When local newspapers publish poll results, one can be forgiven for looking at them with skepticism.
Most surveys on public attitudes toward Taiwanese identity tend to focus on the "independence versus unification" question. And it is rare that such polls stray from a familiar pattern of asking in a variety of wordings the following question:
"Do you think Taiwan should declare independence, unify with China or maintain the status quo?"
The results of such surveys show that the vast majority of people respond to this question with "maintain the status quo." The figures of a broad range of surveys have been consistent enough to indicate with high statistical probability that the majority of people in Taiwan feel this way.
And why shouldn't they? "Maintain the status quo" is an answer that allows everyone to have their cake and eat it, too. People from Washington to Beijing to Taipei can interpret that answer however they like.
But the problem with all this statistics-mongering -- and the conclusions that people draw from it -- is that it willfully obscures certain realities, chiefly this: Taiwan is independent.
But this tends to be forgotten by the foreign think tanks and experts when they fly into town.
They get to have their three days of meetings with Really Important People and ask Really Important Questions, and then justify their existence by writing books and papers with dramatic sounding titles like Taiwan Island of Ultra Crisis: Super-Armageddon Annihilation Nuclear Death Match USA versus China 2016, in which they inevitably use the aforementioned polls to justify their conclusions.
Their goal, of course, is to support whichever political ideology their organization represents, or more mundanely, to sell books.
The problem is, China is indeed dangerous, and a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would benefit no one. But when one ignores the reality on the ground and dramatizes the potential for conflict, one contributes to an environment in which misunderstanding is rife and paradoxically increases the potential for conflict.
What people in China, Washington and elsewhere must understand about the nature of Taiwanese "identity" is that, regardless of what people here call themselves, virtually everyone accepts that this society is different from China's. More than 111 years of cultural and physical separation, combined with 61 years of autonomous political development, have created two different societies, regardless of how many traits they share.
A recent survey by the Straits Exchange Foundation indicated how wide this gulf has become. More than 60 percent of respondents said they believed China had malicious intent toward Taiwan. Only 15.8 percent of respondents identified themselves as Chinese, while 16.8 percent consider themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese, and 57.8 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese. One might dispute the exact numbers, but anyone who spends time in Taiwan can see the overall picture is accurate.
Some well-intentioned people (as well as a few opportunists) here and abroad have said that what Taiwan needs is some kind of interim non-aggression pact with China. Others say unification is "inevitable" given economic interdependence with China.
But the first assumes that either (a) Taiwanese are willing to sacrifice their political autonomy, or (b) China is willing to compromise. The second ignores the reality that economic interdependence is not an indicator of political dependence.
Dealing with the "Taiwan Issue" requires accepting reality. The reality is that there are two distinct societies on either side of the Strait. One is free and autonomous and doesn't want to be coerced out of its freedom or autonomy. All other formulations are just window dressing.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,