A forum discussing the draft of a "second republic" constitution for the Republic of China (ROC) was recently concluded. This draft, the writing of which I directed, has produced an active response in all sectors of society. Two main reasons explain why we decided to respond to former presidential adviser Koo Kwang-ming's (
First, Taiwan is an immigrant society. It is the efforts of these people, regardless of whether they came first or arrived later, that has built Taiwan into a political community that belongs to all its 23 million citizens. Taiwanese have functioned in this political community for over half a century, and yet, Taiwan still has not been recognized as a sovereign state by the international community. This has resulted in an increased sense of collective frustration among Taiwanese. As a result, finding a way out of this sense of frustration has become the primary impetus that is driving forward the movement of national normalization.
Taiwan's national title remains the ROC, which was founded in 1912 and was immediately recognized by the international community. Today, however, the name ROC on Taiwan cannot be used internationally, nor can it be changed.
Renowned constitutional expert Lee Hung-hsi (
Pushing for the draft "Taiwan constitution" and de jure independence has idealistic appeal and is consistent with the public's right to write a constitution. This, however, is difficult in the context of the current situation, and it is first necessary to build domestic consensus and determination before it can become possible. Offering a different solution that retains the national title ROC and makes it usable is a milder, internationally acceptable and more practical strategy.
The reason for calling the constitution "The Second Republic of the ROC" is to show the continuity of the ROC, by calling it the "first republic" and maintaining the nation's unchanging identity. But the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government of the first republic was forced by the Chinese Communist Party to retreat to Taiwan, limiting the ROC's jurisdiction to only Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen, Matsu and other islets.
The Nationality Act (
In other words, this is a kind of "national streamlining," but it still leaves the nation's identity unchanged. Following the same logic, although simplified to a "Taiwan constitution," what a second republic constitution does not imply is de jure independence, but rather a constitution for a more streamlined nation.
Second, Beijing has long sown dissension among Taiwanese people on the issue of "Taiwan independence" and is pushing its "united front" strategy to oppose Taiwan independence and support cross-strait unification. As a result, Taiwan has unwittingly fallen into the "prisoners predicament" trap set by Beijing -- with China as the "policeman" and with Taiwan's opposing pan-blue and pan-green camps playing the role of "prisoners."
I hope that by understanding the basic fact that the ROC is Taiwan, we could build a consensus between the pan-blue and pan-green camps and break out of this predicament. We could then ask Beijing to take a pragmatic approach on how it deals with the existence of the ROC, since this is the only practical way to resolve the cross-strait issue.
After the conclusion of the conference, Beijing launched a media campaign that claimed that a second republic constitution in fact amounted to de jure Taiwan independence. I would exhort the Beijing authorities to persist with a peaceful development strategy. Cross-strait peace depends on our leaders, their pragmatic approach to the existence of the ROC and continuous negotiations to establish a new and improved political relationship.
This is the only way I can see to build a peaceful cross-strait relationship.
Chen Ming-tong is a professor at National Taiwan University's Graduate Institute of National Development .
Translated by Lin Ya-ti.
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