Premier Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) announced on March 18 that Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairman Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) had been selected to become the nation's representative in Washington.
Wu is the first member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to serve as representative to the US and will assume his new post by the middle of next month.
Wu earned his doctorate in political science from Ohio State University and is fluent in English. He joined the DPP in July 2002, serving as deputy secretary-general of the Presidential Office.
In 2004 he became chairman of MAC. While serving as council chairman, Wu periodically traveled to Washington for exchanges with US officials, members of Congress and academics regarding relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.
Wu is familiar with President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) ideas and vision for Taiwan and has the full confidence of the president. There is therefore cause for optimism that the new envoy will be able to contribute to the restoration of mutual trust between Washington and Taipei in the critical last year of Chen's presidency.
In 2001 US President George W. Bush famously said that "the US will help defend Taiwan whatever it takes." Since then, US-Taiwan relations have been going downhill.
There are two principal reasons for this.
The first is Taiwan's feckless stance on national defense in the face of a growing military threat from the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
The second is Chen's habit of making pronouncements affecting the nation's present or future status without prior consultation with the US.
On Aug. 3, 2002, Chen declared there was "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait, a statement Beijing deemed provocative. And during Taiwan's 2004 presidential election, Chen launched a referendum on national defense, again without giving prior warning to Washington.
The latest incident was Chen's statement on March 4 that Taiwan wants independence, new names for state-owned companies and a new constitution.
The US State Department immediately asked whether these pronouncements constituted a breach of the "four noes, one without"pledge made by Chen in his 2000 inaugural address.
Such repetitive incidents have created an impression in Washington that Chen is an unreliable and untrustworthy troublemaker and have harmed US-Taiwan relations.
One of Wu's first tasks -- even before he leaves for the US -- will be to ensure that Chen ceases making such provocative statements by explaining to him the difficult situation the US is facing. US military forces are bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and extrication appears years away. If there is a conflict over Taiwan, the already overstretched US military might not be able to join the battle in time.
In another scenario, the US would arrive late on the scene and take heavy casualties. In any event, the US President George W. Bush administration feels that any decision to involve the US military in battle against the PLA in the Taiwan Strait should be made by Washington, not by Taipei. Taiwan must be sensitive to US fears that any action by Taiwan could be perceived by Beijing as a move toward formal independence and trigger a conflict at a most inopportune time.
This does not mean, however, that Taipei should kowtow to each and every whim of the Bush administration, which is so preoccupied with the Middle East quagmire that it pays little attention to the growing potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait, with or without provocation by Taiwan.
Washington also does not understand Taiwan's growing internal subversion resulting from collaboration between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), the People First Party (PFP) and Beijing to scuttle Taiwan's democratic institutions and the DPP government through unconstitutional means.
A prominent example of this is last fall's red shirts "rebellion" instigated by the pro-China media and opposition parties.
Wu's second task as representative to the US will be to educate the US policy elite on the objectives and strategy of the pan-blue opposition, which seeks Taiwan's annexation by China at the earliest opportunity. Hence, their consistent opposition to the acquisition of US weapons, which are badly needed for the defense of the nation. Through its united front tactics, China is effectively interfering in Taiwan's domestic politics.
Even though the Taiwan Relations Act purports to protect the human rights of Taiwanese -- including their right to determine their own future -- Washington may be reluctant to get in the middle of partisan bickering between the DPP and the pan-blue opposition.
But Washington must not inadvertently interfere in Taiwan's party politics in such a way that would undermine US interests.
During Taiwan's 2004 presidential election, China objected to the concurrent referendum on national defense. Washington then joined the KMT/PFP in condemning the DPP for initiating the referendum. The result was victory by the DPP with a tiny margin.
The KMT did not concede defeat and was able to exploit the small difference in votes to request a recount, initiate a lawsuit to invalidate the election and to obstruct -- to this day -- normal legislative operations.
One could argue that Washington's failure to understand the devious nature of the pan-blue camp contributed to Taiwan's political dire straits.
Even though Washington is already in elections mode, it must nevertheless pay enough attention to developments within Taiwan to avoid committing another grievous mistake.
Washington keeps reminding Taipei of President Chen's pledge. That promise was based on the precondition that China had no intention of attacking Taiwan. The reality, however, is that the PRC has been actively preparing to attack Taiwan. It passed the "Anti-Secession" law pre-authorizing use of non-peaceful means by the PLA at a time of its choosing. Beijing has threatened to invade Taiwan if the nation shows no intent to capitulate.
China, therefore, has clearly removed the conditions upon which Chen's pledge is predicated.
It is unreasonable for the US to hold Taipei to its "four noes, one without" promise when the US is unable to persuade Beijing to renounce the use of force and cease its active preparation for war.
Washington should be reminded that while, in the short term, the US may need to avoid conflict with China over Taiwan, its long-term strategic interests require Taiwan to resist annexation by the PRC, because once Taiwan falls, it would be very difficult for Japan to resist becoming a vassal state of China. US forces will then have to be withdrawn from Asia and the US' political, economic and strategic interests in the Western Pacific would sustain incalculable losses.
Yet to sustain their morale and will to resist Chinese aggression, Taiwanese must have hope that their struggle to maintain their freedoms has a chance of success, with support from allies such as the US and Japan. This means Washington must be careful in its dealing with Taipei, lest it give the impression that the US is working with Beijing to undermine Taiwan's sovereignty and democracy.
Washington should weigh the inherent dilemma between its short-term goal of avoiding war in the Taiwan Strait and the longer term objective of denying China's hegemonic ambitions in Asia. Preserving Taiwan's freedoms is also the way to steer China toward peaceful development. Wu should urge the Bush administration to consider dropping its insistence upon the "four noes, one without" -- for Chen and his successor.
Wu's mission will be a daunting one. He will have to engage in substantive diplomacy, restore mutual trust between Washington and Taipei and help bolster friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the US and Taiwan.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
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