Anti-Secession" Law (
But the embargo debate did lead to a re-evaluation of the EU's China policy. Especially after 10 eastern European countries joined the EU in May 2004, these new members have been unwilling to ignore US opinion. Also, the French-German alliance that dominated the push to lift the embargo collapsed after German Chancellor Angela Merkel came to power in late 2005. This trend could become even more obvious after pro-US French President Nicolas Sarkozy's coming to power last month.
The EU has made subtle adjustments to its China policy and is now more willing to cooperate with the US against China. The two sides have gradually adopted a more compromising but picky stance, demanding that Beijing adjust its trade policy and make its military expenditure more transparent. Although the EU is still adjusting or even searching for a cross-strait policy, this process has already meant that the lifting of the embargo has been greatly delayed. The impact this will have on Taiwan and the development of Taiwan-EU relations should not be overlooked and Taiwan should seize the opportunity this represents.
Chen Shih-min is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Lin Ya-ti and Eddy Chang
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS