The statement issued by the US and Japanese foreign and defense ministers after wrapping up the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee talks in Washington on May 1 did not include the sentence "encouraging the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue" as part of a common strategic objective, as it did in the statement issued two years ago. This has been noted and interpreted variously on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as in other East Asian states.
This could be a tactical change in response to situational changes involving three factors. First of all, cross-strait security was included in the US' and Japan's common strategic objectives in 2005 in response to Beijing's passage of its "Anti-Secession" Law legalizing military action against Taiwan. Beijing seemed to believe that the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) continued hold on power following the 2004 presidential election might increase the risk for unilateral changes to the cross-strait "status quo."
Thus the situation in the Taiwan Strait was addressed in the US-Japan security treaty with emphasis on the strategic benefits of a peaceful resolution. Today, two years later, Beijing has adopted softer policies, and US restrictions have pushed Taiwan back inside the "four noes" framework. Although the cross-strait stand-off remains, it seems there is a slight decrease in the risk of military conflict.
The second reason is the recent improvement in bilateral Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations. The China policies of former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi and former US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld were filled with suspicion, but the appointments of US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson have led to a redefinition of the Sino-US relationship.
During his visit to China, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also proposed that Japan and China establish a mutually beneficial strategic relationship, which seems to imply the beginnings of trilateral interaction between the US, China and Japan.
Abe's meeting with US President George W. Bush in Washington was probably the final crucial meeting to decide that the cross-strait relationship should not be included in the "2-plus-2" statement this time, which shows that the US and Japan want security cooperation with China.
The third reason is a preventative tactical adjustment, since the Chinese government was very displeased with the 2005 statement and has questioned the real intentions behind the US-Japan security treaty. If the cross-strait issue is mentioned again, it could instead lead to the People's Liberation Army testing the treaty by strengthening military deployments and even initiating a minor incident, thus creating a tense situation that could erupt into war.
From another perspective, the US and Japan do not want to send the wrong message to Taiwan. Faced with the presidential election in Taiwan next year and the calls for a constitutional referendum, they worry that making the cross-strait situation a common strategic objective once again will be seen as an endorsement in Taiwan and may cause the government to commit actions that change the cross-strait status quo. To avoid sending wrong signals, the US and Japan would probably refrain from mentioning the cross-strait issue even if the first two factors didn't exist.
The strategic intent of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, however, has not changed. When taking questions at the press conference for the talks on military and security issues, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stressed that the US' Taiwan, cross-strait and East Asia policies remained unchanged and they still adhered to the "one China" policy. She also urged the two governments to avoid unilateral changes to the status quo and said that she did not want to see military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
This was followed by US officials stressing that it would be a mistake to think that US policy has changed just because the cross-strait situation was not mentioned in the statement this time around.
One should of course not make the mistake of thinking that the objective of the US-Japan treaty is to contain China or build an alliance with Taiwan. The purpose of the treaty is, on one hand, to maintain the current peace in East Asia by legalizing the US military presence there and, on the other hand, to let Japan participate in the logistics and base operations supporting US actions.
The treaty stipulates that the two countries' military forces -- lately with the addition of Australia -- comprise a military mechanism for the active defense of the status quo in order to stabilize the regional situation and to prevent war from breaking out. The key point remains that there has been no major change to the US' East Asia and cross-strait policies.
Unless the US and Japan make a clear negative statement to reject the 2005 statement, policy intent and strategic effects remain on record. Taiwan should thus look at the issue from the international, regional and cross-strait perspectives, as well as big power relations and the security strategies for regional stability. This would give a deeper understanding of the relationship between the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and cross-strait security. We must not misinterpret the significance of the 2005 statement, nor should we be worried that this year's statement makes no mention of the cross-strait issue.
Philip Yang is a professor in the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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