Australia and Japan have entered a new phase in their relationship, having signed a joint declaration on security in Tokyo during Australian Prime Minister John Howard's recent visit to Japan. It is an important regional development, coming as it does in the midst of China's expanding military power.
Of course, both Howard and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have emphasized that their new closer security relationship is not directed against China.
"This document is not designed at China ? the purpose of this is to express the common desire for Japan and Australia to work even closer together to contribute to security in the region," Howard said.
But more telling was Howard's observation that "Japan and Australia have a common destiny in this part of the world." He has said before that "Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan."
The two countries are already part of a high level trilateral strategic dialogue with the US.
Howard wouldn't, though, consider entering into a similar security arrangement with China because it is not a democracy. Australia's relations with China are pragmatic based on economic realities, with both countries gaining from mutual trade exchanges.
China is getting assured supplies of much-needed resources from a stable country and Australia gets to expand its economic opportunities in a growing Chinese economy. In this sense, Canberra doesn't seem unduly worried about Beijing's negative reaction. China will do business with Australia because it needs access to its resources.
At the same time, Canberra is determined to pursue its strategic interests based on growing security ties with Japan and its security alliance with the US.
Howard has pointed out that the security agreement between the two countries is not a full fledged security pact. He maintained, though, that it might develop into one -- like Australia and New Zealand's ANZUS treaty with the US -- at some future time. If so, it could entail a mutual obligation to come to the other's aid in the event of an attack on either party.
Even without the status of a security treaty, Australia's security relationship with Japan will now be closer than with any other country, with the exception of the US. And for Japan, it will be the first security agreement outside of its US alliance.
The Australia-Japan defense agreement will involve "joint exercises and training" between their two armed forces. Much of the joint training is likely to happen in Australia.
It also involves the gathering and sharing of military intelligence, and "exchanges of strategic assessments and related information," as well as contingency planning. It should enable both Australia and Japan to mesh their military and strategic plans.
The security agreement between Japan and Australia squares the circle of the US-Japan-Australia strategic relationship. Commenting on its significance, one senior official is reported to have said: "The US and Japan already have a security treaty and Australia and the US have the ANZUS alliance. This fills in the missing bit of the trilateral process."
China is worried, sensing it as part of a containment strategy to curb China's expansionary role in the Asia-Pacific region. And undoubtedly it is, despite what Australia and Japan might say to the contrary.
Calling those in Australia who advocate equal treatment of Japan and China "dreamers," Paul Dibb, a professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, said: "China is not a democracy and it has a poor attitude to the rule of law and a dreadful record on human rights."
"This is not to underestimate the importance of our relations with China, but the jury is still out on how a future militarily strong China will behave," he said.
In other words, Australia is keen to pay an advance premium on its future security by further cementing its ties with Japan as part of the trilateral US-Japan-Australia equation.
It is pertinent to note that it was Canberra which took the initiative in this regard "with the strong backing of the US," said Paul Kelly, editor-at-large of the Australian, in his column.
Canberra indeed wanted a formal pact but "Japan told Australia any treaty must be submitted to Japan's parliament and, given the pacifist Constitution, there would be trouble."
After that Australia settled for the joint security declaration with the prospect, at some time in the future, of a formal security pact being signed by the two countries.
It is also important to note the policy of closer security ties with Japan is supported across the political spectrum of both the ruling party and the main opposition Labor Party. The opposition leader Kevin Rudd has supported "greater security cooperation with Japan."
Rudd doesn't believe, though, that, in the current circumstances, "we should now be moving down the path of a formal defense treaty between our two countries." In any case, Japan is not yet ready for a security treaty because of its constitutional constraints.
Even though Beijing has come to accept Australia's US alliance (but not its Japan connection), it has never lost hope of creating leverage from its growing economic relationship, and regional political clout, to dent it here and there.
For instance, when Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said some time ago that Taiwan might not be covered under the ANZUS treaty if it were attacked by China, Beijing must have felt quite hopeful.
Though Canberra doesn't seem to have repeated this interpretation, Australia would like to maintain some ambiguity regarding Taiwan.
But it is difficult to see how Canberra can stay out of it (if the US were to get involved on Taiwan's behalf) without seriously damaging its security alliance with the US. It is unlikely that Australia would pay that heavy a price since its US alliance is regarded as the ultimate guarantee of its security.
With the new Australia-Japan security declaration closing the "missing pieces of the trilateral process," the circle is now squared to China's chagrin. The talk now is of making it quadrilateral by bringing India in.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
George Santayana wrote: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This article will help readers avoid repeating mistakes by examining four examples from the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces and the Republic of China (ROC) forces that involved two city sieges and two island invasions. The city sieges compared are Changchun (May to October 1948) and Beiping (November 1948 to January 1949, renamed Beijing after its capture), and attempts to invade Kinmen (October 1949) and Hainan (April 1950). Comparing and contrasting these examples, we can learn how Taiwan may prevent a war with
A recent trio of opinion articles in this newspaper reflects the growing anxiety surrounding Washington’s reported request for Taiwan to shift up to 50 percent of its semiconductor production abroad — a process likely to take 10 years, even under the most serious and coordinated effort. Simon H. Tang (湯先鈍) issued a sharp warning (“US trade threatens silicon shield,” Oct. 4, page 8), calling the move a threat to Taiwan’s “silicon shield,” which he argues deters aggression by making Taiwan indispensable. On the same day, Hsiao Hsi-huei (蕭錫惠) (“Responding to US semiconductor policy shift,” Oct. 4, page 8) focused on
Taiwan is rapidly accelerating toward becoming a “super-aged society” — moving at one of the fastest rates globally — with the proportion of elderly people in the population sharply rising. While the demographic shift of “fewer births than deaths” is no longer an anomaly, the nation’s legal framework and social customs appear stuck in the last century. Without adjustments, incidents like last month’s viral kicking incident on the Taipei MRT involving a 73-year-old woman would continue to proliferate, sowing seeds of generational distrust and conflict. The Senior Citizens Welfare Act (老人福利法), originally enacted in 1980 and revised multiple times, positions older
Nvidia Corp’s plan to build its new headquarters at the Beitou Shilin Science Park’s T17 and T18 plots has stalled over a land rights dispute, prompting the Taipei City Government to propose the T12 plot as an alternative. The city government has also increased pressure on Shin Kong Life Insurance Co, which holds the development rights for the T17 and T18 plots. The proposal is the latest by the city government over the past few months — and part of an ongoing negotiation strategy between the two sides. Whether Shin Kong Life Insurance backs down might be the key factor
RSS