The US-Japan alliance is evolving. This is partly as a result of internal developments in Japan, and partly in response to dynamic change in Asia. Political leaders in Taiwan should take note of this evolution as the future course of the US-Japan alliance may have a direct impact on Taiwan's security.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has begun to demonstrate his intent to see Japan become a stronger alliance partner to the US. His aim to establish the Ministry of Defense from the Japan Defense Agency has already been realized. He has committed to adjusting Japan's self-imposed constraint on collective self-defense, likely by making gradual adjustments to the interpretation of the Constitution.
He has also endorsed an effort to begin drafting legislation that would allow for the overseas deployment of Japanese forces based on certain conditions (as opposed to the current system which requires ad hoc legislation). The net result of all these steps for Washington would mean that the US may soon have a security partner in Tokyo with greater capabilities and less constraint.
The US, I believe, should welcome these developments in Tokyo. It is equally important that Washington's planning take into account a partner with wider latitude to engage in the life of Asia.
As planners in the US look at questions about force structure (addressed bilaterally through a process called the Defense Policy Review Initiative, which looks at realignment), plans for regional contingencies and preparedness for non-traditional security threats, all should be pursued with full consultation and coordination with Japan.
The most immediate threat to both Japan and the US remains North Korea. Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and missile development programs have become more threatening given multiple missile launches last summer, and a subsequent nuclear detonation in October. Washington and Tokyo have been in lock-step with respect to diplomatic approaches in the Six Nation Talks. But military alliance preparations must also go forward. The US was correct to reiterate their strong commitment to Japan's defense to include protection provided from their nuclear arsenal. Japan is correct to continue to invest in missile defenses and other deterrent capabilities.
Over the longer term, the greater security challenge may come from China. The US and Japan should consult closely to develop a coordinated approach to China. While part of this approach should acknowledge that China's interests are converging with the US and Japan in certain areas, it is also important to keep a sober mind about the many ways our interests are on divergent paths.
The US and Japan should be clear where more active Chinese cooperation would be helpful -- such as in urging North Korea and Iran to change their behavior -- but should begin to orient the alliance to hedge against a China that chooses a path of confrontation or rivalry with Washington and Tokyo.
Why does this matter to Taiwan? Taiwan and the success of its democracy are important to the US and Japan. Sustained democracy in Taiwan is the best chance for better governance and freedom for the people of Taiwan, enhances the prospects for bilateral and regional cooperation with Taiwan as a like-minded friend and preserves Taiwan as an example for other countries in Asia aspiring to liberalize their respective political systems.
In February 2005, the US and Japan announced through the two-plus-two minister's statement that it is a common strategic objective in the region to "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue."
This is a sensible objective, but should also be seen to imply shared responsibilities to secure this goal. For the US, this means supporting Taiwan's legitimate defense needs, maintaining the capacity to resist force and opposing any attempt to resort to force as a means for resolving differences. Japan should understand these US obligations and seek to adapt as an alliance partner in ways that are appropriate to support the US. For both the US and Japan this means encouraging positive and constructive interactions between the two sides and resolutely opposing military intimidation and coercion.
Also embedded in this approach is an assumption that the people of Taiwan support a similar vision to that of the US and Japan for how to best promote an environment conducive to peace.
Taipei needs to send the right signals to ensure Washington and Tokyo will understand that Taiwan stands beside them. Over the near term, Taiwan should take steps to strengthen its own defenses, improve its democracy and governance and develop a plan for positive engagement with China including approval of direct links. Such steps would be well-received by the US, Japan and the region.
The US-Japan alliance will continue to shape Asia's future. But one can imagine two very different potential futures for Asia depending on how the alliance orients itself toward the region -- the alliance can choose to be insular, narrow and limited in its regional engagement, or a pro-active force for positive development in the economic, political and security spheres.
I strongly endorse an activist agenda that rests confidently in the proposition that Asia and its people will be far better off for a US-Japan alliance that embraces a robust agenda for shaping Asia. Taiwan can and should help.
Randall Schriver is a former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and a founding partner of Armitage International LC.
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