The recent 2+2 statement emanating from the US and Japanese ministers' meeting in Washington in the immediate aftermath of the summit between US President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe represents the logical growth and diversification of the most important US alliance in Asia. Underscoring an increasingly complex set of overt missions and unstated intentions, the document is more detailed -- but less ambitious -- than previous 2+2 statements.
In this respect, it reads like a workmanlike roadmap on a range of operational and policy tasks confronting the leadership in Washington and Tokyo.
What has raised a few eyebrows is the general absence of the subject of the situation across the Taiwan Strait as an enduring matter of mutual concern, particularly given the central treatment of the subject in the previous 2+2 statements when the US and Japan came out firmly and in unison for preserving peace and security across the Taiwan Strait.
The most recent 2+2 document underscores the simultaneous operational challenges and global objectives of the US-Japan alliance. Reflecting the new realities of a nuclear North Korea and the potential anxieties this provokes, the document takes pains to reaffirm the US nuclear umbrella over Japan and the continued relevance of extended deterrence in Asia.
There is also a very clear desire to shore up signs of disagreement between the US and Japan on six-party negotiating matters, including Tokyo's unhappiness over the unfreezing of disputed North Korean holdings in a bank in Macau and the downplaying of the abductees issue.
Also, continuing a recent trend in highlighting common values, the statement underscores the common democratic inheritance and purpose in the US and Japan's approach to the world.
In addition, there is a clear call for greater operational cooperation and strategic dialogue among several key states, including the US, Japan, India and Australia, a kind of "containment-lite" effort with China clearly in mind.
However, to balance out the clear intent of this subtle grouping of nations are reassuring words to China which make clear that both the US and Japan prefer to see China's emergence as a peaceful, stable and harmonious player in Asia.
This is significant given all the recent tension in Sino-Japanese relations and the clear competition between Tokyo and Beijing.
And finally, the document contains the inevitable nuts of bolts of the maintenance of the military dimensions of the alliance, including specifics about adjusting military airspace and the status of US bases in Japan.
However, documents such as these are important not only for what is specifically articulated but for things that go unmentioned as well. And in this respect, the subject of the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan itself goes unheeded. What is the meaning behind such an oversight?
The truth is probably multifaceted and layered. Documents such as these can resemble at a quick glance a laundry list of "to-do" items with no particular organizing principle, but in truth, respective bureaucracies labor over every word and punctuation mark in a 2+2 statement: Few other official joint statements receive such careful attention.
So be assured that the drafters were mindful of what they were doing by ignoring the Taiwan dimension in this most recent statement.
The best interpretation for the oversight -- and indeed the most likely explanation -- is that the central point around the emerging US-Japan consensus on the maintenance of stability across the Taiwan Strait had already been established and further elaboration was unnecessary and seen to be potentially counterproductive.
Some of the most powerful concepts in modern diplomacy have been articulated only once. It is not unlikely that the matter of a convergent US-Japan position on Taiwan Strait stability may not get much further explanation in public documents such as these.
It is also the case that Japan seeks closer ties (or at least less tension) with China at this time given all the recent turmoil in relations, and few things stir more Chinese suspicion and outrage than Japanese proclamations on Taiwan. So it is not unreasonable to assume that Japanese diplomats are seeking to send a somewhat conciliatory message to Chinese friends in one area -- the Taiwan Strait -- while moving ahead expeditiously in other areas like constitutional reform and military modernization -- issues that raise concerns in Beijing, but to a lesser degree. In this sense, Japanese foreign policy and national security players are mindful of the balancing act they are trying to play in Asia and with China in particular. That is, to take steps to become a more "normal" country in the arena of national security and defense but still trying to do so without unduly alarming the neighbors at the same time. Alas, the persistent historical commentary coming from Japanese leaders about wartime memories simply exacerbates these issues.
Finally, it is also true that China has put its enormous influence behind the recent momentum in six-party talks with North Korea, and US diplomats are ever mindful of avoiding what can be seen as potential flashpoints in Sino-US relations.
The entire US strategy toward North Korea requires continuing pressure from China on Pyongyang in the background and this is well understood at the State Department.
In the current environment -- with Taiwan providing disappointments in the defense arena and concerns over domestic provocations and China rendering quiet assistance in ongoing nuclear talks -- the US team on Asia probably determined that this was not the time to amplify its position regarding cross-strait matters.
Kurt Campbell is the CEO and co-founder of the Center for a New American Security in Washington.
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